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A. Guest Editor’s Introduction
– A Time of Consequences

In October 2011 a group of humanist scholars and experts from three different continents met at the Faculty of Humanities in Koper, Slovenia, to discuss some of the most pressing issues of our age – problems, connected with the environment and our ethical stance towards non-human animals. As the title of the conference “Living With Consequences”– chosen by Anton Mlinar and taken from David Orr’s book *Down to the Wire* – suggests, the question faced was not whether we have to deal with environmental problems but rather how to deal with them. The time of skeptical doubt regarding detrimental anthropogenic impact on the natural world has namely passed and the severity of its grave consequences is already felt.

Environmental situation demands urgent action. Why, then, would we want to waste time reflecting on it philosophically? Perhaps the clearest short answer to this question can still be found in Lynn T. White’s seminal paper *Historic Roots of our Ecologic Crisis*, a text from a time when humanist reflection still found its way into *Science*: “Unless we think about fundamentals, our specific measures may produce new backlashes more serious than those they are designed to remedy… More science and more technology are not going to get us out of the present ecologic crisis until we find a new religion, or rethink our old one.”

Indeed, in contemporary life, marked by sophisticated compartmentalization of knowledge and action, ‘fundamentals’ may easily be obscured by overwhelming number of elements in an intricate web of information. Not only that: due to a specific constellation of cultural

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ideas, whether intentional or unintentional, conscious or unconscious, which (speaking in pragmatist sense) guide our actions, a number of truly important interconnections become obnubilated: one of them is certainly a profound and distressing hidden relation between different forms of domination found in Western cultures. Two such forms, covered and extended in various directions in this volume by Nadja Furlan Štante and Emily A. Holmes, are male domination of women and the natural world. As both authors show, thinking about feminism and religion in connection with our environmental crisis yields precisely the thing we are looking for when trying to tackle environmental problems – practical difference.

It seems that information technology is so powerful today that it does not only find its way into most intimate recesses of our being but is also able to kidnap millennia old philosophical disciplines: recently, the power and potential of the word ‘ontology’ has migrated from philosophical debate to computer science where the discipline is used to formally represent knowledge as a set of concepts within a given domain. That there is, however, much to be gained from philosophical questioning of the nature of concepts becomes more than clear when one looks at Mădălina Diaconu’s paper on ‘diversity’. What is, actually, ‘diversity’?; is variety to be cherished because it serves us well or because it is beautiful?; and in which way can it be beautiful? As Diaconu shows, pondering those questions does make a difference, for: “not only we know what we see, but also we have to know in order to see better.”

Not only do we have to know what we do, but we also have to know in order to do better: this is what we could, analogously, say about ethics. And, as Paul Haught shows us, what we know, hear, and tell about the place we live in is of prime importance for each one of us. For we do not occupy empty Cartesian space where directions are interchangeable and bodies dispensable; we dwell in a place infused with meaning and our values are directly connected with its ecological and cultural history.

From places we call our homes we are sometimes displaced. Such a displacement occurred two years ago in the vicinity of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan which malfunctioned after being severely damaged by an earthquake and a tsunami. More than anything else this tragedy raises questions regarding our ever increasing energy
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demand and supply options. However, in her paper about this catastrophe Evelyn Schulz also reflects on its social consequences, on betrayal, mental stress, extreme loneliness, climate of distrust, and suicide that followed as an aftermath of this disaster.

Environmental questions are not the only difficult questions that our non-human surroundings impose on us: in this vein Vojko Strahovnik’s paper opens the last section of Poligrafi with the difficulty of animal question. Engaging with the debate around J. M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals, Strahovnik shows how the animal question cannot be thought of independently of the human question and how, following Diamond, our response to animals depends on a conception of human life. Approaching the animal question in this way turns out to be more radical than thinking about our non-human fellows in terms of animal rights. Strahovnik’s paper is followed by Anton Mlinar’s approach to animal ethics with its evolutionist and neuroscientific spin. While emphasizing the importance of temporality and interconnectedness in ethics, this last contribution also engages the issue of patriarchy, the topic that introduced the present collection of papers.

Through closing the loop of the Living With Consequences 2011 conference Poligrafi issue the indispensability of philosophical reflection of environmental issues should become transparent. Endangered almost to the same extent as the environment, humanities can still convincingly display depth and power of reflection, a thing that makes us human animals.

Tomaž Grušovnik
B. ENVIRONMENT AND...
1. ... F E M I N I S M
BIOTIC INTERDEPENDENCE: FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ECOFEMINIST THEOLOGY

Nadja Furlan Štante

“Human beings are a part of the whole we call the Universe, a small region in time and space. They regard themselves, their ideas and their feelings as separate and apart from all the rest. It is something like an optical illusion in their consciousness. This illusion is a sort of prison; it restricts us to our personal aspirations and limits our affective life to a few people very close to us. Our task should be to free ourselves from this prison, opening up our circle of compassion in order to embrace all living creatures and all of nature in its beauty.”

In line with this thought from Albert Einstein, modern western individualised society is trying to take the next step in the evolution of interpersonal relations and gradually transcend the optical illusion in our consciousness about the radical separateness between all human and nonhuman living beings, between man and nature in the space of life. Interdependence, connectedness and the integral, holistic principle is practically the sales package of contemporariness echoing in the political, economic, as well as religious and social spheres. Everything is mutually dependent and connected … are the slogans of global (western new-age) society looking for new forms of higher-quality relations amidst an economic crisis. The focus is thus the relationship of interdependence.

The purpose of this article is to study the ecofeminist paradigm of the ecological ethics of interdependence of all human and nonhuman living beings, of man and nature in the web of life.

In light of the discrimination and subordination of women and nature by the patriarchal system, ecofeminism critically points out the hierarchical evaluation and construction of certain dualities: culture/nature; male/female; me/other; reason/emotion; human/animal. In line

with ecofeminist theory, nature is dominated by culture, woman by man, emotion by reason, and animals by man. This hierarchical structure of relationships is, according to ecofeminist theory, ordered and created by the patriarchal system. But before we examine in detail the relationship of interdependence between man and nature, let us first take a brief look into the term “ecofeminism.”

What Is Ecofeminism?

Ecological feminism or ecofeminism is a feminist perspective based on the premise that the oppression of women and the exploitation of nature are two interconnected phenomena and two categories that are subjugated and discriminated against by the patriarchal system. Essentially, ecofeminism is based on the premise that what leads to the oppression of women and to the exploitation of nature is one and the same thing: the patriarchal system, dualistic thinking, the system of dominance, global capitalism. The common denominator of all forms of violence is the patriarchal system, understood as a source of violence. Ecofeminism thus experiences the patriarchal system as a conflictual system building on an exploitative hierarchical relationship, unaware of the equality, unity and connectedness of all living beings in the space of life. This is the reason why the patriarchal system is ruining the harmonic connection of man and woman, man and nature … It is a pest with a destructive effect on nature, as well as people.

Ecofeminism emerged in the late 20th century as a great school of philosophical and theological thoughts and social analyses. The legendary founder of ecofeminism is considered to be the French author Françoise D’Eaubonne, who in 1974, with her newly coined term ecofeminism defined the political opinion that women (as a subordinate species in the social order) possess greater potential for actualising the political change that is indispensable for the preservation of life on our planet. In her book *Le Féminisme ou la Mort (Feminism or Death)* D’Eaubonne designated woman as the key agent in the process of ecological revolution. In 1972, Mary Daly adopted this term and integrated it, just like
Christian feminist theologian Rosemary Radford Ruether, into the context of Christian theological ecofeminism.\(^2\)

Considering the huge variety of forms and orientations of ecofeminism\(^3\) it would perhaps be better for us to speak about a plurality of ecofeminisms. Heather Eaton compares this wide diversity of ecofeminisms to “an intersection point of multiple pathways” for “[P]eople come to ecofeminism from many directions and have taken it to other places, disciplines and actions”\(^4\) But regardless of the wide variety of individual types and forms of ecofeminism, which result from the many disciplines and approaches to it (from humanities, social and natural sciences, environmental studies and technology to political activism …), they all have in common the awareness of the fact that it is impossible to solve the ecological issue without at the same time including the feminist question and vice versa. The common element of feminism and ecology is therefore the battle for liberation from the shackles of cultural and economic oppression and exploitation. The connection between the abuse of the natural world and the oppression of women is thus the key and common point of all types of ecofeminism.\(^5\)

Ecofeminism thus sees the basic interconnection between the domination of women and the domination of nature. This connection is displayed in two levels: the ideological-cultural and socioeconomic. The ideological-cultural level is based on the premise or prejudice that women are closer to nature than men, more in tune with their own bodies, the emotional and animal worlds. The socioeconomic level, on the other hand, confines women to the field of reproduction, education and care of children, cooking, cleaning, tidying up – in short, the woman is here confined and limited to the mere household, and her chores are devalued in comparison with the public tasks falling into the domain of men

\(^3\) Heather Eaton divides the different forms of ecofeminism into four models: the ecofeminist model of activism and social movements, the academic ecofeminism model, religious ecofeminism model and global ecofeminism model (see Eaton 2005, p. 23).
and with the power of modern culture. Rosemary Radford Ruether, a pioneer in Christian theological ecofeminism assumes that the first level acts as an ideological basis to the second.\(^6\)

Ecofeminism also touches the spiritual-religious dimension, but assigns it to the field of critical views of a determinate religious tradition and its patriarchal stamp.

In the last decade of the 20\(^{th}\) century in fact, all major world religions started to contend with the possible damage that their traditions had caused to the understanding of the environment, of nature and non-human beings, and began searching in their traditions for positive elements for an ecologically validating spirituality and everyday practice. In their third development phase, feminist theologies expanded their criticism of determinate theologies also in relation to their attitudes towards nature and nonhuman beings. Thus the various ecofeminisms or ecofeminist theologies critically question the correlation between gender hierarchies in an individual religion and culture and the hierarchical establishment of the value of man to be above that of nature. All types of theological ecofeminism thus strive for a deconstruction of the patriarchal paradigm, its hierarchical structure, methodology and thought. They try to deconstruct the entire paradigm of man’s supremacy over woman, of mind over body, Heaven over Earth, of the transcendent over the immanent, of the male God, alienated and ruling over all Creation, and replace all this with new alternatives. All major world religions are in this sense challenged to self-questioning and self-criticism in their judgement of the possible negative patterns that contribute to the destruction of the environment, and to restoring environmentally-friendly traditions. From an ecofeminist and environmentally fair perspective, it is essential that religions do away with the negative stereotyped prejudices which strengthen the domination over nature and social domination.\(^7\) The Christian tradition, for instance, has (from an ecofeminist point of view) contributed several problematic images and symbols that have consolidated and survived in form of stereotypes and

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\(^7\) Radford Ruether, op. cit., p. XI.
BIOTIC INTERDEPENDENCE

prejudices and taken root in the legacy of the western philosophical-religious thought. Ecofeminist Christian theologies thus seek to revive the lost images and the symbol of understanding the universe as the body of God (Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sallie McFague). This used to be a typical metaphor (albeit present in various forms) and the focal image of the sensibility of the western (Mediterranean) world, but was replaced by a mechanistic worldview model in the 17th century (Carol Merchant and Vandana Shiva). In 1972, the radical feminist theologian Mary Daly drew a link between the ecological crisis, social domination and the Christian doctrine. As an antithesis to the Christian ethics of missionary work in the sense of uncompromising Christianising (converting at any cost all pagans, who were considered barbarians) she offered a vision of a cosmic commitment to sisterhood that envelops our sister Earth and all its human and nonhuman inhabitants and elements. That would, in Daly’s opinion, enable a potentially positive change in the ecological awareness and environmental ethics and lead us from the culture of predators and desecrators into a culture of reciprocity, where we would look upon the earth and other planets as individual parts of a whole, as being with us, not for us.8

Some ecofeminist theologians have, in their criticism of patriarchal hierarchical subordination of women and nature, remained with Christianity and offered a vision of Christian woman- and nature-friendly theology that acts as a determined co-shaper of better-quality relations in the web of interdependent life. Other ecofeminist theologians, on the other hand, have come to the realisation that the Christian doctrine is incurably patriarchal and as such incapable of radical reform necessary for an inclusive ethics of responsibility towards all living beings. These have turned towards radical feminism or neo-pagan ecofeminism.

In 1972, theologian Rosemary Radford Ruether lent the first ecofeminist voice within Christianity. Through the eyes of the theology of liberation, or more precisely, from a feminist somatic and ecological perspective, she called attention to the basic dualisms – the origin of which she ascribed to the apocalyptic-Platonic regional legacy of classical Christianity. These include the alienation of the mind from the body; of the

8 Primavesi, op. cit., p. 46.
subjective self from the objective world; the subjective withdrawal and alienation of the individual from the wider human and social network; the domination of the spirit over nature. For Ruether, in order to transcend these dualisms, we should first shape a new self-understanding of our own identity in relation to all other relationships within the web of life. In *New Woman, New Earth* Ruether strongly opposes the model of relations based on the logic of domination, stating:

“(W)omen must see that there can be no liberation for them and no solution to the ecological crisis within a society whose fundamental model of relationships continues to be one of domination of one over another.”

According to Ruether, to transcend this logic of domination over women and nature, (western) society and (Christian) religion should reconstruct at their very foundations. Ruether developed this hypothesis in practically all her later works dealing with ecofeminist topics. She also stressed the need to change the symbols and “reshape our dualistic concept of reality as split between soulless matter and transcendent male consciousness,” and the need to reshape the alienated male-centred image of God from “a (humanly) modelled God constructed after male consciousness and represented as ruling over nature” into “an immanent source of life that sustains the whole planetary community.”

Sallie McFague is another of the various feminist theologians offering a vision of God who supports the equality of women and men, nature and all nonhuman beings. In *The Body of God: An Ecological Theology* she also criticised the legitimated image of God as a distant, superior king reigning and commanding over all Creation. Her criticism is based on two arguments: (1) This image has supposedly contributed considerably to the construction of the concept of dualistic division between the kingdom of God and Earth, and (2) This image is supposed to have robbed humanity of its primary responsibility, which is the concern for nature, the Earth, nonhuman beings … As an alternative, she calls on all Christians to symbolically imagine the entire universe as the body of God instead of viewing God as an external, separate monarch ruling over the world. Or in her words: “It is [more] appropriate to see God as

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In addition to the mentioned transformation of the symbol of God, McFague proposes the Big Bang theory as the focal creation story. This would in her opinion unite the people in the awareness of fundamental interconnectedness and interdependence.

While Rosemary Radford Ruether and Sallie McFague try to reform Christianity, pagan ecofeminists turn to the so-called feminist spirituality, which celebrates and unites women and earth. Cynthia Eller has identified five main characteristics of the different feminist spirituality practices: 1. significantly valuing women’s empowerment; 2. practicing ritual practices and/or magic; 3. revering nature; 4. using the feminine or gender as a primary mode of religious analysis; 5. espousing a revisionist version of Western history favoured by individual movements.

Individual religious feminisms have formed various, their own distinctive models of theological ecofeminism. Judith Plaskow (1993), for instance, has created a vision of Jewish theological ecofeminism, while Johanna Macy (1991) developed a Buddhist ecofeminist perspective centred on the concept of dependent co-arising or mutual causality.

The mentioned common point apart, the various types of ecofeminism offer very different views and perspectives on certain issues. It seems that the greatest dissent among them was caused by the question of the woman/nature connection, or better, the question whether the woman is closer to nature than man due to her ability to bear life.

**Conceptual and Cultural-Symbolic Connection between Women and Nature in Ecofeminism**

Some ecofeminists acknowledge that there is some truth to the ideology of women being closer to nature, but recognise in it traces of a
skewed and distorted belief pushed by a patriarchy which wants to dominate women as well as nature and sets both in an inferior position. It is this very ideology that, according to them, remains firmly rooted in the essential truth claiming that women are more in harmony with nature, more in tune with their own bodies by virtue of their probity and their ability to bear life. From the pagan ecofeminist viewpoint, women are more in harmony with nature and should therefore strive for a life in tune with nature and Earth, for establishing new environmental ethics and ecological spirituality, and for asserting active ecological life practices.15

Still, most ecofeminists reject or oppose the hypothesis of women being more connected with nature due to their ability to give birth and engage in motherhood. They understand the concept of affinity between woman and the natural environment as a social construct naturalising women and feminising nature with the purpose of making them look more similar or cognate. At the same time, owing to the social determination of their position in the field of physical and material support of society, women are more exposed to the exploitation of nature and more aware of it.

The issue of women and their harmony with nature is thus more a question of female experience in a determinate social ideological perception than a question of a different nature when compared to men.16 In the opinion of ecofeminists opposing the myth of substantial female likeness to nature, the domination and exploitation of nature and women by western industrial society is strengthening on account of this very prejudice or myth (of women’s likeness or closeness to nature).

The stereotype of a deeper woman/nature connection and a marked separateness of men from nature in modern western society is one of

15 Radford Ruether, 2005, op. cit., p. 94.
the topics also dealt with by feminist writer Susan Griffin, who in her book *Woman and Nature: The Roaring Inside Her* (1987) problematizes the negative stigmatisation of women, femininity and nature by the western theological and philosophical paradigms. Griffin builds on the stereotyped assumption that men perceive themselves and their identities as markedly separate from nature:

“He says he is not part of this world, that he was set on this world as a stranger. He sets himself apart from woman and nature.”

Griffin also introduces a female interpretation of self-identification with the world, which presupposes a deep interdependency of all (women as well as men) with the Earth, contrasting the male ‘distorted’ idea of their radical separateness from all others and from any other form of life. Griffin concludes with the concept of a fundamental, intuitive understanding of the connectedness of all human and nonhuman living beings within nature’s harmony and the entire web of life:

“I know in this earth, the body of the bird, this pen, this paper, these hands, this tongue speaking, all that I know speaks to me through this earth and I long to tell you, you who are earth too …”

Ecofeminist academic activists Carolyn Merchant and Vandana Shiva represent similar ideas on the female understanding of interconnectedness of everything and everyone in the web of life. In *The Death of Nature* (1980) Merchant advocates the hypothesis about a gradual decline of the image of organically connected cosmos and the cult of virtuous femininity of Mother Earth from the 16th century, since it was replaced by the mechanistic world ethos and the perspective of world and nature. The latter, viewed through the eyes of technological revolution, was to be controlled and dominated by culture and man from then on. Nature is thus completely subjugated by culture; man fully (over)rules nature, the latter only serving him as a means to reach a goal. This new world paradigm has – as Carolyn Merchant wrote – “resulted in the death of nature as a living being and the accelerating exploitation of both human

18 Griffin, op. cit., p. 229.
and natural resources in the name of culture and progress". According to Merchant, the death of nature also reinforced the negative stamp and the negatively stigmatised legacy both on the environment and the social status of women throughout the following history of western society. This is, in her opinion, the very point where the dual concept of understanding nature and woman consolidated: of women as attentive mothers and of nature as wild and untameable. The latter stereotype has prevailed in the technocratic patriarchal culture, which is more comfortable seeing nature (and women) as something that needs to be tamed and restricted at any cost, rather than living in harmony with it and its natural laws.

Vandana Shiva similarly supports the hypothesis of the mechanistic paradigm of understanding the world being the main culprit for the contemporary ecological crisis, degradation of the environment and nature, and asserts that women are the ones to possess the gift and wisdom for living sustainably, in harmony with nature. Shiva thus, somewhat ironically, comments on the development measures and practices of western society. While the women of the Third World have been mastering efficient farming and feeding their families and communities for centuries, the so called green revolution of fertilizers and genetically modified crops instantly turned everything upside down:

“…Forty years of knowledge of agriculture began to be eroded and erased as the green revolution, designed by multinational corporations and western male experts, homogenised nature’s diversity and the diversity of human knowledge on a reductionist pattern of agriculture”.

Carolyn Merchant and Vandana Shiva thus appeal to the integration of women’s voices and wisdom into the paradigm of western science and development practices, as they see in them a counterweight to environmentally-harmful practices and habits.

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Understanding the Interdependency in Ecofeminism

The significance of creation stories or accounts on the beginning of the world is described by Rosemary Radford Ruether as follows:

“Creation stories not only reflect current science, that is, the assumptions about the nature of the world, physical processes, and their relationships; but they are also blueprints for society. They reflect the assumptions about how the divine and the mortal, the mental and the physical, humans and other humans, male and female, humans, plants, animals, land, waters, and stars are related to each other. They both reflect the worldview of the culture and mandate that worldview to its ongoing heirs.”

The Hebrew creation story written in the Old Testament of the Bible (Gn 1:1–2:3) thus describes the making of the cosmos as a seven-day creative process by the great Creator God. One particular characteristic of this text is that God creates with his word and within the time frame of one week. The whole world is thus God’s work. God is not only the regulator of a given matter (chaos), but the creator of all that emerges “out of nothing” (cf. 2 Macc 7:28). The Maker thus first created light. With his word, God invoked light and thereby started regulating the world (cf. Ps 104:2). The separation of light from darkness, day from night, denotes the beginning of time. The separation and denomination are two characteristics of organising the world; the first separation started up time, the following ones shaped space. On the second day, God created the firmament and separated the waters from the sky. On the third day he created dry ground and the earth started producing greenery, plants, grain and fruit trees. On the fourth day, the Maker created the stars, the Sun and the Moon to rule day and night and separate light from darkness. On the fifth day he created fish and birds. On the sixth day he gave life to terrestrial animals and humans. Man is distinguished from animals by the fact that he was created ‘in God’s image.’ He is let to rule over plants, animals, earth … While here (in Gn 1:1–2:3) God only gives man plants for food, he later, after the Flood (in Gen 9:3), explicitly allows him to eat meat. To feed on animals is, according to exegetes, to shed blood, which is in opposition to God’s original plan.

(see note no. 29 in Gn 1). In his creation plan God dedicated plants as the only food for animals, too, which indicates an ideal world without violence; people and animals live together in harmony; violence among people is the beginning of chaos in the Creation (cf. Gn 6:11–12). On the seventh day the divine Creator rested. Work and rest …

From this creation story it is possible to discern the basic model that God conferred to humans, animals and plants. Adam as the first human is the collective caretaker of God’s image, the image of God’s kingdom on earth, ruling all living beings …

This creation story leaves room for discussion in relation to the issue of equivalence or equality between men and women. Although humanity was according to the basic creation plan in Gen 1: 26–27 intended as a united joint entity created in God’s image, later on, the passage Gen 2: 22–23 emphasises male dominance, which is supposed to reflect the image of God’s sovereignty. From the viewpoint of critical exegesis of feminist theologians (Rosemary Radford Ruether, Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza …) the stressing of the male primacy in Gen 1: 26–27 is in the service of advocating the agenda of the patriarchy. Similarly, environmentalists and supporters of the green agenda (ecofeminism, environmental ethics, deep ecology etc.) criticise the idea of the ‘dominion’ over the rest of creation given to Adam in this story. Rosemary Radford Ruether provides her critique of the anthropocentric model of animal, plant and environmental exploitation ensuing Adam’s (human) domination over nature with the following words:

“There is no doubt that the account is anthropocentric. Although created last, the human is the crown of creation, given sovereignty over it. However, an exploitative or destructive rule over earth is certainly not intended. Humans are not given ownership or possession of the earth, which remains “the Lord’s.” God, finally, is the one who possesses the earth as his creation. Humans are given usufruct of it. Their rule is the secondary one of care for it as a royal steward, not as an owner who can do with it what he wills.”

According to this interpretation people should be God’s guardians of nature preventing its exploitation and destruction. Actually, even the word for the first man – Adam (in Hebrew Adamah) means soil and in-

Biotic interdependence indicates the matter from which (so the creation story goes) he was made. The fact that humans share with the other mammals the same kind of warm blood is supposed to be the reason why according to the creation story they would not be allowed to eat meat. All this presupposes a deep interconnectedness between man and earth or nature, as well as man and nonhuman beings.

The understanding of women’s (and human’s) identity in the context of theological ecofeminism is therefore focused along the ethical principle of the fundamental interconnectedness of equal human beings and nature in the web of life. Mercedes Canas describes this fundamental interdependence and interconnectedness like this:

“The life of the earth is an interconnected web, and no privileged hierarchy of the human over nature, justifying its domination, exists. A healthy, balanced ecosystem, which includes human and nonhuman inhabitants, must maintain its equal diversity.”

One of the common characteristics of the various forms of ecofeminism is that they all perceive the patriarchal system as a conflictive system building on a hierarchical relationship and unaware of the unity and connectedness of living beings. From an ecofeminist point of view, the patriarchal system destroys the harmonic connectedness between man and woman, man and nature. It is therefore a pest, with an injurious effect both on nature and women. Ecofeminism thus fights for a new awareness that could teach both sexes to live and operate in coexistence with each other and with nature. Members of Christian theological ecofeminism (Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sallie McFague, Cynthia Eller etc.) draw from the Christian tradition, for which they are convinced that it includes the mentioned concept of oneness and interconnectedness of all God’s creations. The interrelationship between woman and man, humans and nature, should be freed from all forms of violence and subordination, as only in the light of mutual respect and respect for nature can the harmony of God’s love fully come to life. The

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world is in this sense the body of God, whose limbs function in harmony and health.25

The connection between God and the world is represented by various symbols. Some resort to female personifications of nature and the divine (particularly the representatives of pagan ecofeminism or eco-theology), recognising the divine principle in the term Gaia and therefore naming it Goddess, Mother Earth. They see the Creation as one body incorporating different ecosystems; a multitude of diversity united and connected in coexistence and oneness. In such Creation, each woman and each man is first a human, and in the light of equal humanity and interdependent connectedness lie the beauty and greatness of this community that ecofeminists define as biotic community.26

From this standpoint, ecofeminism promotes global movement based on common interests and respect towards diversity as opposed to all forms of domination and violence. The continuation of life on this planet requires, from an ecofeminist point of view, a new understanding of our attitude towards ourselves, our bodies, towards the other, towards nature and nonhuman beings. For the majority of representatives of theological (Christian) ecofeminism this means a thorough study, deconstruction and criticism of androcentric models of theology, particularly in relation to the image of God and his relationship with the entire cosmos. Mere inclusion of the female element into the existing theological agenda is not enough. According to ecofeminists, it is necessary to radically deconstruct the patriarchal theological frame of mind and the hierarchical structure. Ivone Gebara thus says:

“Changing the patriarchal paradigm for an ecofeminist one starts with epistemology, with transforming the way one thinks. Patriarchal epistemology bases itself on eternal unchangeable ‘truths’ that are the presuppositions for knowing what truly ‘is.’ In the Platonic-Aristotelian epistemology that shaped Catholic Christianity, this epistemology takes the form of eternal ideas that exist a priori, of which physical things are pale and partial expressions. Catholicism added to this the hierarchy of revelation over reason; revealed ideas

come directly from God and thus are unchangeable and unquestionable in comparison to ideas derived from reason."27

Gebara’s ecofeminist perspective is revealed in her understanding of the intimate link between feminist ideas and ecology that should, as a consequence, lead the individual not only to the possibility of true equality between men and women and between different cultures, but also open the individual to a different relationship with ourselves, the earth and the entire universe. For Ivone Gebara the personal embodied experience is the central premise for understanding the relationships in the web of life.28

From this perspective the female identity is understood in the context of transcendent interconnectedness with all living beings in the web of life.

Similarly, Rosemary Radford Ruether understands ecological interdependence in the sense of a life-giving web as a pantheistic or transcendentally immanent web of life. This common source in her opinion fuels and maintains a continual renewal of the natural life cycle and at the same time allows and binds us to fight the exploitative forms of hierarchical relationships and strive for the establishment of renewed relations of mutual acknowledgement.29

For ecofeminists, the awareness of the interdependence and interconnectedness of all human and nonhuman beings, nature, environment etc. sets ecocentric egalitarianism as the fundamental and starting point of the ethics of interpersonal relationships.

For Karen J. Warren, the ecofeminist criticism of the patriarchate is contained in the principles of ecology:

“Everything is interconnected with everything else; all parts of an ecosystem have equal value; there is no free lunch; ‘nature knows best’; healthy, balanced ecosystems must maintain diversity; there is unity in diversity.”30

28 The web of life is a quite widespread metaphor originating in ecofeminism and poetically denoting the dynamics of the collective female view of a world of interconnected subjectivity.
A similar ecofeminist thought on the basic reciprocal connectedness and dependence of everyone in the web of life is also advocated by Thomas Berry, who introduced the vision of ecospirituality. Berry understands this connectedness as if “each individual being is supported by every other being in the Earth community. In turn, each being contributes to the well-being of every other being in the community.”

From the standpoint of theological ecofeminism (Ivone Gebara, in particular) the understanding of human identity is ingrained in a prism of viewing the individual in the web of relationships. The individual therefore does not exist outside a relationship. He or she is constituted in and through the relationship. The conclusion is that an individual’s autonomy does not mean exclusion from the web of life. That would be illusory from the point of view of ecofeminism. Here the attempt at separating man from the cosmic entirety does not entail autonomy and individuality, but illusion. The individuality of a human being is understood in the perspective of connectedness of individualities into a whole. A single person as an individual is immersed in this entirety, is part of it and at the same time autonomous. His autonomy should be reflected in reciprocal responsibility and respect for the integrity of an individual, of the other, of the different … Critically, the ethical goal of theological ecofeminism is therefore to improve the quality of relationships.

Into this harmony Ivone Gebara echoes the trinitarian understanding of God. In her interpretation, the concept of Holy Trinity does not translate as a revelation from above that should be understood as an eternal, unquestionable truth, incompatible with the experience of everyday life, but as that which is continually constructed anew through everyday experiences of relations within the web of life, and as such keeps acquiring new looks and new faces.

Conclusion

Within the context of theological ecofeminism the individual’s identity is faced with the model of fundamental interconnection of all beings

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in the web of life. The awareness of the fundamental interconnectedness, of the consequent interdependence and joint responsibility in the ethical-moral sense therefore represents the next step in the evolution of interpersonal relationships and all relations within the web of life. The conceptualization of women’s identity and the identity of an individual in postmodernity, through the perspective of theological ecofeminism, sets, above all, an ethical imperative of responsibility that the awareness of the fundamental interconnection presupposes.

Bibliography

The way we eat represents our most profound engagement with the natural world. Daily, our eating turns nature into culture, transforming the body of the world into our bodies and minds."

"There is nothing to eat, seek it where you will, but the body of the Lord."

The past five years in the United States have seen increased attention to problems in the industrial food system. While Vandana Shiva and Slow Food international have long advocated local control over farming and food production, in the United States it was the 2008 documentary film “Food, Inc.” that caught the attention for the first time of a wide popular audience. The writings of Michael Pollan, Marc Bittman, and Barbara Kingsolver have increased awareness of the high environmental and health costs of the so-called American or Western Diet and the benefits of eating “real food” instead of the processed, industrial, or fast food consumed by the majority of Americans. Today, it is possible to identify the emergence of a broad and inclusive “food movement,” which encompasses topics ranging from ending factory farming; supporting organic, sustainable, and urban agriculture; protecting the food security rights of the developing world; advocating vegetarian, vegan,
and locavore diets; increasing the number of urban farmers markets, Community Supported Agriculture (CSAs), and community gardens; as well as addressing childhood obesity, instituting farm to school lunch programs, and eliminating food deserts so that all people have access to fresh, local, nutritious food.

As the food movement grows and we become increasingly aware of the need to transform the standard American diet, the question arises of how American Christianity fits into this movement. Christians have long been committed to feeding the hungry, following Biblical command, and food charity is an essential ministry of many churches that supplements government benefits for those who suffer from hunger and “food insecurity,” that is, a lack of consistent access to nutritious foods. While the food movement, to be sure, includes the need to feed the hungry and eliminate food insecurity, it also aims far beyond charity to advocate a complete transformation of the food system, away from industrial agriculture and processed foods and toward local food systems. This aim may seem beyond the scope of traditional Christian ministry and mission but it is tied to the fundamental Christian values of social justice and love of neighbor. At the same time, while the food movement has broad and ambitious goals, what it often lacks is a language with which to speak about the sacramental nature of food and the act of eating itself. For food is primarily a relationship, not a commodity, and yet it is easy to forget that relationship—with plants and animals, with the land, and with other people—while living in the midst of the industrialized food system. Here Christian language can help to articulate the symbolic meaning of the food movement, for the central Christian ritual is a shared meal in which our relationship to food, and food itself, is transformed. The Eucharist, and the doctrine of the incarnation in which it is rooted, offers an incipient vision of a transformed relationship to food, in which its sacramental nature is affirmed. This vision, however, must be carefully articulated and expanded in order to avoid reinforcing oppressive aspects of the Christian tradition that have been harmful to the bodies of women, animals, and the land itself.

In what follows, I explore a theological framework that can support the food movement from a specifically Christian perspective. I am particularly interested in how ecofeminist Christology, reflection on the
person of Christ from a feminist and ecological perspective, might contribute to a theology of sustainable and ethical eating practices. The doctrine of the incarnation, that is, the Christian belief that God became enfleshed in the person of Jesus Christ, provides a powerful Christian paradigm for the food movement, one that also creates an avenue for Christian churches to enter and engage fully with this movement. In turn, this doctrine, and the ritual of the Eucharist that it supports, can contribute a sacramental language that affirms the relationship of human bodies to the more-than-human world through the act of eating. But this doctrine has often been oppressive to women and the natural world, and so it must be carefully critiqued and reconstructed in light of contemporary concerns. Engaging the ecofeminist theologies of Sallie McFague and Rosemary Radford Ruether, I suggest that although the doctrine of the incarnation has at times been problematic for Christian views of women and nature, it is richly suggestive for rethinking Christian attitudes toward food and eating, particularly through the ritual of Eucharist. The language of incarnation, thus refined, can help to express the transformed relationship to food advocated by the food movement. At the same time, the incarnation provides Christian churches an avenue into that movement that takes their mission beyond food charity and towards a vision of food justice. I conclude my discussion with a brief consideration of how these theological themes can be put into practice through the pedagogy of service learning at select non-profit organizations working for food justice in Memphis, Tennessee.

Traditional Views of the Incarnation

The incarnation of Christ has been traditionally conceived in both androcentric and anthropocentric terms. The incarnation has been described by Athanasius, Augustine, and Anselm as God’s solution to the problem of human sin. This traditional narrative blames a woman, Eve, for the loss of human freedom; her fault introduced death and the struggle for food into the world.4 Right relations between humans and animals and God, in a garden setting where food was freely available, were

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4 See Gen 3:17–18.
disrupted by sin. For the church fathers, this fault lived on in every woman, as Tertullian preached to the women in his community: “And do you not know that you are (each) an Eve? The sentence of God on this sex of yours lives in this age: the guilt must of necessity live too. You are the devil’s gateway…. On account of your desert—that is, death—even the Son of God had to die.”\(^5\) In this view, the incarnation was a one-time event necessary to reverse the fault of Eve: Christ became the “new Adam” to renew the image of God in humanity by overcoming sin and death. An androcentric social context in which men were thought to be the ideal form of humanity assumed the necessity of Christ’s maleness. Although Jesus was a man, the Church fathers reasoned, women were included in salvation because Jesus, as a perfect human male, included women in his humanity.\(^6\)

This traditional narrative of the incarnation is also anthropocentric, however, in that the primary concern is with human sin and salvation. Although Genesis describes the disordering of right relations between human beings and the natural world, that concern was rarely translated into Christian theological interpretations of sin. Instead, the logic of domination—of human beings over nature, of men over women—was taken to be the natural order of creation, ordained by God, as a result of Gen 1:28: “God blessed them and God said to them, ‘Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth.’” One result of this logic has been a world-denying asceticism, especially evident in the first centuries of Christianity, that sees the world as fallen and subject to human domination. Consequently, Christians have frequently denied the pleasures of the body and the temptations of the world in order to await the return of Christ, or they have pointed to the opening chapters of Genesis to justify the exploitation and subjection of women and nature. In the denial and domination of the world, the goodness of creation and the human body have often been forgotten.

\(^5\) Tertullian (c.160-c.225), On the Apparel of Women, I.1

Ecofeminist Theology: Sallie McFague

Feminist theologians over the past thirty years have raised a variety of critiques of this traditional narrative of the incarnation. Sallie McFague, for instance, challenges the idea of Christ as the unique savior in a multireligious and modern scientific world: “In its traditional form the claim [of the uniqueness of Christ] is not only offensive to the integrity and value of other religions, but incredible, indeed, absurd, in light of postmodern cosmology. It is not remotely compatible with our current picture of the universe.” She also points to the surprisingly negative effect that the doctrine of the incarnation has had on actual human and natural bodies. While focusing all its attention on the uniquely salvific male body of Christ, “Christianity has denied, subjugated, and at times despised the body, especially female human bodies and bodies in the natural world.”

In contrast she proposes shifting Christian attention away from the effects of Genesis 1–3 and towards the words of the gospel of John—“The Word became flesh and lived among us”—to interpret the incarnation as the embodiment of God. For her, the incarnation is not just the divine response to human sin, but instead provides a new model of the God-universe relationship in creation. Rather than a king who is sovereign over his creation, God is immanent in the universe, making the natural world itself “the body of God.” McFague further specifies this model through what she calls “the Christic paradigm,” that is, the body of Christ. The Christic paradigm makes the story of Jesus paradigmatic for understanding God’s relationship to creation through two related Christological moves. On the one hand, she preserves the particularity of the historical Jesus by making his life and death paradigmatic for Christian understanding of God’s love and ethical practice.

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9 John 1:14 (NRSV).
11 As McFague rejects the traditional narrative of the incarnation, she proposes a constructive theological view that both “relativize[s] the incarnation in relation to Jesus… and maximize[s] it in relation to the cosmos.” (McFague, *The Body of God*, p. 162)
On the other hand, she extends the incarnation to include the cosmos as sacrament or body of God. Let us briefly consider these theological gestures separately.

The story of Jesus is paradigmatic for a Christian understanding of how God is present in creation.\(^\text{12}\) Just as Jesus practiced inclusive love for all, but in particular for the “oppressed, the outcast, the vulnerable,”\(^\text{13}\) God’s love for creation extends beyond humanity to nature in all its rich diversity, which McFague calls “the new poor”\(^\text{14}\)—poor due to human exploitation, domination, and neglect. In this way, McFague extends feminist liberation theology in the direction of ecological concern. The story of Jesus is also paradigmatic, however, in his parables, which overturn oppressive, dualistic hierarchies; in his ministry, in which bodies are healed and fed; and in his table fellowship, eating with others across social classes, all of which demonstrate care for bodily needs.\(^\text{15}\) McFague draws attention here, first, to the way in which food, the basic support of life, is always shared by Jesus and his disciples, and second, the way food functions as a metaphor to signify the satisfaction of deepest spiritual hunger.\(^\text{16}\)

Her second Christological gesture is to extend the incarnation from the historical body of Jesus to the entire cosmos. As McFague writes, “The resurrected Christ is the cosmic Christ, the Christ freed from the body of Jesus of Nazareth, to be present in and to all bodies.”\(^\text{17}\) In oth-

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\(^\text{12}\) Although I do not have the space to discuss it here, an important aspect of McFague’s discussion is the place of the cross and God’s response to suffering—both human and non-human—in creation. Her Christic paradigm for the world as God’s body demands the way of the cross, that is, suffering in solidarity with those who suffer, and advocating for their liberation, as signified by the resurrection. She writes, “In both forms of Christian solidarity with the oppressed, the active and the passive, liberation and suffering, the cross and resurrection of the Christic paradigm are central to an embodiment theology.” \(\text{The Body of God, p. 173.}\)


\(^\text{17}\) “The New Testament appearance stories attest to the continuing empowerment of the Christic paradigm in the world: the liberating, inclusive love of God for all is alive in and through the entire cosmos.” \(\text{McFague, \textit{The Body of God, p. 179.}}\)
er words, “the power of God is incarnate throughout the world.”18 The image of the Cosmic Christ means that salvation is not separated temporally or sequentially from creation as an otherworldly remedy for a fallen world; rather salvation takes place in creation, and creation always tends toward salvation. Incarnation was always the means of God’s revelation of divine love, both in the historical Jesus and in all of creation.19

Another way of talking about the presence of the incarnation in creation is through the notion of sacrament. The idea of the world as sacrament, mediating God’s grace through the order and beauty of nature, has long been a part of the Christian tradition, and Christian sacramentalism is rooted in the incarnation.20 McFague worries that a sacramental view of nature has often viewed the world in instrumental terms, however, as a path to spiritual insight with primarily symbolic value for human beings instead of intrinsic value.21 In response, she suggests that we focus “not on the use of all earthly bodies but on our care of them.”22

But simply advocating care for earthly bodies rather than their use seems a weak suggestion after McFague’s powerful discussion of the Christic paradigm and the Cosmic Christ. Viewing the world as sacrament is hardly a crass instrumentalism, nor is care for earthly bodies of plants, animals, and humans an alternative to sacramentalism.23 Rather,

23 For instance, in her reflections on food, she rhetorically opposes its literal and sacramental significance, advocating for more emphasis on the former in our time. Food, she writes, is “an appropriate and powerful symbol of both bare existence as well as the abundant life. In the Christian tradition food has always served these dual functions, though the emphasis has often been on the latter meaning, especially in the eucharist as a foretaste of the eschatological banquet. But in our time, the value of food is precisely its literal meaning: sustainability for bodies, especially the many bodies on our planet that Christians as well as others in our society think of as superfluous. In a telling reversal of the need of all bodies for food, many people assume that other creatures not only do not deserve food but are themselves only food—food for us.” McFague, *The Body of God*, p. 189. To my view, however, these dual functions are not opposed (and that dualistic thinking is the legacy of the logic of domination); instead, the symbolic and sacramental significance derives directly from the role of food in sustaining our bodies and in linking us to the larger ecosystem of which we are a part. Our practices—our sacraments and rituals—need to help us remember our food with gratitude, without losing its symbolic significance. See also Wendell Berry’s poem, “Prayer after Eating,” in which food is at once sacramental
it follows directly from Christian belief in the incarnation and in Jesus’ own practices. If the world, as McFague argues, is in fact God’s body, revealed through the incarnation in the historical Jesus, and extended through the cosmos through resurrection and sacrament, then it should be treated as such, with reverence and care.24

In sum, Sallie McFague interprets the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ to indicate 1) the importance of the body; an embodied feminist theology insists on the value and needs of bodies; 2) God is with us in the flesh because God takes on a body in the incarnation; 3) Jesus’ historical practices of teaching, healing, and eating are paradigmatic for the way God cares for creation; and 4) the incarnation extends from the body of Jesus through the resurrection to the entire cosmos, which can be seen as sacrament with both symbolic and intrinsic value. I now turn to a second prominent Christian ecofeminist theologian, Rosemary Radford Ruether.

Ecofeminist Theology: Rosemary Radford Ruether

One of the earliest feminist critics of traditional Christology for its androcentric bias, Rosemary Radford Ruether offers a sophisticated and historically nuanced critique, while recovering submerged strands of Christology in light of contemporary concerns. Like Elizabeth Johnson’s writings on Christ as the embodiment of Wisdom-Sophia,25 Ruether’s Christology draws on the Biblical figure of divine Wisdom in the Hebrew Bible, which functions theologically in identical ways to the Logos or Son of God in the Christian Testament. This female symbol for the divine figure that became incarnate in Jesus is found in the writings of the church fathers, although it was ultimately neglected in favor of Logos or Son Christologies. For that reason, “the unwarranted idea develops that there is a necessary ontological connection between


24 Although, it should be noted, McFague does not discuss concrete practices in detail that might help us transform the way Christians view the world.

the maleness of Jesus’ historical person and the maleness of Logos as the male offspring and disclosure of a male God.”

Ruether is highly critical of classical forms of Christology that emphasize Jesus’ generic humanity. Indeed, she rejects any Christology that identifies “the maleness of the historical Jesus with normative humanity and with the maleness of the divine Logos” for excluding women as representatives of Christ. Like McFague, she turns to the Jesus of the synoptic gospels and his prophetic message and inclusive praxis. Here she finds Jesus as a liberator and iconoclast who uproots relationships based on domination. “What is paradigmatic about Jesus,” she writes, is not his maleness, “but rather his person as lived message and practice. Jesus becomes paradigmatic by embodying a certain message. That message is good news to the poor, a confrontation with systems of religion and society that incarnate oppressive privilege, and affirmation of the despised as loved and liberated by God.”

Jesus’ maleness has no ultimate significance theologically; it is his message of liberation that matters and that makes him a paradigm for humanity. Ruether expands this paradigm by turning to the divine figure who exceeds the historical Jesus, that is, the Christ, the figure of redemptive, liberated humanity. The resurrected Christ, “as redemptive

26 Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), 117. See also p. 126: “The male alone is the normative or generic sex of the human species; only the male represents the fullness of human nature, whereas woman is defective physically, morally, and mentally. It follows that the incarnation of the Logos of God into a male is not a historical accident but an ontological necessity. Just as Christ has to be incarnated in a male, so only can the male represent Christ.” See further Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, pt. 1, q. 92, art. 2; q. 99, art. 2; pt. 3, supp. q. 39.1 (and pt.3, q.31, art. 4).
27 As well as for its soteriological exclusivism in a multireligious world. (Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, pp. 134–35).
28 “His ability to speak as liberator does not reside in his maleness but in the fact that he has renounced this system of domination and seeks to embody in his person the new humanity of service and mutual empowerment.” (Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 137).
29 Ruether, Introducing Redemption, p. 93.
30 Although it does have “social symbolic significance” in patriarchal societies precisely because of his rejection, as a male, of systems of domination and privilege. “In this sense Jesus as the Christ, the representative of liberated humanity and the liberating Word of God, manifests the kenosis of patriarchy, the announcement of the new humanity through a lifestyle that discards hierarchical caste privilege and speaks on behalf of the lowly.” (Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 137).
person and Word of God, is not to be encapsulated ‘once-for-all’ in the historical Jesus. The Christian community continues Christ’s identity [and] redemptive humanity goes ahead of us, calling us to yet incomplete dimensions of human liberation.”

In this inclusive vision, human beings have the potential to embody Christ by embodying his message of liberating social praxis.

In Ruether’s later, more explicitly ecofeminist work, she considers, like McFague, the figure of the Cosmic Christ in the context of the sacramental tradition. Christian sacramentalism sees Christ as “both creator and redeemer of the cosmos, and not just of human beings.”

In this tradition, Christ as the Logos is the principle through which the world was created as well as the power of new creation, renewing and reconciling the entire cosmos with God.

For the second-century church father Irenaeus, in his battles with world-disparaging Gnostic Christians, “creation is itself an incarnation of the Word and Spirit of God, as the ontological Christ is the renewal of this divine power underlying creation. In the incarnation divine power permeates bodily nature in a yet deeper way, so that the bodily becomes the sacramental bearer of the divine, and the divine deifies the bodily.” This notion of the cosmic Christ is taken up by several more recent thinkers such as Teilhard de Chardin and Matthew Fox, who also see Christ as the direction or fulfillment of creation, although this notion is not without its problems.

Ruether herself critiques aspects of the cosmic Christ for its seeming denial of mortality, in its ancient form, and of materiality and equality, in

31 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 138. She expands more fully on this point in a later essay: “While Jesus is the foundational representative of this way of the cross and liberation, he is not its exclusive possibility. Each Christian must also take up this same way and, in so doing become ‘other Christs’ to one another. The church becomes redemptive community, not by passively receiving redemption ‘won’ by Christ alone, but rather by collectively embodying this path of liberation in a way that transforms people and social systems.” (Ruether, Introducing Redemption, p. 93). In addition, the way of Christ is not exclusive of other ways.


33 In this sacramental view of the cosmic Christ, salvation is not at all otherworldly. Rather, the “culmination of this process of...reconciliation of the cosmos with God, is, as Paul puts it in 1 Corinthians 12:25, ‘So that God may be all in all.’” Ruether, Gaia and God, p. 233.

34 Ruether, Gaia and God, p. 235.
its modern form. In contrast, her Christology emphasizes the prophetic message and praxis of the Jesus of the gospels and the on-going liberation of humanity through the resurrected Christ, who is met wherever the struggle for liberation takes place.

Ruether’s ecological theology at times seems disconnected from her Christology.35 *Gaia and God*, for instance, focuses largely on the doctrine of creation, with surprisingly little reference to Christ. While creation is the logical starting place for ecofeminist theology, it seems to me that Ruether misses some of the radical potential of the incarnation. McFague does a somewhat better job of incorporating the incarnation, and Christology generally, into her ecofeminist theology because Christ provides the paradigm for her description of the cosmos as “the Body of God.” However, in maximalizing the incarnation to include the entire cosmos, McFague risks glossing over the significance of Jesus’ particular, historical body too quickly and, in the process, eliding the negative effect his masculinity has had on the position of women in Christianity. That is, while she draws attention to his inclusive practices, I wonder if she is too quick to invoke a cosmic incarnation without addressing the particularities of his body and especially how female bodies might also be seen as incarnations of the divine.36

From the Body of Christ to Christian Bodies

These brief criticisms aside, what do these thinkers identify in the incarnation that can support and inspire Christians in the food movement working toward food justice and ethical practices of eating? As I see it, there are at least three implications in eco-feminist theology for Christian attitudes toward food and eating. First, the doctrine of the incarnation as articulated in ecofeminist perspective draws our attention

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35 Her eco-theology outlines three important premises, none of which relates directly to Christ or the incarnation: “An ecological spirituality needs to be built on three premises: the transience of selves, the living interdependency of all things, and the value of the personal in communion.” (Ruether, *Gaia and God*, p. 251).

to Jesus’ historical body and his embodied practices of healing, feeding, and table fellowship with those on the margins of society. Tax collectors and prostitutes, Pharisees and Roman centurions: Jesus ate with everyone, overturning the social rules of commensality. Sallie McFague takes these practices to indicate concern and respect for human bodies that hunger. In the New Testament, food is not just a metaphor for the fullness of life; it is a basic need that Jesus addressed by feeding and eating with others. These practices make Jesus’ historical body paradigmatic for understanding how God relates to the world and all the bodies in it. God wants bodies to be nourished.

Second, Ruether identifies Christ as the incarnation of divine Wisdom, who orders all of nature (not just the human part of it) and desires the flourishing of all creatures. In McFague’s panentheist terms, the incarnation is paradigmatic of the model of the universe as “the body of God” in which redemption is not separated from creation nor limited to human beings. When we look to the cosmic Christ, the presence of divine Wisdom or Logos incarnate in the cosmos, we begin to see the world as sacrament: everything that is, reveals God’s presence; everything that is, is part of God’s Body. What this means in practical terms is that everything we eat is potentially Eucharist. The body and blood of Christ are given to us in the gift of the food we eat. In the American industrialized and processed food system, however, it is difficult if not impossible to recognize the sacramental nature of food. Essayist Fred Bahnson speculates that “we have impoverished food lives precisely because we have impoverished sacramental lives.” But a sacramental worldview, rooted in the incarnation of the cosmic Christ, can help renew an appreciation of the gift of food as the body of Christ. A sacramental worldview has the additional benefit of attributing both rela-

37 I find the Trikaya doctrine of Buddhism helpful for understanding the different “bodies” of Christ. Like the Buddha, Christ has multiple bodies: a historical body, which was born of Mary, suffered, died on the cross; a mysterious resurrected or spiritual body, which was able to pass through walls, retained the scars of his suffering, and ate fish and bread; and a cosmic body, the Wisdom/Sophia or the Word/Logos that is incarnate in the cosmos. In addition, we find the body of Christ in the Eucharist and in the church. Making distinctions among these different “bodies” allows us to understand nuances within the doctrine of the incarnation.

tional and intrinsic value to creation: it is both the source of food given “for us” and the incarnation of Christ in itself.\textsuperscript{39}

The third implication of the doctrine of the incarnation is the value it places on all bodies as sites of divine revelation. In contrast to the Gnostic denigration of bodies and matter as well as the dualistic logic of domination that too frequently appears in Christian thought (spirit over matter, soul over body, male over female, God over creation, grace over nature, etc.), the incarnation reveals these oppositions to be both artificial and pathological. The incarnation overturns any opposition between Word and flesh, between the divinity and humanity of Christ. These are both essential for the Christian view of salvation: flesh is where God is revealed, making all bodies potentially divine.\textsuperscript{40}

Like Ruether, many feminist theologians extend the incarnation to other bodies who become Christ by embodying liberation within Christian redemptive community.\textsuperscript{41} The effect is an inclusive understanding of the incarnation, which means “that Christ can take on the face of every person and group and their diverse liberation struggles. We must be able to encounter Christ as black, as Asian, as Aboriginal, as woman,”\textsuperscript{42} and, I would add, as plant and animal, too. Christ is incarnate wherever liberation is practiced just as Christ is hidden in the face of those who hunger and thirst.\textsuperscript{43} The incarnation extends to the bodies of others—both those who suffer and those who come to their aid—through practices of care. As McFague notes, the distinctively Christian view of the world as God’s body emphasizes God’s solidarity with the oppressed, revealed

\textsuperscript{39} One way to address this disconnection is to supplement sacramentalism with a theory of intrinsic value, so that plants, animals, and ecosystems are not reducible to “food for us.” See McFague, \textit{The Body of God}, p. 189, as well as her critique of sacramentalism, pp. 183–185.


\textsuperscript{42} Ruether, \textit{Introducing Redemption}, p. 94.

\textsuperscript{43} Matt 25:31–46.
in the suffering body of Christ. Human beings are invited to live into the incarnation through ethical and spiritual practices that attend to the beauty and vulnerability of bodies that suffer.

Principal among these are practices surrounding food and its environmental impact through production, distribution, consumption, and disposal. Ecofeminist Christologies and the doctrine of the incarnation invite a reconsideration of Christian eating practices through the paradigm of the body of Christ extended to other bodies and the body of the world. In light of the incarnation, food appears as sustenance, relationship, and metaphor all at once, paradigmatically present in the central Christian ritual of the Eucharistic meal in which Christ’s body is distributed and consumed.

Christian Eating Practices

At the most basic level, food meets the body’s need for nourishment: along with air, water, clothing, and shelter, food is basic to life’s needs. But food is always so much more than satisfying hunger. As Michael Pollan notes in the epigraph above, the “way we eat represents our most profound engagement with the natural world. Daily, our eating turns nature into culture, transforming the body of the world into our bodies and minds.” Although the industrial food system treats food primarily as a commodity exchanged for profit, it is more accurately viewed as a relationship. Like Jesus’ radical practice of table fellowship, food crosses boundaries: between dirt, plants, animals, people, and God. Food as relationship sustains the weblike connections of an ecosystem, moving nutrients up and down the food chain. Like Jesus’ table fellowship, it

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46 Cf. Vandana Shiva, who writes, “In India we deeply believe that this amazing universe, this amazing planet, this amazing earth is connected through the web of food, the web of life. Food—everything is food, everything that eats that food is someone else’s food. That’s what connects us, we are food: we eat food, we are made of food, and our first identity, our first wealth, our first health, comes from the making, creating, giving of good food. In India we have an Upanishad that says, ‘If you give bad food you sin.’ The highest karma is the production of food in abundance and the giving of good food in generosity.” Shiva, “For the Freedom of Food,” in *Manifestos*, pp. 35–36.
reveals the artificiality of our social boundaries and systems of domination, instead disclosing our profound interdependence.

From this basic level of meaning as both nourishment and relationship, food emerges as a powerful metaphor. In Christian teaching, food is a metaphor of salvation in the form of abundant life, signaled time and again in the life of Jesus the Christ who became food. The infant Jesus is placed in a manger—a place for feeding animals. Jesus describes himself as the “bread of life” (John 6). He dies, according to the rule of ancient Temple sacrifice, so that we can eat him. He appears to his disciples after the resurrection and proves he is not a ghost by asking for and consuming food (Luke 24:41–43). Food is also the metaphor of the redemption of the world in the form of the eschatological banquet, in which all are gathered to feast together, including different species who set aside their predatory nature to eat food that can be shared by all. These earthly images for heavenly life mean that food always functions for Christians as more than basic sustenance: it is the promise of life abundant.

These metaphorical aspects of food are intimately connected to the Eucharistic meal, the central Christian ritual of consuming the body of Christ in the form of bread and wine. Through participation in the Eucharist, Christians implicitly recognize the sacramental power of food to transform the bodies who consume it. But the challenge is extending this recognition to all meals and to all bodies: to find Christ in a meal, in the land that produces, and in the face of those who hunger. This sacramental worldview requires training our senses to perceive the world in a new way, as nothing “but the body of the Lord,” in the words of the poet in the epigraph above. Christian ethical and spiritual practices can assist in the discipline of training our awareness to attend to the

47 See Farley, Gathering, pp. 189–190.
49 See McFague, The Body of God, p. 189; and Isaiah 11.
50 See S. McFague, Life Abundant: Rethinking Theology and Economy for a Planet in Peril, Fortress, Minneapolis, MN 2000. See also Matt 25, in which the Son of Man appears in those who hunger and thirst.
sacramental significance of the food we eat. But these practices must be taught and embodied in order to transform our awareness of food. I now turn to ways of putting the theology of incarnation into practice in the classroom through a pedagogy of service learning.

Teaching Sustainable Food Practices

Over the past few years, I have developed a course on “The Spirituality and Ethics of Eating” in which I try to connect the issues addressed by the food movement with the Christian language of incarnation and Eucharist. The aim is for students to explore the symbolic meaning of food in conjunction with difficult ethical issues of hunger, health, agriculture, and social justice. The students and I attempt to put the theories of the course into practice both in our personal eating habits and in our service to others. While students read authors such as Wendell Berry, Michael Pollan, and Barbara Kingsolver, the heart of the course is highly local as we examine the way the food movement is developing in our local environment of Memphis, Tennessee. To that end, a central pedagogical aspect of the course is service learning, an embodied and practical form of education in which students learn and reflect on the material of the course through their service to others. Students are asked to volunteer at non-profit organizations (NGOs) in and around Memphis that are connected to the food movement, at places such as soup kitchens, community gardens, food pantries, urban farms, and farmer’s markets. This hands-on, practical, and embodied form of education—growing, preparing, eating, and serving food to others—teaches students directly the value of sustainable farming practices, eating real food, and ending hunger and food insecurity. Connected to these practices is the theological and more theoretical side of the course: the presence of the body of Christ in the bodies of the hungry, in the food we eat, and in the land on which it is grown. All bodies desire and deserve locally and sustain-

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ably grown real food, and the aim of the course is to connect that thesis with both theological theory and concrete ethical and spiritual practice.

Memphis suffers from an extraordinarily high poverty rate. Nineteen percent of the population lives in poverty, making Memphis the poorest city in America.\(^52\) It is also the “hunger capital of the country, with 26 percent of people … reporting an inability to afford food for their families in the last 12 months.”\(^53\) Many of the poor in Memphis live in “food deserts,” that is, areas with limited access to nutritious food. A number of organizations in Memphis are working hard to overcome these problems, and many of them are religiously motivated, although their incarnational theology is frequently implicit rather than an explicit part of their mission.

One such organization is the Church Health Center, founded by physician and Methodist minister Dr. Scott Morris in 1987 “to provide quality, affordable healthcare for working, uninsured people and their families.”\(^54\) Their ministry includes a robust wellness program, with a fitness facility, nutrition education, and cooking classes, as well as a weekly farmer’s market in the parking lot, making real food easily accessible to the working poor. The Church Health Center puts into practice an expansive vision of salvation in which the care of bodies is just as important as the care of souls.\(^55\) Students who are particularly interested in the medical professions can volunteer or intern with health, wellness, and nutrition programs offered by the Center.

Farmers’ markets have proliferated around Memphis in the last five years, with fourteen different markets now open.\(^56\) Two of these are located in food deserts, low-income neighborhoods that lack access to a


grocery store within a one-mile radius.\textsuperscript{57} One of the markets operates in a church parking lot because the mission of First Congregational Church is to care for bodies as well as spirits. This church also runs a program called “Food for Families,” distributing donated and purchased items from the Memphis Food Bank as well as produce from the market and day-old baked goods to families in need once per month. This ministry is a form of the ancient practice of gleaning, avoiding food waste by redistributing food to the needy that would otherwise be discarded. What makes Food for Families different from traditional soup kitchens is that guests choose what they want from a wide selection of donated food, preserving both dignity and agency. Students can volunteer or intern with this ministry by receiving, gleaning, organizing, and distributing food directly to those in need.

Two further organizations with which students frequently volunteer both focus on developing sustainable urban agriculture: GrowMemphis, formerly operated by the Midsouth Peace and Justice Center but now an independent organization,\textsuperscript{58} and Urban Farms, originally a project of Christ United Methodist Church and the Binghampton Development Corporation.\textsuperscript{59} GrowMemphis “fosters the creation of robust community food systems that eliminate hunger, promote health, and further social justice” and has founded twenty-four community gardens in neighborhoods, schools, and places of worship. In addition, GrowMemphis advocates for better food policy and revision of local and state laws to increase access to local, nutritious foods in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods. Urban Farms aims to “improve access to healthy food” sustainably through “local, natural food sourcing and accessible food distribution” by means of a three-acre farm in the heart of the city and a community market at which locally sourced food and food grown on the farm can be sold. Both organizations practice sustainable, organic agriculture.

\textsuperscript{57} The Urban Farms Market and The South Memphis Farmers Market (http://somefm.org/ accessed December 3, 2012).
My students serve at all of these institutions and more, including traditional soup kitchens, food pantries, and in the community garden on our university campus, founded by the student social justice committee four years ago. For many students, getting their hands dirty is a transformative experience, like the student who wrote, “The garden allowed me to gain practical knowledge related to the issues studied in this course and showed me that even a small group of young adults can make a difference…. Working in the garden was difficult… I’m not a nature person by any means; but I loved every minute of the itchy grass and dirt under my nails because it allowed me to become one with God’s creation,” or the one who reflected on her experience at a soup kitchen, “It was amazing to see God’s grace at work. I do not believe I have ever experienced so many extraordinary emotions while helping others. I felt love for everyone that came through the door, and I felt the presence of God in everything I did.” As their teacher, I see service learning, an embodied form of practical education, as a way of directly teaching what the incarnation is all about: the beauty and vulnerability of the human body and our relationship to local ecosystems, plants, animals, and people through the just growth, distribution, and consumption of real food. Participation in this form of education emulates Jesus’ own practices of feeding and eating with others, and thereby connects students to the body of Christ. A pedagogy of service learning with respect to food additionally allows Christians a spiritual avenue into the ethical issues addressed by the food movement because it recognizes that food carries meaning far beyond nutrition: in the words of Michael Pollan in support of commensality, “Food isn’t just fuel; it’s about communion.” An incarnational perspective, informed by ecofeminist theology, has the power to translate the ethical concerns of the food movement into the sacramental language of the church, which, if it looks hard enough, can

60 Christopher Peterson, “A Semester in Food Life,” Belltower (Spring 2011), 31–33.
find Christ present in the land, in the food, in the bodies of the hungry, and in the gestures of those who serve them.

Bibliography

2. ...Ethical Ontology
DIVERSITY
AS A MORAL IMPERATIVE
AND AESTHETIC VALUE

Mădălina Diaconu

The concept of biodiversity was introduced in the mid 1980s as symptom of a crisis, after empirical studies had demonstrated the significant decline in the number of species during the last decades and prognosticated the acceleration of this process. The biodiversity loss is the result of a complex social dynamics, which includes the large-scale destruction of the natural habitats of species in order to make room for more efficient systems of production, the intensification of the land use, the demographic explosion, the increased volume of consumption, the mass tourism, and the introduction of exotic species.

Usually understood as species diversity, the concept of biodiversity refers to the total sum of biotic variation, ranging from genes to populations, species, and biotic communities, and it can be therefore investigated within a species, in inter-species relations, and in ecosystems. At all these levels, diversity is considered an objective fact. The biodiversity studies deal with genetic, taxonomical and systematical aspects. Still open questions concern the definition of the species in biology and taxonomic criteria, the function of diversity within an ecosystem, the

quantification of diversity, i.e. the real number of existing species, as well as the identification of the vital species within an ecosystem.

Given that a similar loss of diversity was remarked also in the field of cultural and linguistic communities, the concept of biodiversity was extended in the 1990s to the biocultural diversity. The latter was proclaimed at the International Conference on Biological and Cultural Diversity (Montreal 2010) as the key for the sustainable development of environment and society. Mapping methods indicate that the hot spots of biological and linguistic diversity are largely overlapping, the top 25 countries for both endemic vertebrates and endemic languages being concentrated in the South Eastern Asia, Central Africa, Canada, and Russia. This provided the basis for the hypothesis about the isomorphism and coevolution between biodiversity and cultural-linguistic diversity. However, cultural anthropologists regard this model skeptically, because it entails the imminent danger of falling into a biological determinism and it is based upon a reductionist (language-centred) concept of culture. Last, but not least, postcolonial scholars regard the objective biodiversity loss as the epiphenomenon of deeper anchored general values and of the “monocultures of the mind,” which are specific for the Western modern lifeworld.

From a philosophical viewpoint it is worth mentioning that some conservation biologists call themselves for unraveling the philosophical presuppositions of biodiversity. Also the environmental ethics emphasizes the possibility of a philosophical argumentation in favour of bio-

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5 The Mega-Diversity List ranked Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, India, Australia, Mexico, Brazil, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Philippines, USA, Malaysia, China, Peru, and Colombia as the countries with the highest level of both biodiversity and cultural diversity (David Harmon and Luisa Maffi, “Are Linguistic and Biological Diversity Linked?”, *Conservation Biology in Practice*, Winter 2002, vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 2–3).
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diversity and the necessity of “a philosophical analysis of rarity.” The philosophical assumptions of the discourses on biocultural diversity refer not only to the concepts of identity and difference, which underlie any taxonomy, but also to the relationship between culture and nature. As a matter of fact, the environmental philosophy focuses on the ethical argumentation in favour of the species preservation, and pays less attention to the concept of diversity as such (or to complexity, which is linked to it), as Holmes Rolston III or David Harmon do, who regard the conservation of diversity as a moral imperative. Nevertheless, diversity is often emphasised as a positive characteristic of ecosystems in the ethics of Aldo Leopold, Baird Callicott, and Arne Naess, and is implicit in the discourses about the necessity of protecting endangered species, as well.

We argue that, apart from the ethical implications of the movement for environmental conservation and restoration, the defense of biodiversity is based also on latent aesthetic presuppositions, which have been however less been subject to theoretical consideration so far in the context of the biodiversity. Useful for such an aesthetic approach to biodiversity is the recent literature which emphasises the impossibility of separating aesthetic from moral issues in the evaluation of nature, discusses the concepts of aesthetic character and aesthetic integrity in the

10 Rolston III, op. cit., pp. 50 and 54.
environmental conservation,\textsuperscript{15} and even condemns the human restoration of nature as a fake.\textsuperscript{16} In addition to these, the question has to be raised whether the “science-based” or the “non-science based models” of the aesthetic appreciation of nature would be more appropriate to endorse the plea for the protection of biodiversity. Finally, the issues of biodiversity and especially of biocultural diversity would have to be related to the attempts to develop an integrated approach for natural and built environments, in form of a general ethics.

What is (bio)diversity?

A philosophical analysis of the studies about biodiversity emphasizes that these use the concept of ‘diversity’ in its modern narrow sense of ‘plurality’ and ‘qualitative variety’ (unlikeness in nature or qualities), that is, as the opposite of the concept of ‘homogeneity’ (likeness). A comparison of this current concept in biology with its philosophical interpretations throughout the history may therefore be useful in order to highlight implicit assumptions of the contemporary theories about biodiversity. Such a comparison can be only briefly outlined here.

In the history of philosophy, diversity (Greek: ετερότης, Latin: ‘diversitas’, German: ‘Verschiedenheit’, ‘Vielfalt’) was in general conceived as contrary to ‘identity’ (‘Identität’) and ‘sameness’/‘similarity’ (‘Gleichheit’/‘Ähnlichkeit’).\textsuperscript{17} Let us consider three moments in the conceptualisation of diversity in the history of philosophy, which may be related to theories on biodiversity. The first one is epitomized by Aristotle, who makes a distinction between otherness and difference (έτερα – διάφορα), as well as between diversity and difference.\textsuperscript{18} From his perspective, identity and diversity are to be considered contraria and nicht contradictoria; diversity excludes identity, but the negation of diversity does not imply

\textsuperscript{15} E. Brady, “Aesthetic character and aesthetic integrity in environmental conservation”, in: Callicott and Palmer, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. IV, pp. 351–368.
\textsuperscript{18} Aristoteles, \textit{Metaphysik}, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 2003, Book X.
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identity. Also Aristotle classifies the diversity according to the difference of genus, species and individuation (a distinction that can be found also in Callicott’s ecology), and mentions that diversity may result from a process of diversification. In the Middle Age, Thomas of Aquinas regards diversity as something good,¹⁹ and relates it to the beauty of the world as divine creation.

Later on, G. W. Fr. Hegel identifies three moments of diversity (Diversität) and defines this concept as “Bestimmung der äußeren Reflexion”²⁰: In a first moment, identity falls apart within itself, and “the distinguished terms subsist as indifferently different towards each other because each is self-identical”; the second moment consists in the “indifference of difference”; and the third implies the process of comparison, as back-and-forth movement between likeness and unlikeness. Diversity itself, and not only the increase in diversity or its loss, is thus regarded as a (logical) process.

The third selected moment is typical for the poststructuralist and deconstructive philosophy of difference. The reasons why this philosophy of difference was rejected by the defenders of the biodiversity²¹ become evident if we take a closer look at Félix Guattari’s “three ecologies”: the social, the mental and the environmental ecology.²² In spite of the similarity of concepts, Guattari’s ecologies and the scientific ecology have divided opinions in a number of issues: Whereas Guattari focuses on processes of a permanent heterogenesis, biologists deal with a relatively stable identity of species. Also the poststructuralist philosophy proclaims the primacy of the dissent and praises the destabilisation of existing systems; this attitude is hard to be accepted by biologists, who are rather interested in the stability and functionality of the ecosystems. Moreover, the production of singularity lies at the core of Guattari’s so-called ecologies, whereas biology as a science can look only for the characteristic variety of species. To conclude, the poststructuralists’ enthusiasm for differences as well as the aesthetic “touch” of these theories

had to make them endorse the creation of new species, as Guattari explicitly does, whereas the conservationists prioritise the protection of the existing species and are rather cautious about the biotechnological attempts to develop new species (as BioArtists, such as Eduardo Kac, have already done).

As for the meaning of diversity within the field of biology, the ecological discourses make difference between ‘biodiversity’ and related concepts, in the first place the ecosystem health and the biological integrity. More precisely, biodiversity refers to “the variety of components (or elements) at every level of biotic community organization.”23 And this implies “the diversity of diversity” itself,24 that is, the plurality of the indices of diversity, be it the species richness and the frequency of a species within an area (Alpha diversity), be it the community diversity of habitats and ecosystems (Beta diversity) or, finally, the regional diversity (Gamma diversity), which is due to the contribution of endemic species. For example, a high endemism in a certain region, even though the local diversity may be rather low, still contributes to the global diversity. Above all, it is important that diversity should not be equated with chaotic variety, since it is closely linked to complexity, (open) unity, and integration. As for the relationship between diversity and diversification, the natural history was characterised by a succession of setbacks, which are often explained by accidental causes, being produced by factors that are external to the evolutionary ecosystem. However, the setbacks were followed by recoveries of diversity, so that the long term effect was an increase in diversity and complexity. In this respect, intermediate disturbances produce colateral positive effects, by stimulating processes of adaption: “The loss of diversity results in a gain in complexity.”25

Arguments in favour of conserving biodiversity

Diversity is commonly regarded as good and in any case as better than uniformity. However, upon closer inspection, it turns out that not

any diversity represents for biologists a value, since it may be in some cases “pointless,” “superfluous” or even unwanted (e.g. the countless forms of the flu virus). As a matter of fact, what is at stake in the conservation of biodiversity is the “relevant difference” or the “diversity that contributes to genuine richness in nature.” Nevertheless, this still does not answer the question why diversity should be more valuable than homogeneity. And would this be a value per se or only for us? In other words, is biological diversity an intrinsic or an instrumental value, should it be defended from a anthropocentric or from a biocentric or physiocentric perspective? An overview of the arguments in favour of preserving the natural diversity leads to the following classification, which develops and complements previous taxonomies.

Biodiversity has been often regarded as an anthropocentric and instrumental value, either as a response to human needs or as having other functional values. For example, biodiversity may respond, on one hand, to a basic need, have a recreative value or satisfy cognitive interests. The biological and psychological need for variation belongs to the humans’ basic/vital needs (and presumably of other living species) and may have an innate component. Also the environmental philosophers who mention the recreative and aesthetic value of diversity usually understand the ‘aesthetic’ value as subjective, pleasurable and desirable, relating it mainly to health and tourism. Finally, the diversity of species and ecosystems satisfies to a higher extent than uniformity cognitive or intellectual interests in general; these interests may be frequently specified in relationship to scientific and pedagogical purposes. In other words, diversity and complexity trigger intellectual processes and are implied in processes of scientific research both as a method (the observation of variety) and a phenomenon to be explained.

Also biodiversity has a high functional value, given that ecosystems condition human life; correspondingly, the conservation of their diversity is in the humans’ practical interest. Such functional values can be

further on specified as economic, stabilising or monitoring value. For example, all species may be regarded as resources; even those which seem to be useless at present may turn out in the future as useful for economic, medical or other sectors and thus have an economic value in general. Moreover, biodiversity is frequently considered the basis of the ecological stability\(^{29}\) and a precious indicator for the health of an ecosystem. This so-called “ecosystem health” is usually assessed according to the following criteria: biological productivity, local species diversity, global species diversity, genetic diversity within the species populations, as well as ecological functionality.\(^{30}\) However, the correlation between diversity and stability is still subject to controversies among conservationists. Also situations in which both diverge are not excluded; in such cases, the integrity of the ecosystem should take priority over the claim of fostering diversity. In this respect, as it has already been mentioned, the “characteristic diversity” goes first, compared to the increase of diversity considered for itself. In addition to this, the local diversity of species is usually considered an indicator for environmental pollution or stress and thus has a monitoring value. Also the experience of restoring dysfunctional biotopes emphasised the necessity of having a functional ecosystem to serve as a model and as a reserve pool for healthy living individuals. Last, but not least, contemporary scientists had to learn from previous experiences with negative results that we should be more cautious about the causal chains within and between ecosystems; put it bluntly, the conservation value is based on the concern that the species loss may bring about irreversible changes with unknown consequences.

This general utilitarian perspective entitles the conclusion that it is “wise” to protect the species diversity,\(^{31}\) but not that we ought to do so. In spite of the importance of the above-mentioned functions of diversity and of the strong impact of the “resourcism” in practice, the resourcist thinking is not only untenable, but it also provides a logically weak argument. In the common experience, other motivations which require to protect nature as a value per se are as compelling as the already men-

\(^{29}\) Śiva, op. cit.

\(^{30}\) Callicott 1999, op. cit., p. 296.

\(^{31}\) Rescher, op. cit., p. 189.
tioned ones and even emotionally more intense or somewhat “deeper.” Also the feeling about the existence of “non-ressource-value[s],”\(^32\) which can be only non-anthropocentric,\(^33\) seems even to precede rational argumentations, being “originary,” spontaneous and unmediated.

The understanding of diversity as an *intrinsic* or *inherent* value is rooted in the evaluative metaphysics\(^34\) and is linked to the requirement to overcome the limits of the anthropocentric ethics and to ground a biocentric or even physiocentric ethics. The non-anthropocentric ethics is based on the belief that existence and the richness of nature are per se values to be preserved. Also it requires to restrain in our activities from destroying the “natural” harmony between humans and nature and to focus on the formal properties of the ecosystems. Let us have now a closer look at the arguments used in the non-anthropocentric ethics:

The *Noah Principle* or the *value of existence*\(^35\) emphasises in its positive version the value of age and duration. The *Noah Principle* says that the existing species “should be conserved because they exist and because this existence is itself but the present expression of a continuing historical process of immense antiquity and majesty.”\(^36\) In other words, “species have value in themselves, a value neither conferred nor revocable, but springing from a species’ long evolutionary heritage and potential or even from the mere fact of its existence”.\(^37\) Complementary to this is the negative form of the *Noah Principle*, which draws the attention to the unpredictable consequences of the species loss, in the first place to the fact that the disappearance of a species may turn out to be irreparable. This argument was criticised as a “naturalistic fallacy,” given that it moves from the state of being to being valuable, “from what *is the case* in natural history to draw conclusions about what *is of value* there.”\(^38\)

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\(^32\) Ehrenfeld, *op. cit.*

\(^33\) Callicott 1999, *op. cit.*


\(^35\) Ehrenfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 172.


\(^38\) Rolston III 1994, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
Another approach consists in the holistic perspective of the harmony between humans and nature and is specific to the deep ecology (Arne Naess, Warwick Fox) and ecofeminism (Val Plumwood). According to Naess, well-being and the unfolding of human and non-human life are inherent values, and the diversity of forms of life is the means to reach this goal. Humans are allowed to reduce this diversity only in exceptional situations, when this affects vital interests. The corresponding “ecosophy” is based upon the principle of self-realisation and of maximising the manifestations of life. The evolution itself is reinterpreted as “a magnificent expression of a multitude of forms of life.” In spite of its popularity, the holistic argument is often considered rather confuse and difficult to be applied. Nevertheless, it has to be remarked that the four norms of conservation biology, namely (according to Michael Soulé) that the diversity of organisms is good, the ecological complexity is good, the evolution is good, and that biotic diversity has intrinsic value, were included by Arne Naess in his Ecosophy T.

In addition to this, several defenders of a non-anthropocentric ethics use to consider the formal properties of ecosystems, such as order, parsimony, complexity or variety, as objective, intrinsic values; the metaphysical roots of such thesis are undeniable. To take an example, already Aldo Leopold considers that an action is right “when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community,” and “it is wrong when it tends otherwise.” However, his concept of beauty remains vague and is somewhat coextensive with the ecological integrity. Later on, J. Baird Callicott reformulates Leopold’s Land Ethic as a non-anthropocentric, yet humanistic ethics which considers the conservation of the integrity of biotic communities and species as “an instrumentally, aesthetically, and intrinsically valuable conservation goal.”

41 Krebs, op. cit., p. 361.
44 Callicott 1999, op. cit., p. 363.
Another argument used in the non-anthropocentric environmental ethics which is interesting for us, given its connection to aesthetics, is related to the description of biodiversity as a form of richness. For example, Peter Miller regards richness as an objective, intrinsic value, yet without providing arguments in its favour.\textsuperscript{45} Also Holmes Rolston III ascribes biological richness to “healthy and robust environments” and distinguishes at least four aspects of richness, considered as a value:\textsuperscript{46}

1. Complexity and diversity enrich human lives and thus have an instrumental value. 2. The animal life has a specific richness and requires to go beyond a human-centered ethics. 3. Richness is essential for organismic life, too. And finally 4. richness is evident at the level of natural systems, for example when the ecosystems manifest themselves as “creative”, productive systems. This fourth dimension of richness, which Rolston calls “systemic richness,” has interconnections, autonomy, and storied history as indicators and is specific only for natural systems, but not for zoos, botanical gardens, dendrological parks, and other artificial attempts to “collect” richness of species. Moreover, systemic richness appears to be linked to sustainability.

While the above-mentioned arguments in favour of the intrinsic character of the value of biodiversity cannot be understood without their more or less implicit metaphysical presuppositions, another theoretical position which claims that biodiversity, ecological complexity, and evolutionary processes are “good” in themselves is prone to agnosticism, considering that such statements can neither be known, nor tested and thus cannot be confirmed.\textsuperscript{47} Also the preference for nature/wilderness over artifice/gardens is simply unexplainable. One may only speculate about their subconscious, genetic basis, and universal character, and regard them as manifestation of some unconscious anthropological constant.

A detailed analysis of the above-mentioned arguments should discuss also the strength of the ethical claims which may be derived from them. For example, even if the value of existence would be intrinsic and


\textsuperscript{46} Rolston 1994, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 35sq.

\textsuperscript{47} Soulé, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 388sq.
even “objective” (which is hardly acceptable in modern non-metaphysical philosophy), this still cannot underpin the right to existence of the non-human species, but only that the humans have a duty or “humanitarian task” to preserve the natural richness.\(^{48}\) Moreover, given that the relationship between human and nature does not imply any reciprocity, the duty of protecting endangered species cannot be justified as a moral obligation, but as a higher, disinterested duty, which promotes the augmentation of value in the living world in general. Also the question has to be raised whether all (endangered) species have to be at least in principle protected (which would be in practice impossible) and whether all populations of a given species have equal value, against our spontaneous preferences and tendency to prioritize species (regarding for example mammals as more important to be protected than insects). In the case of collision between the maintenance of several species, the more complex species is indeed usually privileged to the detriment of the less complex organisms. Thus the evolutionary hierarchy of species provides a supplementary criterion of action.

Aesthetic aspects in the conservation biology

Due to the focus of the environmental philosophy on ethical and practical issues, the relationship between aesthetics and ecology benefited from less attention. However, the knowledge of the history of continental aesthetics as well as the analysis of the aesthetic experience would enable to correct the so-called “aesthetic argument” in the environmental studies and to extend it beyond its recreative value and use it as an argument in favour of the intrinsic value of biodiversity.

The aesthetic argument for conserving diversity is currently misunderstood in the environmental philosophy as being merely subjective and hedonistic, implying pleasure, delectation, wellbeing or the factors “fun” and “experience.”\(^{49}\) This appears to correspond to the tradition of modern philosophy in the Anglo-Saxon culture and to their empirical approach to aesthetics. However, as we have already seen, the arguments

\(^{48}\) Rescher, op. cit., p. 185.
\(^{49}\) Cf. Ehrenfeld, Rescher and others.
in favour of biodiversity as an inherent value are often contaminated by an aesthetic terminology regarding the objective “beauty” of the world and the “inventivity” of nature. In the following we focus on three aspects of such an extended aesthetic argument: unitas multiplex, the aesthetic dimension of rarity and richness, and the consequences for environmental aesthetics of the reinterpretation of the aesthetic theory as ‘aesthetics’ (philosophy of perception).

Unity in diversity and objective beauty

Ecological experts remarked that diversity does not mean merely pluralism or “a blooming, buzzing confusion,” as it may seem to untrained observers, but it is complemented by order, integration, and unity.\(^{50}\) From an aesthetic perspective, this recalls the concept of an objective and even cosmological beauty, which is characterised by \textit{unitas multiplex}, harmony, complexity, perfection, and plenitude; this approach is no other than what Władysław Tatarkiewicz called “The Great Theory of Beauty”, which remained undisputed until the 18\textsuperscript{th} century.\(^{51}\) To take only one example from the history of this theory, William Hogarth still defined variety in 1753 as “an abstract principle of beauty” and as the first characteristic of beauty, even before simplicity, symmetry, individuality, complexity or quantity.\(^{52}\) This theory receded since the understanding of aesthetics as theory of the experience of beauty and art took over-hand; nevertheless, the search for objective features of beauty and for a presumable universal formula which would transgress the difference between art and nature continues to fascinate scholars, such as the promoters of the positivistical psychological aesthetics in the second half of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century\(^{53}\) or those who put forward an arithmological explanation of beauty.\(^{54}\) More recently, some architects are still convinced that

\(^{50}\) Rolston 1994, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 40.
\(^{51}\) \textit{Op. cit.}
\(^{52}\) W. Hogarth, \textit{Analyse der Schönheit}. Philo Fine Arts, Hamburg 2008.
the “good form” must be led by universal laws,\(^5\) while other theorists subscribe enthusiastically to the aesthetics of the fractals.\(^6\) Even some biologists attempted to identify criteria of an “ecology of the beauty.”\(^7\) However, each time that the emphasis was put on specific analogies between the properties of biological species and ecosystems, on one side, and the criteria of the objective beauty in aesthetics, on the other side, the aesthetics of the 20th century produced theories which were either unacceptable in the art philosophy or obsolete, by focussing, for example, on the coherence and closed unity of the artwork and attempting to transform beauty into a “streng wissenschaftlicher” concept. How would be then possible to bring art theory and biology closer without relapsing into an organismic approach which has gone out of use?

Rarity and richness

Rarity (uncommonness) and richness (profusion) are further connectives between conservation ecology and aesthetics, since “a biologically rich world is aesthetically and epistemically more satisfying and is materially more secure than an impoverished or ‘poor’ world.”\(^8\) Although the rarity of a phenomenon does not guarantee a value (as the phenomenon of “curiosities” proves), it is still sufficient to raise one’s interest and tends to be assimilated to an aesthetic value. In art, rarity is linked to the aura of the original. In nature, rarity provides a strong argument for claiming the protection of certain landscapes. As for species, rarity cannot be a value indicator in itself, as diversity and complexity are: fossils, defective species, ineffective species are rare, but not important. Nevertheless, the rarity of species may be interpreted in terms of the richness and “splendour” of life, since it expresses “exuberance in nature,” imply competence in a small niche, can be the result of contingent factors,
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indicate an “inventive” natural history, and impress as “extraordinary manifestations of survival” and “remarkable success stories.” On one side, Rolston’s analysis of rarity and complexity epitomizes how environmental ethics interprets ecological issues in aesthetic terms. On the other side, promoters of the environmental aesthetics are currently interested in founding an “ethics of profusion, care and justice.”

Sensibility and eco-sensitivity

Another possibility to link the environmental philosophy to aesthetics is related to the sensory experience of nature. In contrast to (modern) philosophy, the natural scientists tend to overlook the subject’s experience of diversity in order to focus on the objective diversity. On the contrary, in the history of philosophy, plurality and variety have been traditionally ascribed to the senses and opposed to those mental operations that order and unify the sensory impressions. During the past decades, aestheticians both in North America and in the German-speaking countries suggested to get back to the roots of the aesthetics in the 18th century and to ground the aesthetics on the theory of perception, as Alexander Baumgarten had initially conceived it. Aesthetics was thus reinterpreted as ‘aesthetics’ (from the Greek aisthesis, ‘sensation’). This transformation of meaning, which is also accepted in the cultural geography, advocates an aesthetics of the infinitesimal, in which the complex faculty of discrimination called sensibility would gain center stage again. However, Sensibilität is no more restricted to a culture of (emotional) sensitivity, as in the age of pre-Romantism and Romantism, but means sagacity or perspicacity, including to pay attention to (fine) dif-

60 Berleant, op. cit., p. 219.
ferences. However, this capacity to make differences within what appears
to be homogeneous may be considered also as a subjective precondition
for acknowledging the objective diversity which exists in nature.\textsuperscript{65} The
aesthetic experience distills not only the unity from diversity, but it also
distinguishes variations within the sameness and makes comparisons; in
other words, it transforms heterogeneity into differences, which corre-
sponds to the above-mentioned Hegelian concept of diversity.

This change of perspective may prove to be enriching for both the
aesthetic theory and the environmental philosophy. On one side, aes-
thetic theories have prioritized so far processes of reducing diversity to
unity, although it is to the same extent essential to be able to see/make
differences in what untrained subjects perceive as indistinguishable. On
the other side, ecology can contribute not only to conserve the existing
diversity, but also to enhance its perception – because not only we know
what we see, but also we have to know in order to see better.

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\textsuperscript{65} Cf. also Berleant’s aesthetics as “theory of sensibility” (A. Berleant, “The Aesthetic Politics


“Individual human nature is a nature of relation in, with, and to a world where we dwell for a very limited time…. Without knowing what it is to dwell, we do not know what form of rationality is proper to human beings, or how to understand the human virtues.” (Christine Swanton, “Heideggarian Environmental Virtue Ethics”)²

Introduction

In 1988, Holmes Rolston published his celebrated Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World. I choose the word ‘celebrated’ guardedly because Rolston’s book is as philosophically confounding—for his attempt to dissolve the is/ought distinction in ethics—and ethically controversial—he defends killing sentient animals—as it is ingenious for introducing an incredibly broad and rich set of environmental values. Although many of the debates in environmental ethics have migrated away from Rolston’s initial efforts to frame them, the book continues to reward anyone who takes seriously the possibility of nonanthropocentrism in ethics. Among Rolston’s unique contributions in this vein is his insight that the world is replete with values that are ‘carried by’ nature, an expression he chooses deliberately to discourage the presumption of a clear and sharp distinction between objective

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¹ Author’s Note: Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Living with Consequences conference in Koper, Slovenia in October 2011 and at the Ninth Annual Meeting for Environmental Philosophy in Allenspark, Colorado in June 2012. I am especially grateful for critical feedback from Matt Ferkany, Brian Treanor, and Phil Cafaro and for helpful questions and comments from Don Maier, Katie McShane and Holmes Rolston.

and subjective values. One of the devices Rolston uses to illustrate his view that many environmental values, like some organisms, are hybrids is the image of an ellipse. The value of the ellipse, metaphorically, is its twin foci—having two ‘centers,’ as it were. Rolston gets substantial use out of the ellipse, using it to characterize not only how objectivity and subjectivity collaborate to inform environmental values, but to bridge other dualities including nature/culture (nature and culture are ‘twin foci’ for Rolston), universal/particular, system/species, species/individual, and the abstract and concrete. The image of the ellipse comes into play again to describe the importance of natural history for different kinds of environmental ethical ends. Rolston’s ellipse in this context contrasts what he calls the ‘idiographic’ or uniquely particular focus with the ‘nomothetic’ or recurrent focus. As he explains, “Under the idiographic focus, ethical concern will be directed toward historical particulars… Humans protect the Grand Canyon because it is the particular place it is, one of a kind, warranting a proper name—not because it is representative canyonland…” Elaborating, he writes, “Under the nomothetic focus, the ethic will value natural forces and tendencies or type specimens. A reason for protecting relict wildlands is that they are living museums of the processes of natural history, and this is true in all the particular wilderness areas preserved.”

This elliptical contrast between the nomothetic and recurrent occurs near the end of Rolston’s book in a section entitled “Storied Residence on Earth.” “Storied Residence” is a semi-autonomous essay on the hybridized descriptive and normative functions of narrative for environmental ethics. In an oft-quoted passage from this section, Rolston writes,

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6 It is important to note that for Rolston there is no hard and fast distinction between ‘environmental ethics’ and ethics. The use of the term ‘environmental ethics,’ when it appears, is often for clarity or convenience. It does not appear to be his view that environmental ethics and ethical theory are essentially distinct.
The rationality of the ethic, as well as the area to be mapped, will be historical. That is, logic will be mixed with story. The move from is to ought, which logicians have typically thought it their job to solve before any naturalistic ethics could be judged sound, is transformed into movement along a story line. It becomes a move from is to becoming, and that historical movement is part of the ought-to-be. The ethic becomes an epic.\(^7\)

Many other philosophers have noticed the normative dimension of narratives, of course, but what is unique about Rolston’s notion of storied residence is its attachment to places and to a sense of place that connects each place to its natural and cultural histories. Moreover, this attentiveness to history activates awareness of attributes of places—especially living places—in general, such as their relation to large scale geological, evolutionary, and temporal dynamics. For example, after citing a long narrative passage by a reflective writer from rural New York, Rolston observes, “Residence in a local environment senses the recurrent universals particularly displayed in that place—the seasons, the regenerative, vital powers of life, the life support, the proportions of time and place.”\(^8\) He even enjoins his reader to discover this storied residence herself by providing in the text a to-do list of place-based observations and activities that one ought to conduct to evaluate the extent of one’s awareness of residing in place.

My present interest in discussing Rolston’s notion of storied residence is provoked by how he connects narrative to character. He claims:

> Ethics must be written in theory with universal intent, but the theory must permit and require ethics to be lived in practice in the first person singular. This person will not be the solitary Cartesian ego, isolated from its world, but the subjective ‘I’ in singular communion with its objective world. The logic of the home, the ecology, is finally narrative, and the human career will not be a disembodied reason but a person organic in history. Character always takes narrative form; history is required to form character.\(^9\)

Central to this notion of storied residence, then, is a narrative-informed understanding of one’s embodied connection to place(s). To

\(^7\) Op. cit.
think of oneself in this way is to reject alternative self-constructions that dislocate the self from one’s terrestrial environment. For reasons I hope will become clear, this is more than a warning to avoid the pitfalls of Cartesianism. Rather, I argue it is fundamentally an injunction to live a richer life by recognizing that the complete story of one’s life is of embodied residing in place(s), that is, places with their own stories with which one’s own narrative is intertwined. I take this advice to be a non-trivial matter for ethical theory. In the passage above, it should be noted that Rolston is also laying out a distinction between formal (logical) and adequacy conditions for an ethical theory. On the one hand, I take him to be welcoming the formal task of evaluating an ethical theory—such as a theory of environmental ethics—by its success in explicating norms or articulating general principles of action, rights, or justice. On the other hand, I see Rolston as also wanting to hold ethical theories to a standard of fitness, that ethical theories must ultimately pass a test of adequacy in accurately describing and thereby being able to influence the lives of moral agents. In short, an ethic must achieve a good fit with the world of moral agents. Adequacy for an ethical theory in the era of environmental ethics, moreover, requires articulation and awareness of an environmental sphere of action; ethics does not end with the interests, rights, feelings, goals, or needs of humans—environments matter, too. Rolston’s project in *Environmental Ethics*, as it has been throughout his career, is to define and describe the diverse ways in which environments do and ought to matter. Yet what emerges from “Storied Residence” is that the environmental ethicist’s task—of ensuring theoretical adequacy—is made difficult if agents are cognitively and psychologically unfit to grasp the significance of belonging to a history that includes the evolution and generation of life and also the evolution and generation of environmental and cultural values. Without awareness of one’s own storied residence on earth, the development of moral character in an era of environmental ethics is stifled—and an environmental ethical theory cannot be rendered adequate to a life truncated by the absence of a contextualizing environmental narrative.

The connection between narrative and character was certainly in the philosophical air in the late 1980s, and Rolston may have been thinking of Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of narrative and the unity of the self
advanced in MacIntyre’s influential work *After Virtue*. In a relevant passage, MacIntyre writes,

> But the key question for men is not about their own authorship; I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do? If I can answer the prior question ‘Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?’ We enter human society, that is, with one or more imputed characters—roles into which we have been drafted—and we have to learn what they are in order to be able to understand how others respond to us and how our responses to them are apt to be construed.\(^\text{10}\)

Rolston’s storied residence shares with MacIntyre’s narrative ‘unity of a life’ this sense that we are only at best partial authors of our own stories. One implication is that culture is not merely a backdrop for each human drama, but is actively co-participating in supplying values and suggesting options for what form a life can take. What Rolston’s storied residence again adds to this account is an expression for how places are also fundamental co-participants—because they carry values—in the forms of life that people take.

**Environmental Virtue**

Moving forward to the present and to the orientation of my discussion here, there is another noteworthy feature of storied residence that forms the subject matter of this essay, and that is its conceptual location in the growing discourse of environmental virtue ethics. Although there are perhaps as many approaches to virtue ethics as there are philosophers who write about it, there are several common features to these approaches. One place to begin outlining these features is the shared view that moral evaluation fundamentally concerns the patterned conduct of agents in terms of their possession of or failure to possess certain character traits. This is not to say that actions do not factor into moral evaluation, but when they do, they do so as indications of an agent’s success or failure in possessing the relevant virtue. Consequently, virtue theories place significant emphasis on the cognitive, moral, and emotional development of agents—as opposed to the content and form of an agent’s rational choice, for instance. Agents need to be able to acquire

the traits that enable them to hit the targets of virtues. In this vein, virtues have unique profiles—defined by their target situations that call for their possession. Virtue theories also tend to accommodate a rich diversity of virtue and vice terms (or catalogs) that are also closely attached to forms of moral life within diverse moral communities. Ultimately, the possession of virtue—i.e., to be a virtuous person—is to be well fit to respond to one’s circumstances and needs as these are experienced within and sometimes between communities. The traits that we admire in ourselves and others convey that fitness, but because circumstances and needs change, so often do the virtues and even the meaning of virtues.11

My proposal concerning storied residence is twofold. First, storied residence clearly belongs to the discussion of environmental virtue ethics not only for its congruent narrativism, but especially owing to the prominence it assigns to place(s) in character formation and moral development. By contextualizing moral development within a horizon of place-based narratives, storied residence informs and broadens an agent’s awareness of the circumstances and needs that determine the specific targets of virtue. Second, like most virtues, storied residence itself fits an agent well to respond to the demands of the world.12 Simply knowing one’s story and its connections to narratives of place and culture arguably situates one better to respond to various demands—for example, threats to environmental value—than by failing to become aware of one’s relatedness to a place, its characteristic and unique features, and

11 For example, Hans Jonas argues that the meaning of humility is changed by life in a technological age. No longer is it attached to a sense of human weakness relative to the power of the gods or God, but to a need to reign in our own self-destructive power. See H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1984, p. 22.

12 I share Swanton’s view that not every virtue has to be defined by such fitness. For instance, we can admire traits for reasons other than their instrumental value in meeting the world’s demands. See especially, C. Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003, p. 93, where she discusses affinities of her own approach to the non-teleological virtue ethics of David Hume and Michael Slote. Ronald Sandler, who disagrees with Swanton that virtues could be correctly defined by their admirability and other non-teleological qualities, nonetheless reserves room for non-eudaimonistic virtues in his theory. Many environmental values fall under this category. See especially R. Sandler, Character and Environment: A Virtue-Oriented Approach to Environmental Ethics. Columbia University Press, New York 2007, pp. 26–30. Later I discuss how Sandler’s pluralistic approach is useful for explicating the virtuous features of storied residence.
its history. It may be the case that storied residence is valuable for supporting the development and cultivation of many other (environmental) virtues and thus is not a virtue itself. However, it also seems to have its own dispositional profile—to not only see oneself in narrative terms but as related to place—that the decision to include it within a catalog of environmental virtues strikes me as uncontroversial (especially for pluralistic theories). Indeed, storied residence may best be thought as a special mode of being in the world. As such, it is the achievement of the moral agent in unifying one’s ethical projects of caring for self and caring for others through a coherent narrative arc rooted in the realities of one’s embodiment and connection to place. Perhaps this characterization gives storied residence the ring of an intellectual or cognitive virtue, but there is a normative dimension to its profile, too. Rather, just as humility organizes an agent’s beliefs about self, world and other into a relational vision of status, storied residence describes the activity of organizing one’s historical and projective beliefs about self, other, and world into a coherent and ethically significant whole in which the environmental field of one’s action is implicated as ground and coauthor. By establishing the connection between Rolston’s version of place-based narrativism with virtue ethical achievement, storied residence becomes a key virtue in the fulfillment of an environmentally ethical life. If successful, this reading of Rolston’s narrativism also opens up a new and amicable possibility for rethinking his own defense of nonanthropocentrism against virtue-oriented approaches in environmental ethics.

Situating Storied Residence within Environmental Virtue Ethics

For the sake of both brevity and clarity, I will focus my discussion, first, on why it is important to include a philosophy of place within virtue ethical discourse, then, second, on what it means to think of storied residence as a virtue. With respect to the former focus, I am also offering a response to a recent essay by Brian T. Reanor in which he advocates for the use of narratives in environmental virtue ethics.13 T. Reanor’s project

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is complicated by the fact that he is appealing to narrative to confront the problem of ethical relativism for virtue ethics. On Treanor’s view, relativism arises for virtue ethics whenever virtue ethicists appeal to cultural and community norms, as they often do, to define what counts as a virtue (for instance, what it means to be hospitable in Memphis, Tennessee probably differs from what it means in Ljubljana—although hospitality is presumably a virtue in both communities). And although virtue ethics has a long history of making allowances for cultural relativity,¹⁴ for Treanor it is contemporary postmodernism and its coinciding skepticism with respect to practical rationality that amplifies the relativistic problem. In short, postmodernism undermines confidence in the existence of a *phronimos*, the man of practical wisdom of Aristotle’s virtue ethics, who can teach his moral community how to discern the virtuous mean. Lacking a *phronimos*, moral agents have nowhere reliable to turn for guidance in practical life. Narratives, therefore, are brought in to explain how agents can simulate virtuous conduct though imaginative confrontations with morally provocative situations. Narratives, on Treanor’s view, allow agents to entertain the felt experience of virtuous conduct as if they were actually exercising virtues. This mimetic feature of narratives is especially important for environmental virtue to simulate responsiveness to the threats posed by environmental crisis with which agents might otherwise lack experience. It is especially by reading narratives that express historical accounts of human survival and of human flourishing that agents can come to possess virtues critical for responding to global environmental crisis. Written narratives, thus, in a sense create conditions for *phronesis* without a *phronimos*, restoring the

¹⁴ Hume expresses this openness to cultural relativity through a fluvial metaphor (and in a manner especially fitting for an essay on narrative and place) in “A Dialogue” at the conclusion of his second Enquiry: “How shall we pretend to fix a standard for judgments of this nature [i.e., of conduct of agents from different cultures]? By tracing matters, replied I, a little higher, and examining the first principles, which each nation establishes, of blame or censure. The Rhine flows north, the Rhone south; yet both spring from the same mountain, and are also actuated, in their opposite directions, by the same principle of gravity. The different inclinations on the ground, on which they run, cause all the differences in their courses.” D. Hume, *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*. Selby-Bigge, L.A. (ed.), Nidditch, P.H. (rev., 3rd edition), Clarendon Press, Oxford 1975, p. 333.
moral guidance of the *phronimos* to the environmentally stressed citizens of the postmodern age.

I am necessarily glossing over many careful moves in Treanor’s thoughtful and thought-provoking account of environmental virtue ethics informed by the use of narratives, and I regret that I will not do justice to his discussion here. Nonetheless, there are features of his account that stand in contrast to Rolston’s sense of storied residence and consequently call attention to the diversity of narrative forms that factor into moral life. Treanor, for instance, recommends that we read the American naturalist writings of Henry David Thoreau and Aldo Leopold. Thoreau, he notes, is especially useful for giving expression to the virtue of simplicity in his nature writing. Moreover, and here I agree with Treanor, it is no stretch of the imagination to think that many of Thoreau’s readers have come to possess at least a sense of this virtue and many others from reading him.15 Such examples indicate that, among other things, the genre of nature writing is one form of narrative construct instrumental in helping agents acquire (environmental) virtues. Another example he cites is the book *Collapse*, by historian Jared Diamond. In *Collapse*, Diamond reflects on the ecological changes that coincided with the failure of several historical human societies. For Treanor, *Collapse* illustrates lessons important for our survival today, especially since many features of our contemporary environmental crisis resemble the conditions that led to the demise of the communities in Diamond’s historical narratives. Yet Treanor also cautions against using *Collapse* as our only guiding narrative. We also require narratives of human flourishing as provided especially by American nature writers of the

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15 As I write this, I am also thinking of Edward Abbey’s float-trip ruminations on Henry David Thoreau. To some degree Abbey sympathizes with Thoreau’s late 20th century critics, who seek to psychoanalyze him and thereby dismiss his odd form of moral life as the effect of psychological disorder. (See E. Abbey, *Down the River*. Plume Books, New York, 1982, pp. 31–32). For Abbey, however, Thoreau, while lonely, is also brilliant, brave, challenging, and in many ways a hero whose “mind has been haunting mine for most of my life” (op. cit., p. 13). Based on Abbey’s reflections, it also seems reasonable to conclude that he would be agreeable to the thought that Thoreau is also an exemplary ‘storied resident,’ as evident in the following passage: “Instead, [Thoreau] made a world out of Walden Pond, Concord, and their environs. He walked, he explored, every day and many nights, he learned to know his world as few ever know any world. Once, as he walked in the woods with a friend…, the friend expressed his long-felt wish to find an Indian arrowhead. At once, Henry stopped, bent down, and picked one up” (op. cit., p. 46).
19th and 20th Centuries. These have the ability to teach us attention and observation, love of wildness, and to assist us in understanding “universal aspects of the human condition.”

I have no disagreement with Treanor’s injunction to read classic works of American nature writing or excellent works of social and ecological history to teach us virtue. I am concerned, however, that such a recommendation not only invites the postmodern skepticism that Treanor worries about by privileging a particular genre of writing as morally exemplary, but it also obscures what I take to be the more profound insight—which is present elsewhere in Treanor’s discussion—that a human life is encountered and developed in narrative mode. This is clearly evident to Treanor in his appreciation and cogent explication of the work of Paul Ricoeur on narrative and personal identity. Yet Treanor seems to conflate the act of reading written narratives with Ricoeur’s understanding of human life in narrative terms. Ricoeur’s own compelling insight is that we find ourselves (whenever we find ourselves) through narrative mode; we are storied beings, and for Treanor this makes Ricoeur especially valuable for virtue ethics. As he explains, “[Ricoeur] argues that hermeneutics is more than a tool for reading and interpreting texts, or, put another way, that ‘text’ should be taken in a much broader sense. Identity and action both have narrative structure—and this structure already points to narrative’s usefulness for personal growth, cultivating habits, and other elements essential to virtue ethics.”

On this rendering, narrative describes an individual’s expression of the activity of discerning one’s own emplotment within the nested sets of stories that circumscribe his or her life and that give direction to moral life and the acquisition and application of virtue. Unfortunately, I also think that Treanor moves too far away from giving this self-productive sense of narrativism its due. It may be that by reading, a person may come to appreciate Thoreau’s simplicity or Aldo Leopold’s humility (e.g., in recognizing his own moral fallibility for once supporting wolf eradication). However, there are limits to how much we can expect people to be transformed by such narratives, and that transformation might not

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16 Treanor, op. cit., p. 376.
always be in a direction we prefer. Thoreau’s simplicity is a virtue to some, but it is uncompromising (even egotistical) asceticism to others.

By contrast, Ricouer’s project, among other things, is to affirm the narrative form of moral life, enjoining us individually to become aware of the narratives to which we belong, and which help us become responsible for who we are, a perspective more fitting with MacIntyre’s narrative-constructed “roles into which we have been drafted” than virtues acquired or strengthened by reading Leopold or Muir. As a result, Ricouer’s project has special force when brought into the discussion of place-based narrativism. It points toward a more fundamental task for moral development and moral agency than that which occurs through mimetic acts of reading. It is a project, moreover, that places emphasis on a person’s direct relation to the world. Consider Linda Ethell’s observation in her examination of narratives and personal responsibility. For Ethell, Ricouer’s project forces us to become aware of how significant and unavoidable the influence of the world can be:

We can only make sense of our lives (our finitude) if we can incorporate our existence as objects as well as subjects of experience into the narratives which comprise our identities. If we conceive of our inner experience in ways that take for granted our independence of the natural world, then we cannot incorporate our most profound and potentially illuminating experiences into our self-conceptions: there will be no room for stories that make vulnerability [for example] affectively (as well as intellectually) intelligible.18

By calling attention to our storied residence on earth, Rolston is similarly describing the narrative conditions of human life. Storied residence calls direct attention to the more-than-cultural narratives to which we belong, and these are encountered through our residence in place(s). Storied residence describes an achievement of the agent in coming to terms with (or at least beginning to come to terms with) the nature of her relationship to more-than-human otherness. That is, through storied residence, the agent is awakened to the active participation of place in her own personal development.

A Profile of Storied Residence

This achievement manifests itself in several ways, more than I will describe here, but one is, as already implied, that storied residence holds in place the dynamic tension between the projective self and genuine environmental otherness. As Rolston puts it, the story lines discovered through storied residence “are not simply found, though many lie there to be found. They must also be constructed, authored as they are detected by complex persons localized in the complex ecosystems they inhabit.” And as I suggested in the previous section, this nuanced sense of self-authorship can be obscured if too much emphasis is placed on the mimetic effects of reading environmentalist texts.

Second, Rolston makes storied residence available to non-experts. One does not need to know the scientific names of all the trees in the forest, although learning them is likely to have positive outcomes for appreciating their value. Thus, despite not needing expertise, storied-residence is also progressive and developmental so that one’s reflective engagement with place is enhanced by knowledge of natural history and environmental science, a view that Rolston continued to develop later on and in substantial depth in his essay “Aesthetic Experience in Forests.” It is worth the risk of conflating the two essays to convey Rolston’s intuition by citing him from “Aesthetic Experience.” There, in a reflection on the role of scientific knowledge on aesthetic appreciation of nature, he asserts the following:

True, those who can count the needle fascicles and get the species right, if they never experience goose pimples when the wind whips through the pines, fail as much as do the poets in their naïve romanticism. Nevertheless, only when moving through science to the deeper aesthetic experiences that are enriched by science can the forest be most adequately known. Aestheticians are often not comfortable with this; they want to insist on human capacities to confront nature in relative independence of science. One must be moved, but one needs to be moved in the right direction, where ‘right’ means with appropriate appreciation of what is actually going on.

As I elaborate in the next section, Rolston’s sense of an agent’s progressive ability to appreciate environmental value, especially with the acquisition of scientific knowledge, has important implications for fitting storied residence into an account of environmental virtue. Most virtue theories anticipate that agents gradually acquire virtues through practice, and here Rolston’s sense of ‘appropriate appreciation’ points toward a mature stage of evaluative ability without precluding legitimate acts of appreciation absent of scientific knowledge. The fact that storied residing can also be initiated without requiring the entire cognitive and evaluative tool kit shows that it has this affinity to Rolston’s own developed expression of the engagement between self and environmental other (e.g., the forest).

A third feature of storied residence, also related to its gradual achievement by the agent, is the manner in which the relevant stories migrate back and forth between local residence in place and cognitive appreciation for evolutionary complexity and deep (even cosmic scales) of time. In “Storied Residence” this dynamic is conveyed by the dialectic between the idiographic and nomothetic described earlier, but this view is again developed in depth in the “Aesthetic Experience” essay:

The forest—we must first think—is prehistoric and perennial, especially in contrast with ephemeral civilizations, their histories, politics, and arts. The perceptive forest visitor realizes also the centuries-long forest successions, proceeding toward climax, yet ever interrupted and reset by fire and storm…The Carboniferous forests were giant club mosses and horsetails; the Jurassic Forests were gymnosperms—conifers, cycads, ginkgoes, seed ferns. A forest today is yesterday being transformed into tomorrow.21

Rolston is insistent on situating each human life in history. As he explains in “Storied Residence,” if an “ethic is really to incorporate the whole story, it must systematically embed itself in historical eventfulness, or else it will not really be objective.”22 Moreover, this eventfulness includes the very distant past even if storied residence is fundamentally an engagement of individual persons living today within range of their more proximate and more strongly felt cultural and environmental

22 Rolston, Environmental Ethics, p. 350.
histories. Consequently, Rolston also emphasizes that storied residence enhances the richness of human life at times by paradoxically dislocating the human from episodes in the evolutionary and cosmic drama; through storied residence one gains an appreciation of the achievements of natural systems and processes that occurred independently of human involvement for the vast majority of earth history.

Yet returning to the temporal span of an individual human life in which storied residence is actually lived, is a fourth distinctive feature, what Rolston describes as a “systemic” and “communitarian achievement.”23 “What goes on in the heads of individuals integrates into something that goes over the heads of any of us.”24 Among other things, this observation adds force to the conviction held by many moral narrativists, including Ricouer and MacIntyre, that each person finds herself already attached to a story (and stories) with their own normative dynamics. Yet, Rolston is also leaving room for authentic contributions to that normative set by the agent and by the places and communities in which one resides. As he puts it, “Environmental ethics will have a history entwined with these biographies of particular individuals. Such a code of ethics will have its rationality embedded in the historical developments in which environmental ethicists reside.”25

A fifth feature of the achievement of storied residence is the development by the agent of the ability to sustain and express attitudes of “love of one’s world and freedom in it.”26 Rolston even adventures to claim that this expression of love “is ultimately, what the evolutionary epic has been about….”27 I suspect that the postmodern skepticism that Treanor worries about is lurking not too far away, perhaps ready to quip that Rolston’s storied residence is patently biblical in its eschatological framing of the evolutionary epic. However, even if storied-residence bears the imprint of the Judeo-Christian narrative, it is important to recognize that (assuming it fits) it may very well be a feature of Rolston’s own unique way of giving expression to his own experience of storied-resi-

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dence. Seen in such a way, Rolston’s account is an expression of a systemic and communitarian achievement as he has uniquely experienced it. Conversely, we may find ourselves (along with our skeptical friends) linked to many of the same stories as Rolston, and a failure to engage with them critically as potentially constitutive of our own stories may leave us deprived of value in much the same fashion as the uninspired scientists and naïve poets he admonishes in “Aesthetic Experience.”

Each of these characteristics deserves more explication than I can provide here, but collectively they supplement an account of how the role of narratives in environmental ethics is more complex and morally significant than an injunction to read particular works of nature writing. This is not to say that storied residence or its indications of moral achievement are uncontroversial, and I will entertain critical questions about storied residence in closing. Yet to the extent that storied residence captures moral and developmental achievements (as the preceding list suggests), it invites consideration within the context of virtue ethics and its catalog of modes of moral achievement.

Storied Residence as Virtue

If storied residence is to play a key role in making ethical theory adequate, as intimated by Rolston’s quote from earlier, then it is meaningful to ask what the theory as a whole should look like. Although Rolston does not wed his environmental ethics to a particular ethical theory, his general approach favors deontological notions of value and respect for environmental values with a particularist sensibility to places and communities. This otherwise unhappy marriage at the theoretical level is one that virtue theories often attempt to sustain by deriving moral principles from virtues (v-rules) while simultaneously holding onto the adequacy criterion that the informal virtue discourse of actual moral communities is ultimately decisive. Rolston is clearly paying homage to both poles of ethics in his discussion of storied residence, but there are other reasons to think that storied residence belongs within the virtue ethical conversation and may be a candidate environmental virtue as well.

To see how, I’ll begin with Rolston’s overt objection to environmental virtue ethics. Alluding to Thomas Hill’s account of the environment-
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tal virtue of humility, Rolston dismisses environmental virtue ethics on anthropocentric grounds. If you recall my characterization from earlier that virtue ethics emphasizes the evaluation of character over action, then you’ll appreciate Rolston’s worry that from the standpoint of evaluation, virtue ethics will always render environmental values secondary to the moral success of the agent. This becomes especially apparent in Hill’s discussion. Hill imagines a person who, in destroying the ecological and aesthetic richness of his own property, acts within his rights yet provokes the judgment that he lacks humility; this person simply does not appreciate the limits of his own destructiveness.28 For Hill, recognition of this moral failure is an important development for environmental ethics; it helps to articulate intuitions that many of us have about such behavior. Unfortunately, this achievement for environmental ethics in demonstrating the relevance of virtue discourse nonetheless fails to justify the stronger judgment that the man ought to be punished or sanctioned. Perhaps even more disconcerting is that the man’s lack of humility only appears to those who possess an environmentally friendly outlook; many of the man’s neighbors might actually approve of his conduct. To an author with Rolston’s environmental sensibilities, therefore, further advice to develop environmental ethics along virtue ethical lines seems wrong-headed. It fails to move environmental ethics any closer to genuine respect for nonanthropocentric values in nature by rendering that activity little more than a cause to celebrate one more human achievement.

There are two avenues for rebuttal from the standpoint of virtue ethics. The first is to stress that Rolston fails to consider the importance of targets of virtue—namely independent environmental values—within his criticism. Although such considerations may not always be necessary in evaluating an agent for the possession of virtue (one can be compassionate without compassion always reflecting responsiveness to environmental values), they are critical for justifying and defining virtues.29


29 For a criticism of Rolston’s objection to virtue ethics along these lines, see Sandler, op. cit., pp. 112–13. Swanton also weighs in on this debate in claiming that Rolston is correct to recognize the independent value of natural objects, but that he overlooks the distinction between
Consequently, environmental values, to the extent that they appear as ends that justify and help to define the virtues, always matter. Put differently, and in terms that might even be acceptable to Rolston, justification and evaluation should be seen as twin foci for an elliptical model of virtue ethics. If our emphasis is on justification, then we will focus our concern on the targets of virtue, including environmental values. Conversely, if our emphasis is on evaluation, then the agent is elevated to prominence.

The second line of response is to recruit Rolston’s ‘storied residence’ into the catalog of virtues. On first glance, to the extent that storied residence represents an achievement in an agent’s capacity to respond to environmental values it resembles other virtues in equipping agents to respond to demands of the world. Rolston’s objection to virtue ethics thus appears to be misguided if storied residence refers to an admirable disposition to discover and respond to environmental values. From a more theoretical perspective, storied residence also appears to have much going for it as a virtue. One framework with which it fits well is the virtue ethical pluralism recently advanced by Ronald Sandler. On Sandler’s view, virtues are justified by their conduciveness to equip agents dispositionally to achieve certain ends. These ends include: 1) the agent’s own survival; 2) the continuance of the species; 3) the agent’s characteristic freedom from pain and enjoyment; 4) the good functioning of the social group; 5) the agent’s autonomy; 6) the agent’s accumulation of knowledge; 7) a meaningful life; and 8) “the realization of any noneudaimonistic ends…in the way characteristic of human beings….”30 On the whole, environmental values tend to fall under the category of noneudaimonistic ends on Sandler’s account, and this distinction is significant because many environmental values might otherwise only serve the anthropocentric interests of humans and their communities. The kind of outlook that one acquires through storied residence arguably amplifies the prospects for discovery of these noneudaimonistic values while also fitting agents well for many of the other objects of praise and blame (i.e., agents) and objects that possess independent value. See Swanton, “Heideggerian Virtue Ethics,” p. 147.

30 Sandler, op. cit., p. 28.
ends that define the virtues, especially the accumulation of knowledge and living a meaningful life.\footnote{Sandler’s account, like Rolston’s philosophy, is married tightly to a kind of scientific naturalism, although both philosophers are non-dogmatic about scientific claims. Science on both of their views adheres to a principle of fallibility (or falsification). Nonetheless, as I hinted at earlier (in note #12) virtue ethical approaches need not be teleological in the way that Sandler advocates. Even while retaining their naturalism, virtue ethics can be fundamentally expressivist with respect to human sentiments, earning their justification on more particularist terms than Sandler’s justificatory schema allows. In addition to Swanton (Virtue Ethics, op. cit.) Simon Blackburn develops this kind of virtue ethical theory. See S. Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1998. At the practical level, however, there is little dispute between approaches that virtues can be cultivated to prepare agents to respond to predictable social and moral situations, and even predictably chaotic situations such as environmental crisis.}

There is another theoretical value for making the connection between Sandler’s pluralistic schema of virtue ethical ends and storied residence. For a trait to be a virtue it must enjoy a fairly tight relation to ethically desirable beliefs, desires, or behaviors,\footnote{I wish to thank Matt Ferkany for highlighting the need to address this issue.} and Sandler’s schema is invoked precisely to supply such desirability. It could be thought that storied residence is already adequately captured by socially or behaviorally desirable expressions of awe or caring, but I am hesitant to embrace these reductive moves too hastily. Rather, I see Rolston, through the concept of storied residence, as endeavoring to describe a special way of being in the world, a way of being that can be illustrated by expanding on Hill’s depiction of humility as an ideal of moral excellence. Although Hill does not make the distinction, we often say that an agent acts humbly, but it may be more accurate to say than an agent thinks humbly since to act humbly requires the recognition of one’s relational status compared to something else. In Hill’s example, this is the natural environment, but one doesn’t really act humbly by not destroying the environment. At best the act is one of restraint, but such restraint is only meaningful against the (also) humble activity of cognitively organizing the features of the world into various relationships of status. To be humble, then, is to adopt a system of beliefs—in Hill’s case, an environmental worldview—that describes those relationships in such a way as to emphasize a separation between agent and other. This recognition of difference is desirable because it enables respect for the other and thereby contributes
to an agent’s fitness to meet many of the ends of an ethical life. Similarly, storied residence is something agents should also want to acquire because by organizing oneself and the features of one’s world into coherent narrative sets one also becomes better equipped to meet the ends of an ethical life. To be sure, a significant feature of this way of being is the activation of various modes of caring, for example, care for oneself—in living a knowledgeable and meaningful life—and for others, at the very least as the coauthors and collaborators in one’s personal narrative. Yet storied residence is also desirable insofar as it stimulates the effort to structure one’s beliefs in a way that lends coherence to one’s ethical projects and thereby makes it possible to live in ways to fulfill them. Moreover, Rolston suggests that storied residence is an antidote to those behaviors, often stimulated by dis-locating technologies, that obscure the realities of our embodiment and connection to place. As a result, storied residence describes a significant achievement in one’s moral development. The effect dispositionally may be more cognitive than practical, but one practical effect is to make it possible to order the ends of an ethical life into a coherent, embodied, and emplaced whole.

Questions

If storied residence passes the test for coherence within an environmental virtue ethical approach, it nonetheless generates several more questions for its practical implementation within a framework of moral excellence. One concerns the relativistic threat that Treanor worries about in his own discussion of narratives and environmental virtues. This problem seems to emerge with storied residence because of its emphasis on place-based narratives in character development. Variant experiences of residing in place(s) potentially lead to variant expressions of value, thereby undermining confidence that moral disputes arising from conflicts between values can be resolved. In response, virtue ethics is sufficiently pluralistic to tolerate variance in agents’ cultural and environmental experiences. Nonetheless, storied residence also entails anticipating that by residing in place and by attending to dynamic characteristics of place (through one’s narrative engagement and reflection on residing), features common to humans dwelling in diverse environ-
ments will emerge. Surviving and flourishing are general characteristics of humans in all sorts of environments, for instance. Different virtues may be enlisted for such ends, or shared virtues may reflect different sensitivities to local conditions, but there is likely to be a broad range of similarities with respect to how human communities survive and thrive, even if commonalities are only compared on the level of human physiological needs. Similarly, although aesthetic sensibilities may be honed by storied residence to the unique features of the particular places in which humans dwell, responsiveness to the aesthetic features of places in general can also be anticipated by storied residence. Aesthetic responsiveness can also be developed and extended to a variety of places as one’s sense of storied residence is amplified by scientific and cultural narratives of place(s).33 Relativism, on the other hand, implies that variance viciously undermines the prospect for moral consensus. The pluralism of storied residence and virtue ethics, by contrast, allows for the possibility of consensus on moral and aesthetic norms without requiring that any particular localized norms must be universalizable.

A second problem for storied residence is related to the concern about relativism, and it concerns the question of whether storied residence privileges a kind of environmentalist worldview. The answer is both no and yes. To the extent that all people have the capacity to cultivate storied residence in their own communal and environmental place/space, then there is no expectation that the perspective it engenders is wedded to political environmentalism. In this sense, storied residence underdetermines one’s politics. However, it is quite arguable that for storied residence to be adequate for environmental ethics in certain communities and places, then particular forms of responsiveness to environmental values (e.g., sensitivity to extinction vortices or environmental injustice) are to be cultivated and encouraged. Consequently, storied residence may overdetermine one’s political sentiments, but this is an

issue for environmental virtue ethics broadly, and I would submit for environmental ethics as a whole if it aspires to nonanthropocentrism.34

Storied residence may also overdetermine the appropriate content for environmental narratives with its dependence on scientific descriptions of natural history and processes. The issue this concern generates is similar to the issue in environmental aesthetics that interrogates the role scientific knowledge should play in the aesthetic appreciation of nature. Opposing sides of this controversy debate the claim that the possession of scientific knowledge enhances one’s aesthetic experience of nature. Rolston, as we saw in “Aesthetic Experience in Forests,” is a proponent of this view, but as his account of storied residence implies, experiences of place, even in built environments, do not require scientific knowledge even if appreciation of one’s residence in place(s) is also often enhanced by such knowledge.

Conclusion

In closing, the proposal that storied residence should be considered within the framework of environmental virtue ethics faces at least one other challenge, and it has to do with the urgency of environmental crisis. It is unfortunately all too easy to despair that anthropogenic devastation of earth’s ecological support systems is so extensive that our sole virtue ethical task ought to be to prepare today’s children for a world that will require their radical adaptation to chaotic swings in weather patterns and coinciding agricultural failures and economic collapse. In such circumstances, prudence would seem to dictate following Trenor’s advice to heed the warnings implicit in Diamond’s Collapse and identify narratives of hope and survival in hopeless situations. Yet as urgently as environmental crisis presents itself, the temporal scales of life’s own struggles and achievements that storied residence compels us to contemplate also become significant in preparing agents for appropriate moral

action. Indeed, among the narratives that residing in place(s) can illuminate are those that describe the ecological and evolutionary dynamics of places that we inhabit today. This is not to encourage narrativistic flights of fantasy or nostalgic yearning for wild lands that our ancestors probably never encountered. But it is to remind ourselves of the mode of our own belonging to these grander stories. And this reminder may in small part help to supply the rational warrant for hope by reminding the storied resident that the drama of earth history is yet unfolding and continues to surprise, astonish, cultivate our wonder, and on occasion to overwhelm us with its beauty. My own sense of things is that despite the evident imminence of environmental crisis, opportunities to cultivate a sense of storied residence still abound globally—even in a warmer, more crowded world. Moreover, these opportunities are more likely to be impeded by human dependence on dislocating technologies, especially those related to information and food distribution and production. To dwell in place in the sense conveyed by storied residence is to interrupt the placelessness that characterizes many contemporary forms of life. More significantly, by fostering the development of a narrative-based sensitivity to one’s emplacement, storied residence supports awareness of the existence of the conditions for environmental crisis, a crisis that undoubtedly seems impossible to those whose narratives are increasingly informed by the dis-embodied and dis-located sources of experience so prevalent today.

Postscript

Although the preceding discussion is framed by concerns that are most germane to environmental ethics, this essay is also an exploration of the significance of bringing together two distinct intuitions concerning the role of narrative in moral development and agency. The first concerns the special domain of environmental ethics where narratives concerning place and places have often been thought to be important

for acquiring or strengthening one’s discernment of and appreciation for environmental values. The idea here is that one might miss out on the benefits of unique and important values if one is unaware of or overlooks the fact that one resides in a particular place (at any given time) and that each place has its own unique ecological and (very likely) cultural history. One’s life is richer in value—more complete—to the extent that one learns the ecological and cultural history of one’s place(s).

On a weak version of this intuition, one might say that knowing these histories adds value to one’s life. A stronger version of this intuition is that place-based narratives are constitutive of agency and self-identity. Indeed, it may be common for people to tacitly respect the values embedded in these narratives because they are broadly reflected in the languages and culture of the people who reside in particular places. One may become more conscientious of the influence of these narratives on one’s worldview, and it may even be possible to moderate that influence. Nonetheless, each of us is more or less tethered to place-based narratives that both inform and transcend our own individual life stories.

For the moment I am not passing judgment on the plausibility of either weak or strong intuitions of place-based narratives, even though the distinction strikes me as non-trivial for a theory of self-identity since the weak version implies that ‘self’ may exist prior to and independently of place. The role of narrative in self-identify, however, also finds expression in theories of virtue. Thus, the second intuition about narrative and self I confront in this essay is one common to virtue ethics, namely that moral agency as reflected in one’s character is encountered reflexively in narrative mode. Our lives are encountered in story form, and each one of us may occupy several stories, which collectively describe origins and imply outcomes for the forms of moral life we take on. These are stories of upbringing, of education, of career, and of relationships. They are stories of choices made and experiences endured. These stories may be fractured or seamless, and they may have a variety of sources, but whether full of fits and starts or marked more by linearity, the stories that circumscribe each of our lives hold open the promise of coherence and supply the basis for an account of our own ability or inability to acquire and grow in the possession of virtue.
Unfortunately, both of these intuitions concerning place-based and virtue-ethical narrativism attract skepticism once one factors in the likelihood that any narrative will be at best a hybrid of fact and fiction. Even a coherent narrative, whether of one’s place or one’s career path, will inevitably be condensed, edited, and will actively recruit the imagination to add flourishes to (or subtract unwanted memories from) the story. Doubts only grow when one considers that we may be only occasionally and then only dimly aware of the stories that circumscribe our lives in place or that help us understand our moral projects. Our minds may echo and distract us with myths, misinformation, and mimetic desires channeled through our parents, teachers, peers and numerous other social forces for conveying information that sometimes fades and sometimes lingers in the space between our ears. Fortunately, to mitigate some of this skepticism, it is also plausible that narratives of place and self can be and ought to be examined (self-) critically—even skeptically—to minimize the influence of flights of fancy or unwarranted optimism (or pessimism) implied by the stories. Whether one story or another ought to persist in determining the trajectory of our future choices is, if Ricouer and Rolston are correct, an option over which we can continue to exercise some control through self-authorship. And as I have begun to argue in this paper, the virtue-oriented approach has much going for it in making sense of how to get the story straight, first for one’s own ethical journey, and second, for those with whom one resides on earth.

**Bibliography**

3. ... Sociology
More than one and a half years have passed since March 11, 2011, when a massive earthquake followed by a disastrous tsunami devastated Japan’s northeastern coastal area. Soon after the tsunami hit the Japanese shore apocalyptic images of drowned coastal regions, villages and towns received worldwide media attention. The outcome of the disaster was present and could be seen everywhere: fortunate people were able to flee on rooftops and hills for safety; unfortunate people were swept off by strong current while fording streets, which suddenly turned into rivers; houses, ships, cars and trucks were swept away by torrents of water. Most of the seawalls, which had been erected to prevent tsunami damage proved insufficient. Shocking news about the natural disaster were followed by disturbing news about the nuclear disaster in Fukushima. In particular Western Europe was painfully reminded of the Chernobyl disaster of 1986. In the subsequent weeks and months in many parts of the world the fate of the survivors receded into the background in the face of the nuclear crisis. However, since then, irrespective of pressing problems due to the simultaneous meltdowns at three reactors, news about Fukushima have almost disappeared from the global TV screens. Only in March 2012, on the anniversary of the catastrophe, the Fukushima nuclear crisis got wide media coverage for a short period of time. Many TV channels ran programs about Fukushima—the region, its people and their present situation as well as the current state of the nuclear power plant. Visual and print media reported about the progress of rebuilding
measures and took a look at how the crisis shaped the role of nuclear power around the world.

Since March 11 Japan is relentlessly fighting on two fronts at the same time: 1) The elimination of the horrible devastation caused by the tsunami, that is the reconstruction of the North-east coast of Honshu, 2) stabilizing the severely damaged Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant and the radiation crisis. Up to this day, the situation is far from being under control. Northeastern Honshu is frequently experiencing earthquakes with varying degrees of severity. As there are no appropriate measures to gain control over the reactors, radiation is still being released into the environment and large-scale radioactive contamination continues to spread. To give but one example, end of September 2011 plutonium and strontium were detected 50 kilometres away from the Fukushima power plant.1 In 2012, a highly radioactive black substance kept appearing in places across Japan and was found at Harajuku station in Tokyo.2

“Fukushima” has not only attracted extremely wide media coverage but also academic attention. In the meantime, a plethora of studies has been published on March 11 and its aftermaths, covering an impressive range of topics, methods and materials. There is such an abundance of publications in both Japanese as well as Western languages available that neither a complete overview of the status quo nor the relevance of data and information is hardly possibly any more.3 In addition, numerous movies and documentaries about the catastrophe have made it to the screens and film festivals.4 Countless literary works have been published

4 In February 2012, the Berlin Film Festival (Berlinale) screened three Japanese movies about the Fukushima nuclear disaster: No Man’s Zone, directed by Fujiiwara Toshi, Nuclear Nation, directed by Funahashi Atsushi and Friends After 3.11, directed by Iwai Shunji.
which engage in the current debate and attempt to respond to the
disaster from various perspectives.\(^5\) To name but a few examples: One
approach is to reexamine Japanese history with regard to the question of
how central Japan and its large metropolitan areas have suppressed and/
or exploited remote and sparsely populated areas for their own purpos-
es.\(^6\) Another approach is to investigate the nuclear disaster from a more
historical perspective and to relate it with the dropping of the atomic
bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 on the one hand, and
Japan’s growing dependence on nuclear energy and its close links with
the USA since the post-war period on the other. Against this backdrop,
the notion of “Cold War love affairs between the United States and Ja-
pan” has been introduced, thus investigating the extent to which the
causes of the Fukushima nuclear disaster are to be found within national
boundaries and to resituate them in an international context.\(^7\)

In spring 2012 a number of interim reports on the Fukushima di-
saster were published, giving the impression that the catastrophe might
be over to some extent. In fact, however, because stricken areas extend
widely and radiation continues to be released all aspects of the disas-
ter are still far from being comprehended. In short, it is far too early to
take stock of the situation and to draw concluding opinions. Against

\(^5\) For an anthology of Fukushima literature translated into English, see E. Luke and D.
Karashima (eds.), \textit{March Was Made of Yarn: Reflections on the Japanese Earthquake, Tsunami,
and Nuclear Meltdown}, Vintage, New York 2012. For an in-depth review of Fukushima literature
anthologies published so far, see L. Gebhardt, „Ein Jahr nach Fukushima: Reaktionen der japa-
nischen Literaturszene auf die Dreifachkatastrophe“, 2012. For an investigation of post-Fukushi-
ma works by Wagô Ryôichi and Furukawa Hideo and their political implications, see T. Kimoto,
„Post-3/11 Literature: Two Writers from Fukushima“, \textit{World Literature Today}, 86(1), 2012; see also
Vol 9, Issue 29, No 4, 2011. The interview given by the writer Yû Miri to the literary scholar
Kristina Iwata-Weickgenannt provides important insights, cf. K. Iwata-Weickgenannt, „’Vieles
wird man nur begreifen, wenn man es langfristig verfolgt’ – Interview mit der Autorin Yû Miri

\(^6\) The term \textit{Tôhoku gaku} (studies of the northeast) has been labelled to define a local, i.e.
north eastern school of thought that reassesses Japanese history in questioning the relationship
between the centre and the periphery and exploring how central Japan has suppressed and/or
exploited the more remote areas.

\(^7\) In March 2011 Lisa Yoneyama held a lecture entitled \textit{Dialectical Images of History After
Fukushima: Cold War Amnesia and the Transpacific Anti-Nuclear Counter-Citizenry}. In her
abstract she used the expression „Cold War love affairs between the United States and Japan“, cf.
this backdrop, I will concentrate on a few of the many issues, namely those, which are of special interest for me from the point of view of Japanese studies.

2. Social aspects and historical backgrounds of the disaster

2.1 Devastation and destruction, displacement, fear of stigmatization and trauma

March 11 caused huge material damage and irreparable human losses. It is estimated that the reconstruction of the era damaged by the tsunami will take at least 10 years. The costs of the disaster can hardly be calculated, estimates vary between 100 and 300 billion euros. The scale of human victims and material damage is enormous: More than 15,000 people died in the tsunami. Nearly 7,000 people are still missing, more than 6,000 have been injured. An area of more than 130 square kilometres around the power plant is expected to be uninhabitable for an unknown period of time. Around 2,400 square kilometres of soil are contaminated. The immense waters of the tsunami with waves up to 38 meters high travelled in some cases up to 10 kilometres inland, devastating a surface of 470 square kilometres. More than 100,000 houses were completely destroyed, more than 100,000 have been badly damaged. More than 90 per cent of the victims were drowned in the flood, a quarter of them was older than 70 years. Countless families have been dispersed or decimated. More than 100,000 children have lost their home, more than 100 children their parents. More than 500,000 people lost their homes and all of their possessions, some counts even put the number of homeless people at 700,000. Place names such as Kesennuma and Rikuzentakata have been indelibly etched into the global memory as synonyms of the catastrophe: These and other villages were literally washed away by the tsunami and reduced to debris and ash. Large areas of agricultural land are flooded by saltwater and are not usable for agriculture for an unforeseeable time. The public infrastructure has been badly destroyed. Countless historical and cultural landmarks, among them many shrines and temples, are heavily damaged.
Due to the ongoing nuclear crisis in the Fukushima region tens of thousands of people are still displaced. 160,000 of the refugees have their home in the 20 kilometres no-go zone around the nuclear plant and therefore had no choice but to leave. In fear of nuclear radiation an unknown number of people, including more than 10,000 children, have left Fukushima on their own accord. One year later, an estimated 80,000 of so-called Fukushima nuclear refugees or nuclear evacuees (Fukushima genpatsu nanmin) are living in government-issued temporary housing or elsewhere. A number of evacuees fled abroad and some of them even tried to get refugee status. For example, a Japanese woman who claimed exposure to radiation from the damaged nuclear reactors was denied refugee status in Canada in February 2012. All these people have fled the earthquake, the tsunami and the nuclear disaster. Being caught between an uncertain future and a broken past they often have to endure harsh judgements of their countrymen who see their choice to flee their homes in the disaster-hit area as “un-Japanese”. Those who chose to seek safety for themselves were accused of betrayal by those left behind. Consequently, large numbers of people are under constant physical and mental stress, many of the survivors are discouraged, lonely, and emotionally spent.

Extreme loneliness and suicide have become issues in post-tsunami Japan. Concerns about suicide and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) are growing among mental health specialists working in the region. The initial trauma of the devastating earthquake and tsunami in March 2011 may be dying down, but the hurdles for victims to overcome have only become more varied. While shelter and food have been immediate needs seven months ago, people now seem to be most desperate for hope and dignity. After many of the disaster relief volunteers and

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8 http://www.stromtarife.de/archiv/11/07/0103.html.
outsiders have gone, it is easy for the feelings of abandonment to come in. The displacement has been traumatic, and now loneliness is an even more serious problem. Many of the survivors are now living in small homes built in parking lots and school playgrounds. Quite a lot of them had lived on their coastal land for generations until the tsunami hit. In particular older people who have left the temporary shelter and now live on their own in the newly built houses commit suicide.\textsuperscript{13}

The fear of radiation was prevalent after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings and stigmatized the survivors, known as \textit{hibakusha}, or people exposed to radiation. Many \textit{hibakusha} concealed their past for fear of discrimination that would prevent them finding work or marriage partners. Similar prejudices may emerge again and there are signs that stigma might become a serious problem for the people in the Fukushima region. For example, in April 2011 Fukushima schoolchildren were being bullied at their new school in Chiba prefecture near Tokyo for “carrying radiation.” An 11-year-old Fukushima boy was hospitalized in Niigata prefecture after being bullied at his new school.\textsuperscript{14} In September 2012 the chairman of Ecosystem Conservation Society-Japan recommended that people from Fukushima prefecture to Kanagawa prefecture, located south of Tokyo, should avoid marriage to prevent births of deformed babies. This statement was heavily criticized because of its discriminatory meaning.\textsuperscript{15} However, it is an indication that an enormous number of people are still far from normal life.


2.2 The Fukushima nuclear crisis and Japan’s “nuclear village”

2.2.1 Downplaying the extent of the disaster and the impact of radiation on humans and the environment

Apart from the reconstruction of the vast area hit by the tsunami the ongoing nuclear disaster will occupy Japan for many decades to come. In 2011 TEPCO, the owner of the damaged nuclear plant, announced to gain control over the reactors in January 2012. In December 2011 the Japanese government declared the Fukushima nuclear plant to be in a state of „cold shutdown“, meaning that nine months after the worst nuclear accident since Chernobyl the Fukushima plant has now been stabilized. In contrast to such soothing statements Murata Mitsuhei, Japan’s former ambassador to Switzerland, told a news conference at the foreign correspondents’ club of Japan in June 2012, that the Fukushima Daiichi plants are „not under control at all... and the situation with nuclear reactors in Japan is like vehicles being driven without a license“.

In particular Reactor Number 4 is the cause for the alarming picture concerning coming disaster scenarios. This reactor holds large quantities of cooling waters surrounding more than 1,500 spent fuel rods, all bound by a fragile concrete pool located 30 metres above the ground, and exposed to the elements. If an earthquake or other event were to cause this pool to drain this could result in a catastrophic radiological fire involving nearly 10 times the amount of Cesium-137 released by the Chernobyl accident. In other words, „[T]he Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant Number 4 reactor presents a security problem for the entire world“.

Conflicting opinions not only exist about the state of the Fukushima plant but also about the extent of radioactive contamination in the Fukushima region and their health-related implications and long-term

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19 Ibid.
effects. Before March 11 Fukushima Prefecture was a densely populated area with more than two million people and one of the agricultural heartlands of Japan.\textsuperscript{20} It’s half the size of Belgium. The extent of radioactive contamination in the Fukushima region is at the centre of important debates as some scientists, NGOs, and citizen’s groups argue that the Japanese government has not gone far enough in dealing with the radioactive fallout from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and has deliberately downplayed the potential health effects of radiation. This is reflected by the fact that much attention focuses on the Fukushima region, while there is less consideration of the impact of the nuclear crisis on other parts of Japan.

According to Fujioka Atsushi, Professor of Economics and a specialist on the US nuclear economy, space and intelligence strategy, not only the Japanese government but also journalists and media who are loyal to the government and to Japan’s nuclear industry, try to downplay the consequences of the Fukushima accident.\textsuperscript{21} Fujioka illustrates his arguments with the following observation: On March 14, 2011 in reactor Nr. 3—in which so-called MOX fuel, that is plutonium and uranium mixed fuel was used—an explosion took place, which was accompanied by a violent thundering sound and emitted a mushroom cloud several hundred meters high. This horrifying spectacle was widely reported abroad, including video footage.\textsuperscript{22} But NHK, Japan’s public broadcaster would not permit the airing of this video or others like it. The other major mass media outlets also consistently played down the scope of the ongoing nuclear catastrophe, minimizing the threat it posed. According

\textsuperscript{20} It is estimated that if all people who evacuated to other prefectures remain outside of Fukushima Prefecture, its population in 2040 would be 1,225,000, compared with 1,989,000 in October 2011 (http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/AJ201208300072). Over the next 10 years, the OECD projects that Japan’s population will fall by 5 million people and 32 million over the next 40 years, but a disproportionate amount of that decline will occur in the six prefectures of Tohoku. According to Japanese government statistics, Tohoku’s population fell by 3.2 per cent in the 2005–2010 period, the exact opposite of the Greater Tokyo area (Tokyo, Chiba, Kanagawa, Saitama), which rose 3.2 per cent in the same period. The earthquake is likely to spur an even greater exodus out of Tohoku into more developed areas with better job prospects (http://accjjournal.com/remapping-re-envisioning-revitalizing/).


\textsuperscript{22} Cf. for example http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZE\_87wRXsDg.
to Fujioka it was thus foreigners who were first made aware and fully informed that in “the country of Hiroshima” a catastrophe on a par with Chernobyl was taking place. Fujioka further points out that in the first stages of the crisis its true nature was not fully reported even to the rulers of the USA: “From data collected by an unmanned Global Hawk spy plane, the U.S. realized that temperatures in the reactors were extraordinarily high. It reached the conclusion that ‘the nuclear fuel had already melted down’ and pressed its Japanese counterparts for accurate information.”23 In the early morning of March 16, with this information still being withheld from the public, the USA issued a threat: “We’ll issue an emergence evacuation order for all 90,000 Americans in Tokyo to leave Japan. Do you really want to plunge Tokyo into panic?” In response, the Japanese government finally permitted the dispatch of a large number of U.S. specialists to crisis headquarters.24

Many observers argue that the Japanese government agencies are in a conflict of interest as they are responsible for promoting nuclear power and simultaneously are supposed to regulate it. Japan’s nuclear industry has a long history of lying and hiding facts about nuclear failures and accidents and downplaying the risks. Since the 1950s, Japan’s nuclear politics have been controlled by the main promoters of nuclear power, also known as Japan’s „nuclear village“ (genpatsu mura) spanning industry, government, and academia. However, despite strong connections between the members of this Iron Triangle of nuclear power, politicians and firms have rushed to frame events and push responsibility for incompetence or mishandling of the Fukushima disaster onto others. This complex mixture of economic and political interests and influences persists in the present and certainly will continue in the future. Jeff Kingston summarizes the situation as follows:

„The Village’s perimeter defenses may have been breached, but the ramparts remain well defended. Japan’s new national energy strategy 2012 may call for phasing out nuclear power, or significant downsizing, but there will be opportunities for the Village to reverse this reversal. It has the resources and resilience to overcome its opposition and has much riding on the outcome. Just

24 Cf. ibid.
as the 2010 strategy was scrapped due to an unanticipated nuclear accident, some shock such as an energy supply disrupting war in the Middle East or a financial crisis could derail phasing out of nuclear energy."25

2.2.2 Narrowing down disaster-affected areas and creating a climate of uncertainty and distrust

The Japanese government has taken the position that no one outside of the vicinity of the Fukushima Daiichi plant is likely to suffer health effects from the radiation that has been released since March 11. However, since then food safety has become a serious issue. The Fukushima coastline has been famous for its rich fishing grounds. Soon after March 11 there was a ban on fishing along the Fukushima coast due to the contamination of fish. The ban was lifted in June 2012, but fish captured near the Fukushima nuclear plant still show to be carrying high and even record levels of radiation. In August 2012 fish captured in this area were contaminated with 25,800 becquerel of cesium per kilo, i.e. 258 times the level government deems safe for consumption.26 In 2011 Japanese green tea, esteemed around the world for its purity and health-enhancing properties, has become contaminated with radiation, too. Shizuoka prefecture is Japan’s biggest tea-growing area and is located southwest of Tokyo, 360 km from Fukushima. Green tea from Shizuoka but also from other outstanding tea cultivation areas such as Chiba, Ibaraki, Kanagawa and Tochigi contains radiation higher than the officially permitted level. The contamination opened a furious argument among local and national officials about how to measure the radiation, and what constitutes a safe level of contamination. Particular attention is placed on the Kanto region, a large area of central Japan that includes Tokyo and nearly 1/3 of Japan’s population. In December 2011 radioactive cesium was detected in breast milk from mothers in Hiroshima Prefecture, located more than 840 km from the Fukushima plant.27

As shown by these examples, the Fukushima disaster is not limited to the Fukushima region at all, instead radioactive material is spread

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across all parts of Japan. Critics of the Japanese government frequently point out that we simply do not know what effects low levels of radiation and the presence of isotopes in the human body will have on long-term health. A climate of distrust, concern and even suspicion among the public towards official statements has been created. Many Japanese, especially parents of young children, are doubtful and worried, and, for example, arrange in the absence of direct government support, to have samples of their children’s urine tested, often with disturbing results. The following story has been reported in various media in September 2011. A mother in Saitama Prefecture located in the north of Tokyo arranged to have a sample of her daughter’s urine tested. The test indicated that despite stringent efforts to protect her daughter from exposure to contaminated food and airborne radiation, the result was 0.4 becquerel of cesium-137 per kilogram of urine. Cesium-137, with a half-life of just over 30 years, is one of main radioactive isotopes released from the Fukushima Daiichi plant. Measures that the mother took to protect her daughter from exposure included hunting down produce from Kyushu—the southernmost of Japan’s major islands and the furthest from Fukushima—even going so far as to buy 80 eggs at a time from a mail order company in the far south. She has also used bottled water exclusively and washes clothes, umbrellas, and the walls and floors of her home daily.²⁸ Stories like this one are by no means uncommon as many in the Kanto area have become increasingly mistrustful of the safety of their food supply, despite government claims that health risks are negligible. The story also alludes to the strength of alternative information networks in the wake of the March crisis. After announcing her daughter’s test results on Twitter, the mother’s number of followers jumped from a number of close acquaintances to 700 people asking for details and advice about how to have their own children tested.²⁹

There are reports of mothers who have strictly controlled their children’s behaviour (such as not allowing them to play in parks and making them always wear a mask outdoors) finding trace amounts of ce-

sium upon arranging urine tests with private companies. Urine tests conducted on children in Fukushima show considerably higher levels of radioactive isotopes than anything that has been seen in Kanto, over three times as much in some cases. The Japanese Ministry of Education, Science and Technology has deemed these levels “extremely small” and claim that they will not result in health effects. Sakiyama Hisako, an influential radiation health researcher, disagrees: “We cannot simply state that there are no potential health problems because the amount detected is low. We simply do not know what happens when even extremely low levels of radiation move through internal organs, the nervous system, and the brain”.30

In June 2012 it was reported that of more than 38,000 children tested from the Fukushima Prefecture 35 per cent have abnormal thyroid growths likely from radiation exposure.31 However, these results have not been widely reported. The Australian pediatrician Dr. Helen Caldicott noted that Japanese officials are not sharing ultrasound results with foremost experts of thyroid nodules in children and accused the media of “practicing psychic numbing,” saying that she does not understand why media outlets are choosing to ignore the nuclear fallout. She further explains that the high rate of abnormal growths in Fukushima children is very unusual—it usually takes five to 70 years to see what the medical implications of radiation are—and insisted that the international medical community become involved.32


3.1 Some facts about the metropolitan area of Tokyo

The metropolitan area of Tokyo is inhabited by more than 35 million people and is said to be the world’s largest metropolitan economy. Most of Japan’s major political, economical and cultural institutions are located in Tokyo. Nearly one third of Japan’s economic output is produced in Tokyo. Various definitions of Tokyo exist: 1) The urban core area consists of 23 wards, covering an area of 621 square kilometres. More than 8.5 million people live here, the population density exceeds 14,000 people per square kilometre. 2) In a wider sense there is the Greater Tokyo Area, consisting of most of the prefectures of Chiba, Kanagawa (including Yokohama), Saitama and Tokyo at the centre. More than 35 million people live here, making it the world’s most populous metropolitan area by far. It covers an area of approximately 13,500 square kilometres, giving it a population density of more than 2,600 person/km². From above, Tokyo looks like a maze made up of buildings, roads, waterways and green spaces, without defined boundaries. Driving through Tokyo gives the visitor the impression of an unlimited urban entity, where the urban areas and their hinterland no longer constitute a clearly demarcated unit. The only limits to Tokyo’s expansion are the ocean in the east and the mountains in the west.

At this point, I will reflect on observations and issues that have concerned me since March 11. I was supposed to spend March and April 2011 in Tokyo for doing research about the slow city movement in Japan, in particular the revitalization of some of Tokyo’s backstreets and waterways. One of these areas is Yanaka, one of Tokyo’s old town areas that have been successful in preserving their local character. At weekends, Yanaka is flooded with people who are on leisurely strolls or shopping. In the morning of March 11, I went downtown Tokyo to explore Yanaka. After noon, I went to Ikebukuro, one of Tokyo’s central areas, where there are a huge train station and great shopping facilities. Around a quarter to 3 p.m. the earth started shaking, for a couple of minutes. During the earthquake I was in the ground floor of a restaurant. Very
soon it became clear that this was not one of the small earthquakes that occur quite frequently in Tokyo, but a very massive one. Plates flew off the shelves, some of the customers stayed calm, others tried to control their fears.

3.2 The complete standstill of Tokyo on March 11

The complete standstill of Tokyo immediately after the quake not only was a very impressive experience for me, but certainly also will enter the collective memory of Tokyo’s residents. Tokyo holds a special position among the world’s mega cities due to its extremely efficient public transport system, not only in terms of capacities but also in terms of disaster preparedness. During the earthquake trains that run like clockwork were shut down immediately, stranding hordes of commuters carrying mobile phones rendered useless by widespread outages. While residents can usually rely on a huge and perfect network of train and subway lines, authorities were forced to scan the entire web for quake damage and cancelled nearly all train service for the day. The quake shook buildings in Tokyo and left millions of homes across Japan without electricity. Japan’s mobile phone network was severely disrupted, and even telephone landlines were hit. Tokyo’s post-quake standstill makes aware of the vulnerability of mega-cities to natural catastrophes. Tokyo is considered to have one of the most efficient public transport systems of the world. More than 40 million trips by subway and railway are conducted each day. In case of a strong earthquake Tokyo’s public transport system is shut down automatically. In 2005 a study showed that a strong earthquake occurring on a weekday at 6 p.m. would make four million commuters to walk home. More than 600,000 of them would attempt to reach one of the bigger train stations to stay there. More than 140,000 of them would stay in Tokyo Station. This situation occurred on March 11. After the shutdown of Tokyo’s transport system most of the hotels were booked up in a few minutes. More than six million people started walking back home. A huge number of people

spent the night in their office or in public buildings that were kept open for this night. Many commuters reached their home only the next day. The Japanese media created for those people who tried to reach their home by foot the term *kitaku nanmin*, „refugees on their way home“. I myself also was a *kitaku nanmin* and walked back home in the night, in the midst of the moving masses. I was in particular impressed by the calm and self-controlled mood of the walkers. People walked with brisk steps, without being rushed. Everybody seemed to have known what to do. The earthquake has shown that Tokyo’s people are well prepared for an earthquake and that most of Tokyo’s buildings are earthquake resistant.

3.3 Ecologically sustainability and energy efficiency of large buildings

The main quake had the enormous duration of nearly five minutes. Skyscrapers such as the 238 metres high Mori Tower swayed for up to 13 minutes, without receiving bigger or serious damages. In recent years, in response to the disastrous Kobe earthquake in 1995, immense amounts of money were spent to make buildings more earthquake resistant. The March 11 earthquake damaged only a few buildings in Tokyo. Seen from the point of view of earthquake resistance Tokyo’s skyscrapers are very sustainably constructed. An impressive example is the so-call Sky Tree in the east of Tokyo, a television and radio broadcasting tower, which is still under construction. It reached its full height of 634 metres on March 18, seven days after the earthquake. During the quake around 500 workers were at the construction site, nobody of them was injured. However, how about the ecological sustainability and energy efficiency of Tokyo’s skyscrapers – and skyscrapers in general? Tokyo’s skyscrapers and infrastructure such as its railway system lay the foundations for its functional efficiency, but both are very energy hungry. The power consumption of the elevators and lifts alone resembles that of little towns. Signs of renewable energy such as photovoltaic systems or solar panels are still difficult to find.

In fact, current rankings of energy efficient skyscrapers list no building in Japan. However, in recent years progress has been made in this
field in Japan.\textsuperscript{34} In 1998, an internationally recognized green building certification system, the so-called \textit{Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design} (LEED) has been incepted in the USA. This system provides third-party verification that a building or community was designed and built using strategies of sustainability such as energy savings, water efficiency, CO\textsubscript{2} emissions reduction, improved indoor environmental quality, etc. Other countries followed to introduce comparable certification systems for green building. In 2001, Japan introduced the \textit{CASBEE}, the \textit{Comprehensive Assessment System for Built Environment Efficiency}.\textsuperscript{35} Currently, there are only a few buildings in Japan, which accomplish the required standards. A representative example is the Breezé Tower in Osaka, completed in 2008. It has a double glass front, the space in-between serves as a natural air-conditioning system. However, apart from a few exceptions most of Japan’s large buildings have a high energy requirement. In Japan – and elsewhere – it is still a long way to go before green architecture is becoming standard.

3.4 Politics and ethics of “energy saving” (setsuden)

The quake and its aftermath clearly demonstrate Japan’s large dependence on nuclear energy and unveiled the country’s failure in investing in renewable energy. It also shows how fragile and vulnerable Tokyo’s supply of energy is in the event of an earthquake. Japan’s electricity supply is provided by a few companies, which have monopoly in their respective regional markets. The biggest of them is TEPCO, which produces 27\% of Japan’s electric power. TEPCO enjoys a quasi monopoly in the metropolitan area of Tokyo and its surroundings, supplying an area with 45 million people. In other words, the electricity supply of one third of Japan’s population is secured by one company only. Since March 11 electricity has become a scarce source in the metropolitan area of Tokyo and electricity supply is severely restricted. The Fukushima Daiichi plant is irretrievably damaged. Its destruction led Japan to shut down its 54 nuclear reactors for regular maintenance or stress testing


after the Fukushima accident in the course of a year. On May 2012, the third reactor at the Tomari plant, in Hokkaido prefecture, was shutting down for routine maintenance, leaving Japan without energy from atomic power for the first time for more than 40 years. However some of Japan’s nuclear power plants are supposed to be restarted in the near future, but due to the growing resistance at the local level against their reopening nobody knows when this will be going to happen. In June 2012 the Japanese government gave final approval for the restart of two nuclear reactors of the Ōi nuclear power station in western Fukui prefecture thus taking a 180 degree turn to its post-Fukushima aim of abandoning nuclear power.

As summer 2011 approached the only way to avoid a national energy emergency was through drastic conservation. The Japanese powered down. Setsuden, or “energy saving,” has become a major buzzword of the year. Setsuden stands for an ambitious and strikingly successful campaign to conserve electricity after March 11. Subways were running with fewer trains. Industries, offices and private households turned lights off and thermostats up. Street lighting was reduced. Many escalators were turned off. The government required big power users to reduce peak consumption by 15 per cent. Japan’s carmakers agreed to work on Saturdays and Sundays and move their weekend break to Thursdays and Fridays in order to use energy at off-peak times and help to avoid power shortages. Office workers moved their shifts to early mornings and weekends, climbed the stairs and worked by the dim glow of computer screens and LED lamps. Families stopped doing laundry every day. Department stores and subway stations turned off the air-conditioning. Posters of happy cartoon light bulbs urged everybody to pitch in. In September 2011, the government lifted restrictions on power use, weeks ahead of schedule. Tokyo lit up again, having avoided blackouts.

38 Cf. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/98112586-b832-11e1-86f7-00144feabdec0.html#axzz2z7em-RymfH.
by keeping peak use well below last year’s levels. However, the challenges are far from over. As Japan debates when or whether to bring nuclear plants back to life, it is firing up old oil- and gas-powered plants, a setback in its battle to curb greenhouse emissions. Some worry that the *setsuden* spirit will wear off. Against the background of Tokyo’s enormous electricity demand I was deeply impressed by the energy-saving measures that were taken immediately after the quake to prevent blackouts. To give an example: In March 2011, friends of mine didn’t use their electric heating, even it was pretty cold at that time and their apartment reached not more than 14 degrees.

4. The world’s first nuclear power plant (*genpatsu*) earthquake disaster (*shinsai*) and the Post-Fukushima era

4.1 Warning voices

The worst-case scenario of March 11 has been anticipated for many years. In Japan, countless books have been written about the risks and dangers of nuclear power. One of the most well known anti-nuclear activists is Hirose Takashi. Since the early 1980s he has written a whole shelf full of books and articles, mostly on the nuclear power industry and the military-industrial complex. Hirose’s warnings are well known in Japan. Probably his best-known work is *Nuclear Power Plants for Tokyo!* (*Tôkyô ni genpatsu wo!*), published in August 1986, in the year of the Chernobyl disaster. In this book he took the logic of the nuke promoters to its logical conclusion: if you are so sure that they’re safe, why not build them in the centre of the city, instead of hundreds of miles away where you lose half the electricity in the wires? Soon after March 11 Hirose wrote *Fukushima Meltdown: The World’s First Earthquake-Tsunami Nuclear Disaster*, Kindle Books, 2011. See also T. Hirose T., „Japan’s Earthquake-Tsunami-Nuclear Disaster Syndrome: An Unprecedented Form of Catastrophe,“ *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, Vol. 9, Issue 39 No 1, 2011, and T. Hirose and C. D. Lummis, „The Nuclear Disaster That Could Destroy Japan:
nami-Nuclear Disaster (Japanese title: Fukushima genpatsu merutodaun), which has become a best seller in Japan and also has been translated into English. In Fukushima Meltdown he makes clear the absurdity of putting nuclear power plants anywhere on the earthquake and volcano prone Japanese archipelago—and by extension, anywhere in the world. Japan’s nuclear power plants are all exposed to high seismic risk.

Ishibashi Katsuhiko, a specialist of seismotectonics, warned in response to the 6.8 magnitude temblor of July 2007, which caused considerable damage to the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant, which is said to be the biggest in the world, about the fundamental vulnerability of nuclear power plants. Already in 1997 Ishibashi coined the term genpatsu shinsai to describe an unprecedented phenomenon: a combined nuclear power plant (genpatsu) earthquake disaster (shinsai). The first genpatsu shinsai in Japan’s history took place on March 11, 2011. Such warnings recall a conversation I had with a Japanese sociologist at a conference in Tokyo in 2008. He was very concerned about Japan’s dependency on nuclear energy and that the risks related to Tokyo’s energy demand were shifted to its hinterland. He used the expression Tôkyô no gaibusei (externality of Tokyo) to point out that 70 per cent of Tokyo’s energy supply is produced outside Tokyo. He explained that in the case of a nuclear accident the Fukushima region would be in great danger. However, Tokyo is no exception: most cities produce their energy outside. In fact, many nuclear power plants are in the vicinity of cities.


4.2 The end of “the safety myth of nuclear energy” (*anzen shinwa*) in Post-Fukushima Japan

Soon after March 11 the term “Post-Fukushima era” was coined. This term suggests a departure from the past. What expectations do people in Japan pin on this term? Since March 11 there has been a profound reversal of sentiment on nuclear power in Japan. The *myth of the nuclear safety* (*anzen shinwa*), as it was created in post-war Japan under the impact of the nuclear politics of the USA, is losing credibility. Over several decades Japan’s nuclear establishment has devoted vast resources to persuade the public of the safety and necessity of nuclear power. Plant operators built lavish, fantasy-filled public relations buildings that became tourist attractions. Bureaucrats spun elaborate advertising campaigns through a multitude of organizations established solely to advertise the safety of nuclear plants. Politicians pushed through the adoption of government-mandated school textbooks with friendly views of nuclear power. The result was the widespread adoption of the belief — called the “safety myth” — that Japan’s nuclear power plants were absolutely safe. The belief helps to explain why in the only nation to have been attacked with atomic bombs the acceptance of nuclear power was so strong that the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl were barely registered.

However, since March 11 a dramatic shift-around in Japanese attitudes to nuclear energy is taking place. Even conservative thinkers have started to contemplate a Japanese energy future without nuclear energy. A newspaper poll of May 2011 suggested that 74 per cent of Japanese want to gradually phase out nuclear power completely. Another poll found that only 5 per cent of Japanese had confidence in the safe operation of the nation’s nuclear power plants, while 60 per cent had little or no confidence in them.

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4.3 The gearing up of Japan’s anti-nuclear movement

The gearing up of Japan’s anti-nuclear movement expresses peoples’ hope that the post-Fukushima era will lead to a move towards alternative energy sources and to the shut down of Japan’s nuclear power plants. Furthermore, it expresses the hope that the future will bring the strengthening of civil rights. Japan has a long history of non-governmental organizations and citizens’ initiatives that take on the concerns of the environment. Japan’s anti-nuclear movement is very diverse in terms of organization and modes of expression. For example, since the Chernobyl disaster a number of pop songs have become classics in Japan’s anti-nuclear pop culture. Recently, rap songs with anti nuke content have become popular.\footnote{For a list of japanese songs on nuclear power and music of resistance in Post-Fukushima Japan, cf. http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/原子力発電を主題にした楽曲の一覧. The list covers songs from the early 1980s until now.} Since March 11, Japan’s anti-nuclear movement is gearing up. Company workers, students, and parents with children regularly rally across Japan, venting their anger at the government’s handling of the crisis, carrying flags bearing the words „No Nukes!“ and „No More Fukushima“. While soon after March 11 only some hundred protesters staged demonstrations, during the summer of 2011 more and more people participated. In August 2011, about 2,500 people including farmers and fishermen marched in Tokyo. They are suffering heavy losses following the Fukushima nuclear disaster, and called for prompt compensation from TEPCO and the government.\footnote{For issues of compensation, cf. D. McNeill, „The Fukushima Nuclear Crisis and the Fight for Compensation,“ \textit{The Asia-Pacific Journal}, Vol. 10, Issue 10 No 6, 2012.} On September 19th, 2011, Japan’s anti-nuclear movement reached its temporary peak. In Tokyo more than 60,000 protesters marched to the beat of drums, waved banners and chanted “Sayonara nuclear power” to call for a complete shutdown of Japan’s nuclear power plants and to demand a shift in government policy toward alternative sources of energy. Among the event’s supporters were the politically active writer Ōe Kenzaburō, who won the Nobel Prize for literature in 1994, and the musician Sakamoto Ryū’ichi.\footnote{Cf. http://sayonara-nukes.org/english/.} However, the police are attempting to suppress the protests.
and media linked to Japan’s nuclear village try to downplay the extent of the demonstrations. During a No-Nukes demonstration in Shinjuku, Tokyo, on September 11, 2011 twelve participants were arrested without any reasonable grounds. The well-known writers and critiques Karatani Kôjin, Ukai Satoshi and Oguma Eiji published in response to this event a Joint Statement for the Freedom of Demonstration and Assembly on September 29, 2011.51 As reaction to the government’s attempts to restart Japan’s nuclear industry in 2012, demonstrations against atomic power have begun to generate serious steam. During the summer of 2012, on several occasions, mostly on a Friday afternoon, ten thousands of people gathered in Tokyo thus forming huge anti-nuclear events never seen before in Japan. On July 16, an estimated 100,000 people demonstrated against nuclear power in Tokyo, followed by a series of similar large demonstrations. November 2012, more than 10,000 people from across Japan were seeking criminal charges against officials of Japan’s government and the utility that operates the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant, after a similar mass complaint this summer accused 33 officials of causing death and injury through negligence. The complainants argue that a broadly backed complaint would show that the general public is seeking criminal accountability for those who promoted nuclear power—and hold them responsible for damage from the disaster and for exposing victims to radiation.52 Japan’s anti-nuclear movement is triggered by fierce debates about restarting selected nuclear power plants such as Ōi nuclear power plant in Fukui prefecture.53

53 For a comprehensive overview of Japan’s anti-nuclear movement cf. E. Oguma, „Japan’s Nuclear Power and Anti-Nuclear Movement from a Socio-Historical Perspective“, 2012.
4.4 Japan’s energy options after Fukushima

Until March 11 nuclear energy was seen in Japan as the way forward to securing a clean energy future and becoming a “low carbon society”.\(^5^4\) The government planned to boost nuclear power to 50 per cent of the total from its pre-Fukushima share of just over 30 per cent by 2030.\(^5^5\) However, the Fukushima disaster led to a complete turn-around on energy politics in autumn 2012. As of September 2012, most Japanese support the call to halt all use of nuclear energy. September 14 the Japanese government announced a dramatic change of direction in energy policy. It would seek to phase out nuclear power by 2040. This statement marks a historic shift for a country that has long staked its future on nuclear energy, however, it falls far short of the decisive steps the government had promised in the wake of March 11. At least, according to the recent announcement there will be no new construction of nuclear power plants, a 40-year lifetime limit on existing nuclear plants, and any further nuclear plant restarts will need to meet tough safety standards of the new independent regulatory authority. Furthermore, the new approach to meeting energy needs will also involve huge investments to commercialize the use of renewable energy sources such as wind power and solar power.

With the growth of hostility towards nuclear power, Japanese energy policy is now in a state of considerable disarray. There are no clear ideas about how the looming shortages in energy supply will be filled without re-starting of Japan’s currently offline nuclear power plants. There are no clear ideas about how the gap in energy needs would be covered if nuclear power were to be phased out over the longer term. Following March 11 the government has begun a process of reviewing its energy policy and specifically the role of nuclear power in the country. The choices that Japan makes will have important implications for energy and climate change policy for Japan and globally. In summer 2012 two of the four


Reactors of Ōi Nuclear Power Plant in Fukui Prefecture were restarted, provoking fierce anti-nuclear protests. Can there be a speedy transition to renewable energy sources in Japan? The problem is that there is not much clarity on anything right now. Solar and wind currently account for less than 3 per cent of Japan’s energy capacity. The hope is that energy supplied from these sources will quintuple in ten years, but that solves less than half the problem.56

4.5 Two decades of bad news for Japan and the hopes of the post-Fukushima area

The last 20 years have been difficult times for Japan. Since the bursting of the bubble in the late 1980s Japan has been faced with difficult political, social and economic problems and issues. To give but a few examples: 1995 was the year of the disastrous Kobe earthquake and the sarin gas attacks in Tokyo’s subways; since the late 1990s Japan’s suicide rate is one of the highest in the world; since 2005 Japan’s population is shrinking; the financial crisis of 2008 led to a recession in Japan in 2009; in 2010 Japan lost its 42-year ranking as the world’s second-biggest economy to China; Japanese national debt is one of the highest in the world and a real burden to the economy. At the start of 2011, just before March 11, Japanese national debt was 228% of its GDP.57 End of April 2011 Standard & Poor’s lowered Japan’s rating outlook to negative due to the tremendous rebuilding costs. It is assumed that these costs will hinder the recovery of Japan’s economy from two decades of stagnation.58 Since 1991 fourteen prime minister have been appointed. One bright spot, however, is the ending of more than 54 years of nearly unbroken rule by the Liberal Democratic Party in 2009. The biggest positive result of the Fukushima disaster could be the end of the nuclear power and an

energy turnaround for ecological sustainability. Since March 2011 there is a complex power struggle underway over the future of nuclear energy in Japan involving political, governmental, industry, and union groups. Despite the seriousness of the Fukushima crisis, Japan’s commitment to nuclear power – and a fuel cycle that includes reprocessing and breeder reactors – still has powerful supporters. Since the quake, however, a growing number of private businesses and local governments aren’t waiting on politicians and bureaucrats but forging ahead with plans to create a post-nuclear power nation.\(^{59}\)

5. Global aspects

5.1 The end of the nuclear age or the renaissance of nuclear power?

There is no doubt that the Fukushima disaster has provoked major worries worldwide about nuclear power, however, it seems that now that the dust has settled atomic energy still has a rosy future. This at least was the main message of the annual gathering of the 151-nation International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) in Vienna in September 2011.\(^{60}\) Despite the permanent closure of reactors in Japan and Germany and slowdowns in some programs in response to Fukushima there are signs that the global situation for energy supply and demand remains effectively unchanged. Developments in the USA, China, India and Russia will remain particularly crucial in determining the overall role of nuclear power in global electricity supply, while prospects for nuclear new build remain strong in China, India, and South Korea. In France and the UK criticism against nuclear power seems to be growing. With just few exceptions, most notably Germany, governments have moved to reassure themselves that their nuclear power is safe and that its two main advan-


tages remain: it is not fossil-fuel based, and it is cheap. The arguments are well-known: A substantial increase in the amount of electricity generated with renewable sources like solar or wind power requires huge investment and is not possible overnight. After Fukushima, the IAEA trimmed its forecasts for nuclear power usage in the coming decades, but its minimum projection is still for 90 new reactors to spring up worldwide by 2030, there may even be 350 more. The debate’s framework largely has been the same: Is nuclear energy worth the safety risk? Is it worth it for a country not to have nuclear power? In other words, the safety myth of nuclear energy still persists on a global scale. Both, the safety myth and the myth of cheap nuclear energy are being built on very shaky foundations. In all these arguments the problem of the final storage for the deadly radiating nuclear waste is not mentioned at all. This means that one of the most important issues related to the future of nuclear energy is suppressed and cut off.

5.2 Costs of the risk— who pays?

As mentioned above, both the consequences and the costs of the Fukushima nuclear disaster are unpredictable. Estimates vary between 100 and 300 billion euros. Such projections assume that only evacuees within a 20 kilometre radius of the plant receive income support, and that the government buys land within that area. There are suspicions that politicians put economic cost above public health when they withheld projections about the spread of radiation. In any event, the clean-up bill will rise depending on the cost of decontaminating farmland and residential areas near the plant, some of which will be uninhabitable for decades. A huge number of Japanese people are exposed to unpredictable health risk. Large sectors of the population are accumulating significant levels of internal contamination, probably setting the stage for a public health tragedy. These are mere assumptions and estimations. The end of the road has not been reached, by any means. Since the Chernobyl disaster insurer refuse to offer energy companies full coverage against the risk of a severe nuclear accident. This means that both

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the financial as well as the human costs of a nuclear accident have to be paid by the taxpayer.

5.3 Modern societies in the 21st century: Torn between the risk of nuclear death zones, nuclear waste and the perils of climate change

According to the sociologist Ulrich Beck the Fukushima disaster is a catastrophe without boundaries. Radiation does not stop at national borders. Radioactive fall-out from Fukushima has been detected in China and South Korea and even at the west coast of the USA. The unlimited scope of the Fukushima disaster affects Japan’s relationship to its neighbours. Jasmina Vujik, professor of nuclear engineering at Berkeley states that „regardless of where in the world a nuclear crisis happens, it affects everybody. Fukushima definitely did affect the entire nuclear energy community.“ The endorsement of nuclear energy is part of a vision of modernity, which has its roots in Europe. This narrative of modernity even can culminate in nuclear disasters for the sake of progress and growth. It means further that in the case of a nuclear accident the transformation of civilized areas into inhabitable death zones is assented and accepted. Since the Fukushima meltdown a radioactive zone has come into existence bigger as that left by the 1945 atomic bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While nature reclaims the 20 kilometre no-go zone, Fukushima prefecture’s farm industry is being devastated and many people in the effected area have to face the reality that they cannot go back to their homes for decades. Critics state that the acceptance of such incalculable risks is tantamount to the moral bankruptcy of a civilized society.

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64 Cf. S. Hansen, „Atomkraft in Asien: Der Preis des Fortschritts“, TAZ, April 27, 2011.
Modern societies are torn between the risk of nuclear death zones and nuclear waste on the one hand, and the perils of climate change on the other. The supporters of nuclear power are sticking to the view that nuclear power is the energy source that can save our planet from another possible disaster, namely catastrophic climate change. Compared to coal and other fossil fuels nuclear power is regarded as climate neutral. The opponents of nuclear energy argue that the risks of nuclear power are incalculable and that the question of the final storage of waste products of nuclear power is still far away from any reasonable solution. The unsolved issue of what to do with nuclear waste is one of the most important ethical issues. In not solving this fundamental problem our generation places enormous burdens on subsequent generations.

6. Conclusion

The earthquake, the tsunami, and the Fukushima meltdown are a compound disaster, which gives rise to complex ethical, social and economic issues. Economic and social analysis of the disaster, in particular the failure of TEPCO, the owner of the Fukushima power plant, to handle the nuclear crisis and the lack of transparency of Japan’s nuclear village, the Iron Triangle of nuclear power, politicians and firms, have shed light on entanglements and interconnections between various segments of society and the power structures on which they are based. Such linkages and mechanisms make transparency and controls of the nuclear power industry and nuclear research institutions more difficult to secure. Since the Manhattan Project of the 1940s and in particular the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the cold-war nuclear armament the political and social implications as well as the consequences for the environment in case of a nuclear incident have paved the way for an intellectual and philosophical debate that evolved a highly critical stance towards nuclear matters. In investigating the social and ethical consequences of scientific and technological progress the protagonists of this movement identified possible risks and unforeseen results for the future of humanity. Well-known examples are works of the Austrian journalist and writer Robert Jungk (1913–1994), such as Der Atomstaat: Vom Fortschritt in die Unmenschlichkeit (1977, English edition.
published in 1979 under the title *The Nuclear State*) and Holger Strohm’s *Friedlich in die Katastrophe: Eine Dokumentation über Atomkraftwerke (Heading Peacefully to Catastrophe: A Documentation of Nuclear Power Plants, 1973)*, a detailed, technical, 1300-page study on civilian nuclear facilities that sold more than 600,000 copies in West Germany in the 1970s. Stimulated by the Fukushima nuclear disaster Strohm’s work has been put into a powerful documentary film in 2012, however, probably because of its highly critical content only a few cinemas will show it.\(^{66}\)

The almost-catastrophe at Three Mile Island in 1979 and the nuclear GSA (greatest supposed accident) of Chernobyl in 1986, which left thousands of people dead and deadly radiated, have triggered the global debate on the consequences for the environment in case of a nuclear incident and the limitation of human rights and civil liberties required by the nuclear industry and the state in order to develop and extend the use of nuclear power. The Fukushima nuclear disaster is intensifying and sharpening the global debate on targets, pathways and priorities of the energy supply of the future and its interactions and relations with civil society. The post-Fukushima age seems to mark a watershed between the nuclear-friendly old Japan and a new Japan, which has developed a highly critical stance towards nuclear matters. However, it is far too early to foresee the precise results of the developments and tendencies since March 11, 2011.

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C. LIVING WITH ANIMALS
THE DIFFICULTY OF ANIMAL QUESTION

Vojko Strahovnik

“But your own vegetarianism, Mrs. Costello,” says President Garrard, pouring oil on troubled waters: “it comes out of moral conviction, does it not?”

“No, I don’t think so,” says [... Elizabeth Costello – n. V.S.]. “It comes out of a desire to save my soul.”

(J. M. Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, p. 43)

At the centre of this discussion is going to be J. M. Coetzee’s story The Lives of Animals because it offers a very complex, inclusive, dialogical, and subtle insight into the animal question. The storyline opens up several dimensions and levels of thought about our relationship with nonhuman animals and our own nature, especially aspects of livingness, vulnerability, death, and relationality. The main facet of the story aims to evoke what is the most human inside of us in order to bring us nearer to nonhuman, and to sense this closeness in order to recognize the distance. Another reason to focus on this story is that it has evoked two quite disparate and incongruent responses or echoes in philosophy. The first response is represented by the more traditional approach to animal question, which is based on the rejection of speciesism and framing of key issues in terms of interests or rights of animals with an aim to improve how we currently treat them in many of our practices. The second, contrasting response is more radical in its understanding of Coetzee’s book. It differs from the first response mainly regarding two key points. First, while the first response primarily understands The Lives of Animals as being about nonhuman animals and the way we treat them,

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2 This first group is most directly characterized by Peter Singer and other authors that have published reflections on Coetzee’s story in the book itself.

the second approach understand it as essentially a story about us, human animals, and about our understanding of ourselves and our condition. Second, while the first response understands Coetzee’s work as providing us with philosophical arguments and reflections\(^4\) in a form of a fictional story (and therefore in a not fully committed way), the second response sees is more as a demonstration of the difficulty or powerlessness of arguments or philosophy itself regarding the animal question. Cora Diamond describes the main character in the story in the following way: “In the life of the animal she is, argument does not have the weight we may take it to have in the life of the kind of animal we think of ourselves as being. She sees our reliance on argumentation as a way we may make unavailable to ourselves our own sense of what is to be a living animal”\(^5\).

In the book Coetzee presents a story about Elizabeth Costello, an established author, who is being honoured by her former university by way of inviting her to hold a lecture and a seminar about her work. Instead of discussing her works Elizabeth chooses to speak about another topic, namely about our (or as it turns out mostly just hers) relationship with and treatment of nonhuman animals. The story evolves in a multifaceted way and can be interpreted on several levels. The first, basic level is descriptive or factual. It contains the recognition and awareness of facts and descriptions of our treatment of nonhuman animals, their suffering, and of our needs and our possibilities to bring about a change in the current state of affairs. This can be seen as the foundation for the debate and for the search for answers to the animal question. The second level is philosophical; it pertains to evaluation and attribution of moral status or standing. Elizabeth’s story comprises of several well known philosophical discussions, arguments and strategies of traditional approaches to animal question, which are connected and intersect in various ways. But as we will see later, one would miss a very important dimension of this question if one would merely reduce the story or the animal question itself to the status of the argumentative or even philo-


sophical debate. The third level is emotional, or even better, poetical. Here, Elizabeth reveals her vulnerability; her wound that is hidden and revealed at the same time. In her address to the audience she says: “I am not a philosopher of mind but an animal exhibiting, yet not exhibiting, to a gathering of scholars, a wound, which I cover up under my clothes but touch on in every word I speak”. Her vulnerability, fear and detachment can be sensed in her relationship with her son and his family and with society in general, from which she feels isolated and battles with expressions of contempt, leading up to her tiredness and not being able to reconcile herself with life. This is a level of establishing both full humanity and full animality. The questions about our status and moral standing get intertwined here with our doubts about such a status itself. The fourth level is meta-level, the level of (meta)narrativity, where all other levels are traversed and reflect each other; as such this gives us an opportunity to really pose the animal question in all its complexity. We will return to these levels in the final part of the paper. For now we will focus a bit on the first response mentioned above.

Suffering

Probably the most direct way to approach the animal question is by acknowledging the needless suffering that the animals undergo due to many of our practices. The most basic train of thought in this regard has been expressed by Jeremy Bentham, when he said that concerning nonhuman animals “the [relevant] question is not, Can they reason?, nor Can they talk?, but, Can they suffer?”. Henry Salt added to this that “[p]ain is pain ... whether be inflicted on man or on beast; and the creature that suffers it, whether man or beast, being sensible of the misery of it while it lasts, suffers evil”. Similar ethical considerations can be traced

6 The second and third level are explicitly present even in the titles of Coetzee’s lectures since the first is titled The Philosophers and the Animals and the second The Poets and the Animals.


back into the history of philosophy, e.g. to Pythagoras, Plutarch, and Porphyry, which stressed characteristics that nonhuman animals share with humans, in particular sentience, followed by a fact that humans can refrain from eating meat and that it is a matter of justice that we withhold from causing nonhuman animals unnecessary suffering.10

This aspect of the prevention of needless suffering of nonhuman animals is best accommodated within a broadly consequentialist or utilitarian considerations, since the very foundation of them gives us little space to exclude the pain and suffering of animals from our understating of utility or welfare and its relation to the moral status of actions. The only possible way that would prevent such a result is an overt exclusion of nonhuman animals from the moral sphere of beings that deserve to be at least minimally taken into account. This would be a sort of ethical humanism, which Engel and Jenni define as consisting of two central claims, namely that “(i) all and only all human beings deserve moral consideration and (ii) all human beings deserve equal consideration”11, which results in a “sad” consequence that nonhuman animals lack moral standing and that moral status of our actions remains unaffected by more or less anything we do to them. The prevalence of ethical humanism, understood in this way, throughout most of history of our moral thought and practices, results in a state we are facing today, where over 70 billion animals are killed annually, predominantly for food and as part of various testing and experimenting methods, having to endure a sorry, painful, and frustrating existence before their gloomy end.12

In The Lives of Animals Elizabeth in her lecture avoids the direct referencing to all the suffering in food production facilities and other horrific experiences that nonhuman animals have to endure and that are being continuously inflicted to them by humans. She takes our acquaintance with the facts more or less as given and “spares” her audience of listing and exposing all the horrors that nonhuman animals must go through

11 Ibid., 14.
as part of our food production and other practices. On this, factual or descriptive level it only amazes her, how we are able to sustain the illusion of innocence and remaining morally immaculate at the same time; “that we can do anything and get away with it; that there is no punishment”. This can be seen as a direct consequence of ethical humanism. Elizabeth sees it as a consequence of closing our hearts as seats of sympathy before these horrific “places of death”. Cavell notes that we might understand this as a particular form of “soul-blindness”, related to the notion of “seeing something as something” in a sense that this variation in responses surprisingly “is not a function of any difference in our access to information; no one knows, or can literally see, essentially anything here that the other fail to know or can see”.

Interests

Probably the most famous and influential upgrade of this approach can be found in the work of Peter Singer who frames the debate in terms of interest of sentient beings. His book *Animal Liberation* launched him at the forefront of the animal welfare or liberation movement and still remains the main reference point for it. It has importantly shaped both public and academic debates. This approach can be characterized as a combination of the utilitarian view on moral status of actions as closely connected with interests and a moral criteria, that tells us whose interests count and to what extent. The foundation for it is the universal nature of ethics; our moral judgments must be universalizable in the sense that they can be accepted or endorsed from an impartial point of view, which puts the “I” perspective in the brackets. From the point of view of attaining good it is irrelevant whether the good attained is mine or someone else’s. Or to put in another way; my interests are not more important as (equal) interests of others just because they are mine (principle of equal consideration of interests). When I contemplate how

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to act, I must consider the relevant interests of all involved in the same way. Given this I must also follow the regulative principle to act in a way and choose an action that has the best consequences overall (maximal satisfaction of interests), and best increases the utility for all involved.\textsuperscript{16} This effectively means universalization of beneficial decision making and action that Singer sees as the most pretheoretically acceptable ethical position to take. Principle of equal consideration of interests is thus basic. But whose interests must we consider? Who belongs inside the sphere of moral consideration? Which creatures are part of such moral community? Singer argues that although “the principle of equal consideration of interests provide the best possible basis for human equality, its scope is not limited to humans. When we accept the principle of equality of humans, we are also committed to accepting that it extends to some nonhuman animals”.\textsuperscript{17}

A prejudice that interests or wellbeing of at least some nonhuman animals do not count is for Singer analogous to e.g. racial prejudices, which would grant non-equal treatment and consideration of members of particular races by disregarding their interest and wellbeing. The characteristic of those nonhuman animals that can feel pain and pleasure (sentience) represents an important ground for the attribution of interests to them, especially the interest to avoid pain and suffering. Sentience is thus the most sensible and at the same time also the sole acceptable characteristics for drawing the line around a set of beings whose interests count morally.\textsuperscript{18} All other basic criteria (e.g. capability for reasoning, speech, colour of skin, intelligence, species membership etc.) must be discarded. A sentient being is a being capable of feeling pleasure and pain and is thus having at least a minimal interest to avoid pain; if a being is not sentient and cannot feel pleasure or pain, it cannot be hurt or harmed by our actions. All this result into a conclusion that as far as the suffering of animals is concerned – even in the absence of a precise standard of how to compare and weight different interests of human and nonhuman animals – we should substantially change our

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 48
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 50.
practices (meat production, intensive animal breeding, experiments on animals, uses of animals in zoos, etc.) that involve the latter. The same goes for killing animals, which is (given the majority of the actual practices) morally wrong. This does not mean that we have to treat all sentient being alike or ascribe them equal rights, but merely to give their suffering and pain an equal consideration in contemplating the consequences of our actions.\textsuperscript{19}

Rights

An alternative approach to the animal question, which is close to Singer’s in sharing with it the rejection of ethical humanism, is an approach defending animal rights. Its most prominent advocate is Tom Regan.\textsuperscript{20} With the mentioning of rights we must first and foremost emphasize that the rights in question are rights in the moral sense and not (necessary or normally) also rights in the legal sense. Legal rights are closely connected with legal orders and systems, while moral rights belong to their bearers independently of those systems, based on a posit, that bearers of such rights are beings or other entities that have the necessary morally relevant characteristics as a basis that those rights then belong to them. Regan argues that (at least some) nonhuman animals have negative rights of non-interference, such as the right not to be killed, not to be harmed or not to be tortured. Most of our existing practices involving nonhuman animals involve at least some kind of serious violations of such rights and are in this regard considered wrong and unacceptable. This rights-based approach is not utilitarian at its core, since it only accepts (in some form) a principle of equality of interests, at the same time rejecting a view that we can reduce our duties to maximizing the satisfaction of those interest or wellbeing in a more general sense. At the bottom of this rejection are supposedly unacceptable consequences of the mentioned view, resulting in regarding an action that would maximize utility e.g. by sacrificing some innocent life as morally right.\textsuperscript{21}

Regan’s approach is based on the ascription of intrinsic (inherent) value to all sentient beings, that is living beings that are experiencing subjects of a life (e.g. with perceptions, beliefs, wishes, motives, memories, etc.) and whose lives can fare well or bad over time. As such they have “an individual experiential welfare, logically independent of their utility relative to the interests or welfare of others”.22 This is then a foundation for their rights and morally obliges us to abstain from actions that would importantly hamper the lives of such beings.

Similarly, Paola Cavalieri presents her case for the extended or expanded theory of human rights. Within this model the standard for (at least minimal) moral status is a possibility of (at least primitive) sentience or conscious experience of the world (which at the same time means the ability to experience pleasure and pain). That provides us with a proper footing for talk about interests, benefits, and harms of beings that meet this standard. The distinguishing feature of her approach is that “it persistently defies all attempts to introduce some kind of hierarchical order into this amorphous, undivided, egalitarian moral community”.23 In this sense regarding direct duties of humans towards nonhuman animals, the latter have – insofar as they are intentional beings with goals they are trying to achieve24 – at least minimal “human” rights.

Although there are several important differences between the presented interests- and rights-based approaches the practical consequences of both are or should be very similar. Both Singer and Regan use the same (or at least very similar) criterion for the inclusion into the moral community in its widest sense and regarding the normative implications both approaches see the majority of existing practices involving nonhuman animals as unacceptable and unjustifiable, since we mostly appeal only to arbitrary and ungrounded differences about the status

of sentient beings to justify unequally treatment. So even the rights-based approach could be understood as broadly falling in the first kind of response to animal question in the sense that it is focused mostly on securing the wellbeing of nonhuman animals (experiences of pleasure and pain) and sees the attribution of protective rights to them as the best way to implement this general aim.

The question of distinguishing characteristics

Within both positions discussed the crucial point in their rejection of ethical humanism is the search for distinguishing characteristics that supposedly define the set of beings that share equal minimal moral status. The problem arises when we appeal to some morally irrelevant characteristics or differences as relevant and justifying our behaviour towards e.g. members of other species. This should be rejected and such approaches claim that “in our attitude to members of other species we have prejudices which are completely analogous to the prejudices people may have with regard to members of other races, and these prejudices will be connected with the ways we are blind to our own exploitation and oppression of the other group. We are blind to the fact that what we do to them deprives them of their rights; we do not want to see this because we profit from it, and so we make use of what are really morally irrelevant differences between them and ourselves to justify the difference in treatment.”

This is a basis for an argument from analogy that puts speciesism on a par with racism or sexism. But the analogy alone is not enough to discard ethical humanism, since its proponents might appeal to some other characteristic other than a mere species membership to justify the inequality between human and nonhuman animals. In the discussion we can locate several alternative candidates, e.g. linguistic abilities, language and/or speech, rationality, reasoning and responsiveness to reasons, ability to agree to social and moral rules, possession of the immortal soul,

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life in the “biographic sense of the word”, moral autonomy, the capacity
to reciprocity, empathy, the desire for self-respect.27

All such attempts fall prey to the following simple dilemma. They
face a very difficult task to find and defend a distinguishing character-
istic such that either (i) only human beings have it (in this case many
human beings will actually not have it, as it is the case with moral au-
tonomy, rationality, etc.) or (ii) actually all human beings have it (in this
case also at least some nonhuman animals will have it, e.g. capacity for
sentience). Since there seems to be no convincing candidates such an
argument from analogy indeed refutes ethical humanism.28

Abolition of (use of) animals

Besides the two mentioned approaches to the animal question the
approach of animal abolitionism29 could also be seen as part of this wid-
er approach defined by opposing ethical humanism. At least in one as-
pect Singer’s and similar approaches defending and advocating animal
wellbeing, liberation and their rights are seen to be deeply mistaken
from the point of view of animal abolitionism. The main issue is that
they merely focus on how we should treat animals, and not on a more
pressing issues that we should not treat and use them at all. In the con-
sumer society such a misguided perspective gives rise to the talk about
“happy meat”, “natural meat” and alike. The final purpose of such move-
ments is a better treatment of animals. Abolitionism takes a more radical
stance of seeing any use of animals as morally unacceptable and claims
that any “humane treatment” or “humane consumption” is merely an
illusion. Avoiding causing “unnecessary suffering” of animals is a very
vague notion, even though it is reflected in many of our practices.

Abolitionism also appeals to sentience and consciousness of beings
(noting that we must interpret it benevolently and use a precautionary
principle in borderline cases) as setting the limits for our use of animals

28 Ibid., 20–21.
29 G. L. Francione, The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition or Regulation, New York: Columbia
University Press, 2010; Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation, Colum-
as a mean or a resource. It advocates a full abolition of any use of sentient animals following the “zero tolerance” principle. It also notes how the so-called humane treatment of animals in food production goes in many cases hand in hand with economic interests of food industry, since the facts reveal that certain measures that are part of the more “animal-friendly” production processes are actually reducing the costs (less dead animals as a result of diseases and aggression between them, reduced costs for medical treatments, etc.) and offering an opportunity to sell the meat at increased prices (since environmentally aware consumers are prepared to spend more). But the important question is not whether animals suffer less because of this, but is it morally acceptable that they suffer at all. Abolitionism also advocates the abolition of most domestic pets, since in many cases we are providing them with a merely sad existence given their nature, making them dependent on us, and – in the case of carnivorous pets – there is a question of the use and suffering of other animals raised to become pet food. The main impediment in all this seem to be that we regard animals as property, therefore as things, while we should move towards considering them as persons in the sense that they deserve a proper kind of moral consideration.³⁰ Thus, if we really are morally concerned with animals, we should neither eat or wear, nor use them in such ways.

Common sense approach and consistency

The approaches discussed are based upon various moral theories and assumptions that are probably not going to be universally shared or accepted. In contrast to them a common sense or consistency approach is not based upon the presupposition of a certain moral theory to be true or our acceptance of its posits. It uses beliefs that are (almost) universally shared by all (at least minimally) morally decent people. Since the consequences of this approach logically follow from such premises, we are faced with a dilemma to either accept its conclusions or reject the

³⁰ That would secure them from manipulation and instrumentalization. See B. Žalec, On not knowing who we are: the ethical importance of transcendent anthropology, Synthesis philosophica 26 (1), 2011, for elucidation of these concepts as related to the concepts of person(hood) and identity.
starting premises. As such it represents a minimal basis for discussing
the animal question.

Mylan Engel\(^3\) designed the following argument from consistency.
The starting set of statements includes the following widely shared be-
liefs. It is morally wrong to cause pain to a conscious sentient being for
no good reason. It is morally wrong to cause harm to a conscious sen-
tient being for no good reason. It is morally wrong to kill a conscious
 sentient being for no good reason. These are statements that more or
less all moral theories would cohere with and are accepted even by the
opponents of animal liberation or rights movement. Now we can for-
mulate the following argument.

\(A. \text{ Step 1}\)

1. It is morally wrong to cause pain to a conscious sentient animal for
no good reason.
2. It is morally wrong to cause harm to a conscious sentient animal for
no good reason.
3. It is morally wrong to kill a conscious sentient animal for no good
reason.
4. Raising animals intensively and in inhumane, overcrowded confine-
ment facilities harms them physically and psychologically.
5. Mutilating animals without anaesthesia harms them physically and
psychologically and can cause them to suffer severely.
6. Slaughtering animals kills them.
7. Slaughtering animals inhumanely kills them and in addition harms
them and makes them suffer.
8. Rearing animals and slaughtering them as part of existing food pro-
duction practices necessarily harms them, makes them suffer or kills
them.
9. Therefore rearing animals and slaughtering them as part of existing
food production practices is morally wrong unless there is a good reason
that would justify this.

\(^3\) M. Engel, Do Animals Have Rights, and Does It Matter if They Don’t?, *Rocky Mountains Ethics Congress*, August 2012.
B. Step 2  

This step of the argument comprises of assessing possible justifying reasons for our treatment of animals, the most common candidates that we tend to appeal to being nutrition, cost, convenience, and taste. But it can easily be shown that actually none of those represent a good reason. Firstly, human beings are in general in no way dependent on our consumption of meat, even more, research shows that alternative vegetarian diet actually benefits our health in many important respects and prolongs our life. Secondly, the costs (both economical and environmental) of meat production are much higher than costs of plant-based food production. Thirdly, plant-based vegetarian diet is in no way less accessible than meat-based food. And lastly, plant-based food is diverse, rich and full of taste, especially when we really give it a try. It follows that there never or hardly ever (the exception being cases where eating meat would save our life and alike) exists such a reason that would justify our existing practices involving animals in food production.

C. Conclusion  

“The Carnivore’s Dilemma”: If one accepts the case for animals rights then one must see the existing practices as violating them and therefore unacceptable. But even if one does not accept negative rights of non-human animals, one is committed by rationality (consistency) itself to a view the rearing and killing animals for food is (with the exception of extreme cases) morally unacceptable.  

Alternative approaches and meta-questions  

There are several other approaches to the animal question that fall outside of the broadly utilitarian or rights-based approaches. Most of these approaches focus on changing our relationship towards non-human animals and eliminating some deeply rooted posits that stand in

32 Ibid.
the way of such a change. In this respect e.g. Mary Midgley\textsuperscript{33} argues for the elimination of barriers that our culture has put between humans and nonhuman animals and are the foundations of our mostly unacceptable attitude to them. Those central barriers include a conception of behaviourism that leads to scepticism about animal minds, a confusion in our understanding of concepts like belief, emotion, understanding, language and relations between them, a distorted view on morality that includes concentric circles of ethical importance of others and our relation to them, where we are at the centre, an excessive abstraction in moral thinking and reasoning, and a oversimplified view that compassion and empathy are limited in “volume” and that we have to conserve it only to the ones near and dear to us. From such a perspective both the proponents of animal liberation movement and their opponents fall prey to a common mistake of excessively generalizing the issues, leading to reduction of all of our moral relations to a simple and abstract model or ethical relevance. Animal liberation, equality of interest perspective, and animal rights movement can be successful only in combating some of our excuses for our current treatment of animals, but they cannot on the whole represent an new basis for establishing an inclusive model of ethical community with a radical change of our beliefs and attitudes. The way to achieve this is to develop an enhanced concern for nonhuman animals based on our common evolution and different ways of our living together.\textsuperscript{34}

Similarly, ethics of care approach emphasizes that our concepts of duty, moral principles, autonomy and individuality must be replaced with morally even more central concepts of relationship, sensitivity for the world around us and care. Authors such as Josephine Donovan and Carol J. Adams call attention to the importance of our focus and sensitivity for the suffering of animals, which is being inflicted to them as a consequence of our social and economic system. We need to reject an image of a autonomous, isolated, independent moral agent with rights and freedoms that was formed in the Enlightenment period – both Singer’s and Regan’s approach remained committed to such an image

\textsuperscript{33} M. Midgley, \textit{Animals and Why They Matter}, University of Georgia Press, Athens 1983.

\textsuperscript{34} M. Engel and K. Jenni, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 33–34.
– and replace it with a notion of a mutually depended and interconnected beings. This also means a rejection of approaches that overlook the importance of emotions and tend towards moral abstraction and formalism, which go against our being genuinely sensitive to a particular situation.35

After this presentation of various approaches we can return to the initial framing of the animals question as present in *The Lives of Animals*. As we saw one of the marks of this framework is that it is inclusive in the sense that it tries to combine several approaches at the same time also revealing vast gaps among them and their insufficiencies. Such gaps are not unimportant since they also point to a similar gap between the power of moral theory and our actual practices.

The Lives of Animals

A story about Elizabeth Costello in *The Lives of Animals* can be read as an interlacement of above mentioned approaches and ideas regarding animal question, but taken as a whole it is much more than that. Philosophical questions on whether animals have rights or what duties we humans have towards them are marked with a sort of duality. On the one hand Elizabeth’s story makes it clear that they are in most situations powerless; the search for rational, justified evaluative answers seems in vain. On the other hand Elizabeth does not abandon them completely and returns to them repeatedly. If philosophy is being powerless against an absence of established compassion towards nonhuman animals, do we then need a radical turn to a different philosophy, which would establish such moral sensitivity? Does it mean that we should go beyond arguments and philosophy towards emotional or personal level? If we read Elizabeth story carefully we can notice that even this level reveals itself as powerless; Elizabeth feels uneasy, wounded and excluded from the circle or people around her, even from those closes to her like her son and his family. What are the causes for the insufficiency of this level? We will return to these questions in the concluding section, after exposing

some of the moments in *The Lives of Animals* that can be particularly revealing in this regard.

At the beginning of Elizabeth’s first lecture two aspects are especially central. She begins by an allusion to the Kafka’s story *A Report to an Academy*\(^{36}\) about Peter Red, an ape, who learned human language and conduct, and addresses – all dresses up and with exquisite words – the gathered audience about his previous life as an ape and experience of coming to the world of human animals. It seems like Elizabeth is also trying to open a similar passage between her world and a world of her audience, and there is a striking difference between the ease with which seemingly Peter Red succeeds in this and the difficulty Elizabeth has in establishing common ground with the audience. That is part of the difficulty of the animal question. Elizabeth decides to omit describing or citing all the horrors of practices involving animals and just evokes to the audience that they could bring them to their minds. As it is the case with Peter Red, which explicitly states that he only reports (in a pure, almost scientific language) and is not interested in any judgment. The second moment in the talk is the analogy between how we treat animals and the Holocaust in the image of a death camp Treblinka, which remains central in the story. “We have only one death of our own, we can comprehend the deaths of others only one at the time. In the abstract we may be able to count to a million, but we cannot count to a million deaths”.\(^{37}\) Since we can only apprehend one death at the time the phenomenon of several billion deaths of nonhuman animals every year related to meat production and experimentation either resist our moral sensitivity or strikes us as unimaginable evil. Elizabeth wonders how is it that if the Germans after WWII felt ashamed, polluted and full of remorse related to their loss of full humanity, then where is a similar feeling in us in regard to what we do to animals. Is that a consequence of the victory of reason, the reason that appeals to our likeness of God and our special place in nature; the victory of reason over nonhuman animals? “Each day a fresh holocaust, yet, as far as I can see, our mor-


al being is untouched. We do not feel tainted. We can do anything, it seems, and come away clean”.  

Elizabeth continues that we have taken away power from the nonhuman animals, and all there is left for them is the silence, with which they face us. They do not “speak” with us any more, except for Peter Red, who has become a human animal and is all dressed up to do that. “Today these creatures have no more power. Animals have only their silence left which to confront us. Generation after generation, heroically, our captives refuse to speak to us.” She sees our experiments with primates exhibiting the achievements and limitedness of their intelligence rather as an insult of their intelligence. The character of being alive and vulnerable, and not reason or developed consciousness, are the pathways towards nonhuman animals. Elizabeth therefore opposes those conclusion from the famous Nagel’s paper “What Is it Like to Be a Bat?” which point towards the limit of our imagining the phenomenal aspects of bat’s experiences. If we can imagine our own death; what is it like to be a corpse, why then we could not imagine, what is it like to be a nonhuman animal. Being an animal is to be embodied, being full of joy and full of life. Intellect alone does not mean being full of life. It is therefore futile to search for common or distinguishing characteristics of human and nonhuman animals, until we are able to feel with them and develop a compassion that has no limits.

The first part of Coetzee’s story finishes along similar lines, exposing the difficulty of philosophy and reason to penetrate to others. After Elizabeth’s lecture the evening ends with a dinner, at which the air is full with feelings of embarrassment, discomfort, guilt, and shame. At some point in the dinner table discussion being a vegetarian, refusing to eat animals, emerges as predominantly a form of superiority over others and a display of strength.

Coetzee continues the story with the second part titled “The Poets and the Animals”, which promises to overcome those difficulties of philosophy and philosophical language framed in terms of pain, interests,

38 Ibid., p. 35.
39 Ibid., p. 25.
consciousness, rights, soul, and differences, and providing a resolution. This second part of the story opens with a letter that Elizabeth receives from a poet Abraham Stern, explaining his absence at the dinner after the first lecture. In the letter he strongly objects to the analogy Elizabeth has made between holocaust and animal farms and slaughterhouses. He sees it as a “trick of words”. He writes to Elizabeth “You misunderstand the nature of likenesses; I would even say you misunderstand wilfully, to the point of blasphemy. Man in made in the likeness of God but Got does not have the likeness of man. If Jews were treated as cattle, it does not follow that cattle are treated like Jews. The inversion insults the memory of the dead. It also trades on the horrors of the camps in a cheap way”. In the story Elizabeth goes on with issues from the lecture in her seminar and addresses the notion of animality as embodied existence that is full of life (using the differences between Rilke’s poem on panther and Hughes’ poem on jaguar). The key dimensions seems to be what it is like to inhabit a body, and not merely what it is like to inhabit a particular aspect of mind. She exposes a confusion embedded in the kind of ecological philosophy that preserves some kind of an idea of a natural order, as a dance of life, in which every being, every species has its place, function and role, and that is placed above the beings themselves. In since such an ordered character of nature is accessible to humans only, we stop understanding ourselves as proper part of it. Elizabeth notes that we actually do no treat nonhuman animals as objects, but more like war prisoners. Her seminar again ends with the exposed limitation of power of reason to penetrate to an answer to the animal question. The story itself ends with feelings of powerlessness, tiredness, and Elizabeth’s isolation from other people. Her son, escorting her to the airport comforts her that it will all soon be over. But what will be over and in what way?

Several aspects of Coetzee’s story expose powerlessness of reason and philosophy. This is reinforced when we consider the rather convincing philosophical cases for a radical change in our practices regarding nonhuman animals. In a way this powerlessness in inherently present even

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42 Ibid., p. 58
within the so-called second wave of the animal liberation movement\textsuperscript{43}, in which on the one side there is triumph and optimism given the achievements and at least some secured better treatments of nonhuman animals at farms, reduced suffering and limits put on experimentation with nonhuman animals, and on the other side a felling that we cannot really declare any sort of victory, but merely note the vastness of suffering animals still endure and the practices that almost completely disregard them a worthy of moral consideration. To what extent does such impressions arise out of powerlessness of philosophy and can we bypass it by some more radical shift in our approach to the animal question?

The difficulty of philosophy and the difficulty of reality

In this concluding section we will turn to approaches to animal question by Cora Diamond and Stanley Cavell. Both also responded and reflected on Coetzee’s \textit{The Lives of Animals}, so we will be able to draw some conclusions in regard to questions exposed above. The animal question seems to defy attempts to articulate and pose it in its full perplexity. Diamond therefore relates this with the notion of “the difficulty of reality”, which she understands as “experiences in which we take something in reality to be resistant to our thinking it, or possibly to be painful in its inexplicability, difficult in that way, or perhaps awesome and astonishing in its inexplicability. \textit{We take things so.} And the things we take so may simply not, to others, present the kind of difficulty, of being hard or impossible or agonizing to get one’s mind round”.\textsuperscript{44} We can clearly see how this is related to Coetzee’s story, where Elizabeth is agonized by the way she perceives the suffering of animals and the responses of people around her to it. It also exposes the inability of reasoning and argumentation to arouse the relevant shift of the perception. Diamond’s approach proceeds in a way in which the difficulty of animal question “itself expresses a mode of understanding of the kind of animal we are, and indeed of the moral life of this kind of animal”.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{43} P. Singer (ed.), \textit{In Defense of Animals. The Second Wave}.
\textsuperscript{44} C. Diamond, \textit{The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy}, pp. 45–46.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., p. 57.
In her earlier paper “Eating meat and eating people”\(^46\) Diamond seeks to find grounds for a novel approach to the animal question. A classical approach, framed in the language of interests, rights and specism, introduces confusion in the relationship between human and non-human animals on the one hand and one the other hand between humans themselves. Diamond argues that the fact that we refuse to eat human meat (or that we at least we find the idea extremely repulsive) is not a simple consequence of our non-readiness to kill or torture people, or to be persuaded by their rights and interest. The wrong that we perceive in such action is not a mere consequence of being a violation of rights or disregard of interests. For Diamond the fact that we think that it is wrong to kill a person in order to eat it and our belief that a person is not something to eat are deeply connected. A classical approach can only make sense of the analogy that just as it is wrong to kill a person for meat it is wrong to raise and kill an animal to eat, but it sees nothing inherently wrong in eating animal meat (e.g. in the case of a painless death of a wild animal or alike). For Diamond the analogy should be the same in the case of nonhuman animals, which is to see how the fact that we refuse killing and eating nonhuman animals is related to the sense that a nonhuman animal is not something to eat.

In answering the animal question we should not reduce our answers to just a single morally important or decisive relationship. There is a plurality of morally relevant relationships and each has its meaning inside a particular form of life.\(^47\) For Diamond our relationship with non-human animal can be framed as a relationship of our fellow creature or a companion, which may be sought as company.\(^48\) Such a notion of a creature is not a biological one, but a moral one, and one that is crucially connected with our understanding of ourselves. “The response to animals as our fellows in mortality, in life on this earth [...], depends on a conception of human life. It is an extension of non-biological notion of what human life is.”\(^49\) As such it takes us beyond moral notions of

\(^{47}\) Ibid., p. 325.
\(^{48}\) Ibid., pp. 328–329.
\(^{49}\) Ibid., pp. 329.
rights, justice or interest, towards respect, dignity, pity, companionship and mutual dependence.

What establishes this relationship between us and nonhuman animals is a sense of vulnerability and mortality, which we share with them as connected to being a living body.\(^{50}\) When we perceive and treat nonhuman animals as objects, we fail to see injustice as injustice on the level of relationship with them and we stick to interests and rights. We can shift this perspective only by recognizing our common vulnerability (remember Elizabeth and her wound that she hides beneath her clothes, a wound that is inherent in her having a body), which emerges on the most raw and direct level. In the case of Elizabeth Costello there is a striking rawness “that pushes her moral response to our treatment of animals beyond propositional argument – and sometimes beyond the decorum of polite society”.\(^{51}\) “The awareness we each have of being a living body, being ‘alive to the world’, carries with it the exposure to the bodily sense of vulnerability to death, sheer animal vulnerability, the vulnerability we share with them. This vulnerability is capable of panicking us. To be able to acknowledge it at all, let alone as shared, is wounding; but acknowledging it as shared with other animals, in the presence of what we do to them, is capable not only of panicking on but also isolating one, as Elizabeth Costello is isolated. Is there any difficulty in seeing why we should not prefer to return to the moral debate, in which the livingness and death of animals enter as facts that we treat as relevant in this or that way, not as presences that may unseat our reason?”\(^{52}\) Animal question is thus genuinely marked with the difficulty of reality that “lies in the apparent resistance by reality to one’s ordinary mode of life, including one’s ordinary modes of thinking: to appreciate the difficulty is to feel oneself being shouldered out of how one thinks, how one is apparently supposed to think, or to have a sense of the inability of thought to encompass what it is attempting to reach.”\(^{53}\) The prevalent approaches in moral theory establish a too wide gap between

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\(^{50}\) C. Diamond, The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy, p. 74.


\(^{52}\) C. Diamond, The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy, p. 74.

\(^{53}\) Ibid., p. 58.
rights and related justice on one hand and compassion, love, pity and sensitivity on the other. The very notion of (in)justice requires a level of established compassion and a loving relationship towards a being that can suffer injustices. The talk about right is sensible to institute when we fail to establish that.

Similarly Cavell discusses the same difficulty of reality and we saw in the case of Elizabeth, how this is related to the difficult of experienced reality around her.\textsuperscript{54} Commenting Diamond Cavell says that he sees her “as raising a question of [...] inordinate knowledge, knowledge whose importunateness can seem excessive in its expression, in contrast to mere or unobtrusive knowledge, as though for some the concept of eating animals has no particular interest (arguably another direction of questionable – here defective–expression)”\textsuperscript{55} He too notes the perplexity and anxiety that can arise due to the gap between philosophy and practices. His expression of scepticism about other mind is in a way central to his thought,\textsuperscript{56} and at this point we can link his thought to the animal question. If scepticism about other minds is connected with our own barriers and failures to acknowledge their reality,\textsuperscript{57} then the link with morality is maintained, since there remains an important connection between responsibility and illusion or self-deception. When the later persist we are seemingly relived of any responsibility, but this is not really so, since we ourselves are to be blamed for such self-deception. It is not a case of a simple mistake about the nature of reality around us. And addressing the animal question in the most direct way, just like Elizabeth does, helps in elimination of this self-deception. Is this what Elizabeth’s son John has in mind, when he promises her that it will soon be over? Or is it that her feelings of estrangement and inability to reconcile with the world around her will be over with her death? Given the persistence of

\textsuperscript{55} S. Cavell, Companionable Thinking, 95.
the way we (fail to) see nonhuman animals, we should be afraid that in this regard death prevails over words and powerlessness of philosophy.

Bibliography

INTRODUCTION

Animal ethic is not from yesterday. Certain statements on animals from the viewpoint of human awareness of animals are going back to the Romantic thinkers who called for a deeper connection with the nature (Mary Shelley, Friedrich Goethe, William Wordsworth, and others). While they were advocating its usefulness for reasons of health, they also longed for freedom of the individual through the nostalgia of the perfect past. One of the most influencing thinkers was John Locke (1632–1704) with his notions on democracy and liberal education. And, not last, the revival of enthusiasm for European cultural traditions which also triggered interests for anthropological studies seems to be the powerful source of conscious awareness in the sixties of 20th century for life’s and environmental questions. The golden bough, written by James Frazer (1854–1941), witnesses for this cultural shift which liberated itself from the core-tradition of Western (Mediterranean) philosophical flow. It opened an autonomous access to the ethic of life-world.

I choose the term animal ethic in singular. The only reason for this is that I would like to frame the space of ethical thinking as an explication of human’s position in this frame. “If we study an argument and end up with a strongly skeptical conclusion in terms of its requirements, this indicates that our attention is turned toward the stringent requirements for ‘knowledge’ that are implicitly assumed in arriving safely at the conclusion” (Naess, 2008: 151). Naess is playing with Descartes’ philosophical presumption that neither human knowing nor their ignorance (doubt) is relevant for life-world. This extremely anthropocentric and egocentric frame of reference which allowed Descartes to doubt of everything (de omnibus dubitandum est) excluded the implicit frame, because the philosopher stood consciously out of it. Instead of discussing
known reasons for animal ethic written for humans – usually it entails questions regarding animal rights and/or animal suffering –, I would stress here intimate relation between explicit and implicit (embodied) knowledge. So my intention is not to build a system but to enter the frame and to become part of the viewpoint.

In answering the question how humanity treats the rest of the animal world, we should not be surprised how certain decisions under pressure of scientific, social and economic advance have influenced the present-day discussions on animal ethic, an vice versa. This dangerous statement that we might act without corresponding knowledge, well known also in human ethics when there are in question human genetics or euthanasia, and other issues, is another reason for choosing the metaphor of ethical mirroring. Animal ethic is an ethic of valuing human life and death.

Speaking of ethical mirroring resembles the dilemma of how to understand processes which with transforming also transform themselves (Minsky, 1986). It is easy to understand how mechanical work-process transforms raw materials into products. But what is the body doing when it processes materials? What processes the brains when they process? What are life-processes when they, in processing, change themselves? What is the meaning of life-world that we experience it as pain or that we care for others? We can probably say that it is not possible to separate process from the processed, the message from the messenger, the reality from its immediateness. It is naturally not the point that we are looking for at the marketplace at any price. But sometimes are even cheap answers the sign that it might be better to be a searcher, or be silent, that finder of ‘necessary’ meaning.

The intention here is to show that the principal activity of ethics is ethical thinking, not success rates or manipulation without harm. It is not the mere behavior or the manufacturing right things. Within the process, it changes the way of subsequently memorized content. Today, this mode of questioning is facilitated by using new thinking methods which released a variety of scientific interests especially in the spheres of cognition and of present-time consciousness. Nevertheless, animal ethic is not an easy undertaking. Like in human ethics, since there exist laws and rules which are better suited for ‘citizens’ and sometimes discrimi-
nate between humans on the basis of their age, health or life expectancy, we can argue with Colin McGinn (1997) who writes on this theme, saying, that it is not really an issue on which there might be two sides. Not only that we could hardly find a justifiable standpoint that could support the current state of abuse, the treatment of animals in “humanity’s worst moral failing” (Orr, 2007: 219).

Since human ethics is characterized by notions of authority, fear, judgment, balancing pain and pleasure, rights and laws and their consequences, and since there is hardly possible to involve concrete living beings, I will first write on animal ethic keeping in mind evident problems. Then I will look for roots of ethical thinking (2), and especially for patriarchy as the most powerful pattern of our present ethical debate (3). With the relation between ethic and evolution (4) I will indicate some aspects of ‘unconscious’ source of ethical thinking which are decisive in ethical choice (5). My presumption is that ethics, also animal ethic, rises out of the present-time consciousness which connects unconscious mechanisms (emotions, feelings) and their invisible powers with conscious awareness of our responsibility for what we know.

Animal ethic

Any quick review of theories of animal ethics likely points out the differences among those authors who advocate a need for a distinctive ethic are questions of details. At the moment I am leaving behind theories which do not include critical consciousness in questions which regard status of nonhuman animals and of life itself in our self-referential reflections. Though individual authors argue that questions of detail are important, it is not easy to explain why these distinctions do not exert influence upon practical treatment of animals. The question is where the debate is going and what might be the markers of it. Within this undertaking is one other question ‘of detail’ why we use the term animal ethics at all. It seems, not only in this situation, that adjective and noun try to disassociate themselves. If we try to explain what we might say with this pair of words, the most extensive definition describes someone who rejects a significant part of traditional ethical codes which regulate human behavior. In fact, the noun in this pair is an adjective, and the
adjective a noun. The definition of animal ethics follows the path where we might realize direction markers on its horizon. It is in some sense the threshold where the knowledge as mere receptivity and passivity (usual learning) changes to an active participation in the process of life.

The original stage of animal ethic, before the journey begins, might be a stage of receptivity and of imagination, and also of certain innocence. In his research in Celtic history, Brendan Kathbad Myers criticizes the meaning of innocence of our knowledge about the nature of things which we will know. The reason is the same truck between innocence and ignorance so that the innocence about our original state is “indistinguishable from ignorance” (Myers, 2006: 220). The original state is, therefore, unknown and uncertain. It is subjected to manipulation, fear, exploitation and destruction on the instant as it is exposed to suffering. Myers draws attention to the state of nature of innocence as it were some reason for excuse. But it is not. Such an initial state has not yet formed any question about the world, and has not yet stood up to seek real knowledge.

This critical observation of animal ethic which we try to open, might be an admonishment that also human ethics are weak in the sense that do not consider the point of departure as well as the relation between adjective and noun. This point is, as for Myers’ view, not innocent. It is, moreover, the reason why we are asking ourselves about the inner structure of ethics as such. While I am quoting an author who is dealing with some mysterious interrogations someone might think that it could be the reason of doubt on the seriousness of that proceeding. But there is one very interesting distinction; it is included in the difference between horizontal and vertical argumentation. While we usually reason from principles to concrete behavior (normative ethics), the horizontal ‘reasoning’ includes the perception of space (and time) as concrete living together. I will develop this dimension later.

So, in liberating me for this theme, I should not stand back passively receiving knowledge with only ‘yes’ (agreement with usual normativity) with those who defend animal rights and are interested in animal ethics as well, but also with a certain ‘no’ in front of too strong theoretical frame of discussion which generally obligates only ‘others’, not me. The case of Gary Francione and Gary Steiner (2010) is instructive. Both
ANIMAL ETHIC AND THE ETHICAL MIRROR

of them advocate high standards of animal ethics (rights/welfare arguments) but they still dispute who of them is right. Gary Francione defends animal’s rights: “For the most part, when I refer to animal rights, I am really referring to one right: the right not to be treated as the property of humans. The recognition of this one right require that we (1) stop our institutional exploitation of nonhuman animals; (2) cease binging domesticated nonhumans into existence; and (3) stop killing non-domesticated animals and destroying their habitat. I am not arguing that animals ought to have the same rights as humans, many of which would not even been applicable to non-humans” (Francione, 2010: 1). On the other hand, Robert Garner is defending animal’s moral status and animal’s welfare. “It is the recognition of the moral significance of sentience that forms the basis of the concept of animal welfare. Indeed, animal welfare has reached such a degree of acceptability that it can be regarded as the moral orthodoxy. Its central feature is an insistence that humans are morally superior to animals, but that, because animals have some moral worth, we are not entitled to inflict suffering on them if the human benefit thereby resulting is not necessary. The principle of unnecessary suffering, therefore, can be invoked if the level of suffering on an animal outweighs the benefit to be gained by humans” (Garner, 2010: 106–7). The first one, as Robert Nozick (1974: 35–42) pointed out, is resulting from ‘kantianism for people’, whereas the second one follows ‘the utilitarianism for animals’.

The main difference between human and animal ethics is that there is almost impossible to reach the balance between interests of both sides. It is somehow permitted to sacrifice the interest of animals for the welfare of humans provided that the benefit for humans is significant enough that it compensates the suffering of animals, but it is prohibited to treat humans in the same way, even though the benefit of one’s sacrifice might have been evident.

Theoretical advancement in this sphere is undeniable. There are few philosophers today who would deny that animal are sentient and that all humans owe at least something to them directly or indirectly. Tom Regan (1985), one of the most audible advocators of animal rights, was referring to the fact that animals are subjects of a life. In his view humans when they are doing with animals, they very often do not notice
that animals are alive to say nothing of animals’ emotional or cognitive capacities. Though they profess to believe in animal rights, they see no violation of rights in traditional agriculture, in hunting of adult animals or in the use of animals in advanced medical research. Where this shortsightedness comes from? Regan argued that it was the systemic mistake built in our traditional (vertical) way of thinking. He was, therefore, committed for the following goals: “The total abolition of the use of animals in science; the total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture; the total elimination of commercial and sport hunting and trapping” (Regan, 1985: 13). We can observe a continuum growing of recognition that animal ethics might challenge our understanding of the world as well as our responsibility for what we know. The fundamental problem is our way of self-recognition and manner of thinking which is that humans see animals as their resource, something which belongs to them to be eaten, manipulated, exploited, and so on. As soon as people have agreed that animals are owned by them, it was already provided what happened later. This manner of thinking can not provide any useful or effective ethical thinking. Even if we go a step further challenging the common knowledge that animals are morally inferior to humans, and recognize a full set of rights to animals, we have no solid ground to stand for them; animals are simply lacking of moral agency. Tom Regan believed that there is not only the question of how animals were treated (utilitarian or Kantian access to this question), but also the question what humans know about animals and living environment. In his view, all humans should reach a consensus that they have to move from mainly negative ethical connotations – which are referring to them as agents – to the positive ones which postulate a circular knowledge starting from human’s dignity to the theory which adequately guards animals against many-fold abuses.

In this sense, Robert Garner writes about flawed ethic (Garner, 2010: 112). In his view every description of normativity, whatever it might be, comes too late and cannot reach substantial change neither of knowing nor of behaving because the point of departure is not known. The normative ethics are lagging behind not only formally but also for certain innocent ignorance mentioned before.
Here we have to point out that difficult journey of the biology of ethics through the period of anthropocene in which the method of violence prevailed. The term was first used by Eugene F. Stoermer, but its popularity owes to Paul J. Crutzen (Crutzen et al., 2011; Seielstadt, 2012). With this denomination of the historical period of humanity we would also expose the problem of the ‘vertical’ pattern of argumentation that goes from above downwards. The eventual reason thereof is the skipping over one form of social regulation of common life (Girard, 1987). This informal terminology emerges as astonishment over human activities which have significant impact both to the social systems’ development as to the Earth’s ecosystems. Humans (homo sapiens) are proud on their complex social functional system while they do not know enough accurately about the fact that this complexity is driven mostly by passively received knowledge (how to behave) and not by a positive one which would have driven a liberating process also in the sphere for ethical thinking (Schwägerl, 2012).

In order to build a culture that grows with biological clock instead of depleting it, humans need to understand better the problem of violence which remains an open question in many directions. Though we do not know about whether the level of violence among simple societies was greater (or lesser) than the violence the civilization experiences today, we find it in the present time as a cultural anomaly especially because of certain circumstances where it emerges. René Girard even argues that one non-typical emerging of violence in the so called scapegoat mechanism was a cornerstone of the civilization on the threshold from tribal societies to (pre)modern civilization (Girard, 1986). In this ‘jump’ should have been born religion which uses both dimension in rebinding the detached, the horizontal one (moral) and the vertical one (religious), but more the last one. Though since then the violence is not only controlled (might be) but also channeled – as for example in the case of wider socialization trough religion –, many elements of violence remain destructive.

In her writing on pagan ethical and religious perspective, Emma Restall Orr (2007) reports that modern research on paganism might be of help in looking for how to couple these two dimensions of ethics, ethics as behavior (morality) and ethics as thinking, reflecting, living (mindful
awareness of what is going on in the process of life, religious thinking, spiritual knowledge and so on). She believes that the Golden Rule offers one answer. Whatever its formulation is worldwide it shows that at the beginning of each new conceptualization there is a certain belief that it is possible not only to show in a concrete action but also to express through language, and that this potentiality of expression at first sight is much stronger than any written code or law which follows. So Orr, we have to go back in the history to the moment when such an experience has been formulated, and in what occasion. One example of this rule is as follows: “Do what you like so long as you harm no one” (Orr, 2007: 99). This pattern might remember us on the faith of familiar community far before there have existed extensive rules how to behave outside of this narrowly framed environment.

The idea of animal ethics requires more than only the ability to reflect upon the welfare of others. In question is the whole life through time and space, its transformation. In many aspects, this transformation starts if one might enter in this circle and participate in the transformation of relational (community’s) life. Encouraging is the phrase: “Do what you like!” The other part, “so long as you harm no one” is much more complicated. First of all, that “it” is referring to one’s doing, on his activity, not to theirs (his/her) living. And what means “hurt/harm”? It is a far broader word than the pain or suffering considered by the utilitarian philosophers, like J. Bentham and J. S. Mill. Furthermore, who is covered by “none” (Orr, 100–1) if there is difference between none and no one? Does this also mean only human beings? The opposite, using the word ‘love’ (in Augustine’s “D ilege et quod vis fac”) instead of ‘like’ is as meaningless as the edict never to cause harm, if it is only transitory painfully rush of passions. But, on the other hand, this word invokes deep experience that the humanness was emerging from unconditional seeking of the full story which is love of the other to me (Irigaray, 1996). This is the case of this paper.

**What is ethics?**

It is not necessary to reject social conventions in order to attain the source of ethical thinking somewhere in the past. But if we think that
ethics is fundamentally motivated by social realm, and as such a consequence of social reality and not its cause, this step is probably necessary. Apart from usual interpretation of ethics as “first philosophy” (E. Lévinas) which is projected on others (neighbors), celebrated with them when shared (Orr, 2007: 64; Irigaray, 2004), my intention is to pose another perspective of this endeavor. It is somehow related with and build upon the well known phrase of golden rule, expressed for example also in already mentioned Augustine’s “Dilege et quod vis fac” (Hom. in Joh., 7, 8).

Ethics is a living thinking which grows immediately out of the consciousness that there is something stronger than I am, like environment (geographical conditions), sudden changes, anger and sadness, sexual characteristic, hunger and so on, but that I am not constrained to submit myself to them. On the contrary, I am invited somehow to enter in relation and to form ‘community’. These ‘forces’ are a fundamental reason that I can breath my own diversity. This horizontal duality which humans experience in the relation between man and woman, already explains that ethics as set of rules in an abstract sphere, like normative ethics, is already a tool which is whether used as a mean for controlling these forces or sold to those people who seek identity and autonomy. In the original ethical thinking, long before the humanity was divorced from nature, there has been no fear of the powers of nature.

Ethical thinking is also a memorization of how certain heritage was lost. The emergence of environmental ethic in the sixties of 20th century, which has its origins in the 18th century when the industrialization began, is characterized by that perception of loss of environmental concern. Characteristic for such an ethical thinking is also an immediate knowledge that the original state of nature (or “nature of state” in Nozick’s thinking, Nozick, 1974) was not submission to but love for nature. At the core of the ancient (traditional) ethical thinking is much more than romantic curiosity of what the nature is; it is an encouraging search for one’s own talents and skills which are then brought back to the community as a whole (Gwynne, 2010). In that sense ethical and religious thinking are very similar: both are seeking for self-awareness in front of powerful nature without being drown in self-delusion. Worse than wrong choice is, then, when someone leaves this confron-
tation by “deliberate evasion of personal responsibility”, by “denial of involvement, through the simplicity of what is the most human brutal ac: thoughtlessness” (Orr, 2007: 139).

How to define, then, ethical thinking? It is more than usual to think that ethics might be a fruit of culture or religion, like its derivative. It is at least more comfortable to think there is (could be) someone who is going ahead like a teacher, sure in his/her knowledge/decisions, every time with necessary information about right and wrong. This kind of ethics is about social acceptability and holds certain cohesive power. On the other side, throughout the modern society, the rational and high intellectual ethics prevail, though it fails to clarify simplest moral codes, like ‘Golden Rule’. This ethical thinking often rejects social conventions, but it has no motivation to forge a new utopia or to break new ground. The defenders of secular ethics are rather focused on inner structure of ethical repertoire than on its realization in the concrete community.

I am not asking for ethics as guidance or as notion of authority, though the inspiration of an immediate ethical consideration is doubtless also practical. I am focused on the autonomy of individual person with his/her strait connection to his/her family, ethnic group, heritage, landscape, and so on (1) who takes responsibility and feels being empowered, (2) engages him/herself with the world and values community, (3) trusts that life is a fundamental good which holds an inherent meaning in itself, (4) appreciates polarities of life, (5) tends to hospitality and (6) is honest to the others and the world (cf. Orr, 2007: 104). But, to repeat, there is no submission to it as an authoritative assessment. From the perspective of interconnectedness with natural environment, there is no separation as from the world as a whole as from its details. The understanding of natural environment holds both knowledge and behaving.

Though everything is in constant move and struggle, the basic ethical notion is not pessimistic. By the side of the fact that cohesive force of ethical thinking belongs to inherent forces of violence, it leads to a clearer understanding of life through generosity and compassion. Generosity and especially hospitality establish the frame of relations and ease pressure when it comes to the potential danger.

Among many characteristic traits of ethical thinking, such as honor, expressivity through body language (especially through the face), cour-
age (Antigone), generosity, hospitality, judgment, awareness of limited life, and of death, one of the most important is freedom. With regard to our theme of animal ethic, freedom is in many ways its defining element. I would underline one of its characteristics represented in Orr’s traits of natural ethics (Orr, 2007: 135–7). E. R. Orr sees in a freedom both a story as well as seeking of the story of personal relationship. Freedom as a story is an expression of fundamental ethical thinking as not being submitted to the forces of (human) nature. Freedom is therefore a seeking of the whole story of the other person besides me. In that sense, freedom is the opposite of a universal law, but not in opposition with it. While the universal law is often irrelevant in one’s ethical knowledge and its personal story, it is universal when freedom becomes a task. The task is on the side of the observers. His/her task of freedom is that they seek the story and accept bad behavior as a natural part of it. Creative is the freedom which is capable to see the nature as a whole so that also the observer takes part of that wholeness. The practical question how to work with destructive forces which produce violence is therefore not to avoid them but to look for the whole story and to express the generosity of listening to the persons (people) who stumble through the life, and then to act (Arendt, 1998).

This expression of reverence for nature’s forces without being submitted to them deserves a special attention in an ethics which attempts human transformation. This insight is important to the humanities if they will take part in the design of animal ethic capable to enact vivid awareness of a wider community of living. “The conscious realization of the sense of relatedness and the development of the more impartial sense of warmth are encouraged in the mindfulness/awareness tradition by various contemplative practices such as the generation of loving-kindness. It is said that the full realization of groundlessness (sunyata) cannot occur if there is no warmth” (Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 1991: 249–250). The point is not that there is no need of normative ethics, but that such rules might be sterile if they were not informed by the wisdom of immediate responsiveness.

If we turn back to the ‘golden rule’, the ethical concern about the consequences of ethical knowledge as well as actions, the responsive freedom, is possible, with Maturana’s words, “only in the domain of love as
we live as languaging being” (Maturana and Verden-Zöller, 2008: 80). Humberto Maturana and Gerda Verden-Zöller include language as a manner of ethical thinking among humans in their living together. They understand language as the primary ability of ethical thinking, of ethical concern, to see the other as legitimate other also beyond human community. “Ethics is a particular kind of conversation, a reflexive conversation of seeing and care for the consequences of one’s actions on others” (Maturana and Verden-Zöller, 2008: 81).

Ethics and the birth of patriarchy

The verbalized (normative) ethics was, in fact, the first attempt to assess not-codified prohibitions, punishments and compensations which emerged at the border between humans and their environment. My intention here is to question if this phenomenon between humans and their environment was the cause or the consequence of emerging of patriarchal system, that is, of conflicts and tensions within the family. Bronislaw Malinowski (2001), the father of social anthropology, supposes in his observation that patriarchy is not necessarily bound with ‘father’ and not even with Freud’s assertions that Oedipus complex is universal. The role of father (or some other ‘individual’ in the family) rested in a certain comfort and protection against the possible intruders from outside. Though Malinowski shows, against Freud, that patriarchy has nothing to do with psychoanalytic drama of unconscious level, his observation demonstrates that primitive society with its combating mimetic rivalry ‘discovered’ the fundamental characteristic of interconnectedness between humans either within human society or beyond the family’s frame. The father does not represent the ideal within the family where the mother took over the cultural line (Girard, 1979: 186–7).

This splitting of the family from within represents an evolutionary level of social and cultural development in which humans (father, mother, son) do not only belong to the same lineage but also live as individuals. Though we do not leave behind that socio-anthropological view, this development caused the more or less arbitrary differentiation of functions which have less and less junctures.
Maturana’s interpretation of patriarchy represents a very interesting joining to this problematic (Maturana and Verden-Zöller, 2008: 87–94). He argues, together with Gerda Verden-Zöller, that patriarchy represents a kind of regression in the evolutionary process of conservation of manner of living together. The experience with children after the Second World War convinced G. Verden-Zöller that this period of modern history repeated one of the most significant insights about what manner of living together would be able to be conserved and what not. In her affirmation of the importance of child-mother relation is also evident that where this emotional dynamic lacks the manner of living is not able to be conserved. The emotioning between mother and child which is operational fundament for the whole life of each individual person was radically broached through the mere normative pattern of life from outside. With other words, the patriarchy represents a pattern of living which is not based on loving relation between mother and child, and therefore a lineage which has no power of its own to be conserved as a manner of living. This is not only the assertion about human’s capacity to accommodate or to change life in different environments but also the statement as far to life as organizational principle which might be translated with ‘love’. Though only humans experience love in conversations which is the core of so called narrative ethics, love is the only principle in which processes of acting and knowing coincide completely.

Why it is important in our case? The rather accentuated normativity which is narrowly linked to patriarchy is the point of departure to our linkage between (animal) ethic and patriarchy. In patriarchy, to much focus has been spent on increasing confidence in our plans and will and in our grasping mind, and not enough, if at all, in our relationship with nonhuman nature. Without significant commitment to the study of how stricter (ethical) commandments emerged we will still have problems with connections between ethics as abstraction of certain rules and (un)ethical behavior. Animal ethic is an example, perhaps not the most convenient, that human beings exist in conversations so that the language (and cognition) represents a relational space beyond material dynamics that make them possible.

In order that such a change would be also a cultural one the basic (biological) relation should be conserved. As we have already seen, the
change to patriarchy cancelled the relational dimension with and within the environment. Patriarchal culture consists in a manner of living centered in appropriation, domination and submission, mistrust and control, sexual and racial discrimination, fear and war. In order to understand that change which occurred in the basic human pattern of mother-child-relation, the step from patriarchy to political manner of living should be considered. Meanwhile the coexistence is more and more tensed, the political manner of living is one of the typical traits of patriarchy. It is enough to expose two characteristics of these types of relations: instrumentality and exposure in the open space (Plato’s *chôra*). There are many other but these two suffice in our case. The political manner of living is namely not able to provide constitutive elements for further development of humanity which is based on mutual trust and love. With other words, the patriarchy as a manner of living uses aggression and mistrust as ‘cultural tools’ in order to conserve advantages gained by them. This style of living suggests diverse anomalies already indicated above. As Maturana suggests, this manner of living does not happen in a closed network of conversations (Maturana and Verden-Zöller, 2008: 88). It must use parasitic methods.

This gap in the network of relations removes language from emotions more and more. The words used in conversations are more and more distant from identities of those who speak. In these circumstances the language is becoming a pattern of manipulation and control.

This radical change of pattern of living together announced the geological period called anthropocene. Its consequences are enormous and may be perceived in geological terms. Many cultural and religious traditions describe this ‘event’ directly or indirectly with manner of living which is characterized with justifying of such a living as well as with search of biological conditions which might justify human’s demanding manner of living (Maturana and Verden-Zöller, 1993). Though this cultural change proved as very successful, compared with the matristic manner of living, this scenario had also different aspects of non-intended dynamic. One of these aspects is also the ‘normativity’ in ethics which is probably comparable with ‘wooden iron’.

Ethical codification is at the same time the consequence of that change of manner of living as well as one of the methods which might
assure the conservation of this change of living. In one supposed scenar-
io, H. Maturana tries to describe how this could happen. The original
coeexistence between animals (wolfs) and humans where they fed to-
gether on the same herd humans (men) begun to interfere with the free
access of the wolves to the animals of the herd that were their natural
food. As men excluded wolves from the herd, they violated the natural
and legitimate coexistence of life. The main question was how the men
told it to the members of their family when they came back home. They
supposedly transmitted this information in the form of norm (prohi-
bition of any contact with wolves which are no more members of ex-
tended family). Three main characteristics of the standardized cohab-
itation emerged: appropriation of property, planning of the future (of
the family), and the fear. The fear is probably generated already within
the family, because men did not tell all the truth about why they inter-
fered with wolves’ free access to the animals. The fear is certainly also
generated outside the family in the wider environment. But the fact that
mother and children had to live and grove with that not explained norm
why they should avoid ‘excluded animals’ generated certain mentality
and behavior which began to restrict the mobility of both humans and
wolves. This mentality supposedly generated typical aggressive behavior
which characterizes the new pattern of living, the patriarchy.

Though we imagine that animal ethic might clarify relations between
human and animal’s world, we eventually have to consider that such
a legitimization does not touch our emotional sphere where enmity,
mistrust, aggression, appropriation, slavery (etc.) prevail. As this man-
er of living became established, the domesticated animals grew under
the protection of humans, but they were not protected against human’s
new mentality. Almost all manners of animals’ abuse originates from
this drift of change of manner living. The whole patriarchal network
arose with all features. It makes no difference between sexes when the
manner of living is questioned. The expression “patriarchal” is not to be
associated with men only. In these circumstances we can only confirm
that human morality is often overtly and primarily based on the simple
need to avoid potentially violent conflict, and not a mirror of matristic
communities which were almost completely destroyed.
Ethics and evolution

It is quite remarkable that today evolutionary proposals for the study of biological origins of ethical thinking and morality are as manifold as profoundly inspirational (Clayton and Schloss, 2004; Murphy and Schloss, 2008). Though early studies saw evolutionary theory as a shifting tool for any engagement in this regard, so that evolutionary ethics resembled to squaring the circle – partly because of the opposition between evolutionary theory and religious (Christian) interpretations of the phenomenon of life – later comments were becoming more and more favorable to philosophical framing of this relation. The partial reason thereof lies in the emergence of cybernetics (N. Wiener, H. von Foerster, W. McCulloch and others) and later with manifold linkages between sciences through systems’ theories.

Meanwhile the metaethical sphere was partly unclothed because of its religious traits and claims of absoluteness of moral norms, another dimension of ethical thinking emerged: ethics as a memorized life. With other words: the evolution appeared as a condition, but not as essential for the living organization whereas it is essential for the historical transformation of cognitive domains of the living systems in their environments (Maturana and Varela, 1980: 11–14). Changes within living systems occur continually; they are not limited to the moment of transmission of life which is the only moment the evolutionary theory has in its disposal in interfering or in interpreting changes; on the contrary, changes are cognitive interactions. This linkage between life’s process and cognition – life as organizational principle – is typical for Maturana’s and Varela’s theoretical work in the biology of cognition. Though the evolution allowed statements as if in the life process was no need for any inherent ethical norm, it also showed that such statements did not consider the fact that the biology rendered possible multilayered joining. The simplest processes of life behave as if there were rules similar to ‘awareness’ that something important is happening.

Nevertheless, in order to demonstrate it we might consider that an interpretation of such awareness is hardly viable. It is also not the point. We would only set the mirror to the ethical thinking, while we state that ineffectiveness of a particular ethic, like animal ethic, reflects the
fact that ethical behaviors, in our perceptions, are not linked to ethical knowledge. Ethics (and morality) do not speak only about behavior but also about knowledge and awareness. This supposition which connects interactive unity of rationality and embodiment enables a wider view on what happens in life. Though human ethical behavior and thinking has a degree of complexity which is unique especially in its codification, the narratives humans have construed around their ethical awareness speak about their unique dignity only if they express through it the whole heritage of life as deeply cooperative (social) interactions.

The issue of ethical realism as relationship between cognition and morality which ‘work’ is as difficult as instructive about the metaphysical domain of morality. There is no need to leave behind notions on moral/ethical reality as something normative when we might follow the way where ethics means promotion of life from within. The metaphysical construction we call ethics maybe has begun as a program of bio-regulation. “The embryo of ethical behaviors /…/ includes all the nonconscious, automated mechanisms that provide metabolic regulation; drives and motivations, emotions of diverse kinds; and feelings. Most importantly, the situations that evoke these emotions and feelings call for solutions that include cooperation. It is not difficult to imagine the emergence of justice and honor out of the practices of cooperation” (Damasio, 2003: 162).

The tension between normative ethics and its application constitute an insoluble situation as long as it turns out clearly that this situation is a consequence that normativity was written for ‘others’. The emergence of nonadaptive behavior which was mentioned above is an “imposition upon recalcitrant human biology, not as an emergent fulfillment of it” (Murphy and Schloss, 2008: 551).

Evolutionary history tells both stories: as this of continuous interactions between individual and the environment which answers the question why individual life is not only the manifestation of its genes, as this of the organization of living which defines the system capable of maintaining structural junctions. Though the question whether evolutionary theory has anything to say about ethics traditionally points out rather oppositional statements without any reference to state of nature, the other side underlines the necessity of a new language which might
help us to connect both organizational principle and structure(s). “[E] lucidating biological mechanisms underlying ethical behaviors does not mean that those mechanisms or their dysfunction are the guaranteed cause of a certain behavior. They may be determinative, but not necessarily determinative. The system is so complex and multilayered that it operates with some degree of freedom” (Damasio, 2003: 164). Antonio Damasio is one of the visible representatives of neurobiology who believes that scientific theories have to go beyond dualism which separates what originally belongs together and to develop methods which could see ethical thinking even within evolutionary theory as the most wonderful and the most useful side effect of all other activities which genes enable in each individual living structure.

The hypothesis that evolution and ethics in some sense mirror each other takes nothing away from moral philosophy where ethics as such came from. On the contrary, the grounding role of feelings and emotions as life-monitoring functions play a critical part in the current development of cultural and technological tools which should help us to attain appropriate access to the circular relation between perception and cognition. “We certainly cannot dispense with any part of the gene-given innate apparatus of behavior. Yet it is apparent that, as human societies became more complex and certainly for the ten thousand or more years since agriculture was developed, human survival and well-being depended on an additional kind of nonautomated governance in a social and cultural space” (Damasio, 2003: 167).

This dimension of ethics expresses, in poetic manner, that it as living attendance of what is happening on the level of embodiment connects exceedingly complex environments with deliberation and formal instruments of culture. Compassion is in this regard the consequence of ethical thinking, but the body (embodiment) has been doing something so that the compassion on another level provoked emotions and feelings characteristic for compassion as a consequence. The decisive difference between such comprehension of ethical thinking, which includes embodied structure, and mere moral philosophy is that in the case which includes complexity we are speaking of ways and there of goals. The advantage of a wider perspective is that these two dimensions commonly expressed as “goals and means” are not flawed. Meanwhile
the automated devices are working on ways, the non-automated devices work on goals. We must touch this question whether the negotiating position is so demanding: feelings essentially maintain those goals the cultural reflection considers worthy of perfecting. Though feelings and emotions negotiate with means (ways) they have to meet non-automated devices and somehow help that goals do not clash with basic regulations of life.

Defining ethical choice

Animal ethic is human ethic as far as we are choosing the conception of human as ethical animal (Blackburn, 2001). Though we define/articulate with ethics what is acceptable in terms of behavior, the ethical choice is profoundly personal standpoint. We are choosing with it what we are, what we think and what we know. As for knowledge, ethics certainly represents it about the line between constructive and destructive; but ethic as knowledge is also an expression of our needs in terms of what we know about others in their conduct of their lives. With other words, ethical choice transforms aggregates (contact, feeling, discernment, intention, attention) in knowledge, realizing that these mental factors do not function as tools of reductionism or of abstract analysis of what we can have/reach (Varela, Thomson, and Rosch, 1991: 119–122). These elements are both causes and effects of awareness which result from this process of coming together.

The mention of patriarchy in this regard is a statement towards development of ethical thinking. The emergence of this manner of living is not an evolutionary but a separate cultural (artificial) one. Here, ethics is conceived as a surrogate, which might prevent something like violence, and not enable the change or the choice. So we are looking therefore for an ethical thinking associated with matristic manner of living. Maturana uses this term in order to demonstrate the difference between two manners of living, relating, emotioning. The term patriarchal “is not to be associated with men only; similarly the expression matristic is not to be associated only with women. In a patriarchal culture both men and women are patriarchal, and in a matristic culture both men and women are matristic. Matristic and patriarchal cultures are different manners of
emotioning; that is, different closed networks of conversations that are realized in each case by both men and women. Therefore, there is no basic contradiction between and men and women in a pastoral patriarchal or in a matristic culture, because in both cultures men and women grow homogeneously patriarchal or matristic. A basic contradiction arises between adult men and women when boys and girls are brought up to become members of different cultures at different moments of their upbringing, which is what we think happen in our Western patriarchal culture” (Maturana, and Verden-Zöller, 2008: 92).

This is a statement to a fairly long historical period of humanity in which human needs were transformed in patriarchal demands. Animal ethic as a distinctive concern for living beings outside human (ethical) community is a result of cultural hybridization in which two patterns have large difficulties in conversations. Meanwhile we are reminiscent of matristic milieu in early childhood we enter then growing up in a patriarchal and political adulthood. Animal ethic is an indicator of this inner opposition humans experience in different spheres in their life: between man and woman, between modern civilization and cultural transitions, between generations, between humans and animals, humans and environment, and so on. Each individual goes through these contradictions which strongly determine personal development of everyone. Whatever ethic there can be, it is only transitory because not founded on relations.

Political manner of life which immediately follows the patriarchy is founded on domination and submission, and on destroying the intimacy. Everything can become instrument of political manipulation, even the ethical thinking (Judt, 2012). Ethics in the rhetoric of politicians is frustrating because it leads to the utilization of human identity and all his/her relation as political and economic instruments. It makes almost impossible for a child to grow in the biology of love. He/she is already as child immersed in a manner of living which interferes with personal development of self-respect.

From a perspective of natural interconnectedness, ethical choice is projected onto others “and where that perspective is fuelled by the mystical experience that is a complete lack of separation, this understanding of truth can be an extremely potent premise of morality. /.../ However, where the understanding of nature’s web is still theoretical, holding to
a notion of truth for morality brings a catalogue of problem, individual truths and needs rising like autumn mist” (Orr, 2007: 105). Morality identifies our affiliation to community while ethics is shaping personal identity. But in both cases the circular structure of living patterns the binding link has to be founded in the experience of permanent self. This insight, already mentioned with the Golden Rule, by F. Varela also called “codependent arising” or “carmic causality” (Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 1991: 110.119–120) constitutes a description of psychological causality of how life process as a whole continues through time. This radical turn to the self-experience – which is not identical to the experience of the self – not only dismantles the problem of theoretical ethics which can in only moment interrupt the chain of codependent conditioning, but also motivates the developing of first-person accounts of explanatory gap between subjectivity and objectivity. Its entire issue is based on the assumption “that lived experience is irreducible, that is, that phenomenal data cannot be reduced or derived from the third-person perspective” (Varela and Shear, 1999: 4).

Crucial here is (1) if the whole community/society discusses and defines the frame of reference, and (2) if the ethical behavior follows belonging to the social group more than the quest for identity. When someone, or a group, can not agree with wider moral/ethical standards, but he is also not able to launch the change, his loyalty brings neither anything to the society not to the shared morality. It is perhaps interestingly that Augustine articulated his version of Golden Rule on the occasion of the baptism. The new-baptized chose new life. We can imagine that this new life was already set within boundaries of common sense, but the person decided, in a certain sense, to change his/her life as with respect to his/her own experience as with respect to the others. This ritual did probably mean the ultimate goal, the Aristotle’s telos, while the intended way was an ultimately good, entelecheia.

To conclude this section, we have at least to mention the role of reason in ethical choice. In a real choice, the reason can likely choose only what is morally acceptable, or not. Though I. Kant declared true morality is anchored in reason, it was rather his desire to separate freedom from desire. It is certainly true that Kant’s perception of ethical imperative postulates in some sense the existence of animal rights, but he prob-
ably could not agree with the meandering role of rational avoiding of the question itself what animal ethic is and what humans choose with it, or through it. On the other side, moral philosophy has for centuries dedicated efforts in order to prove that there was universal morality as through time as through the globe. Though moral codes have been multiplied and the consideration of anything other than universality was held as illogical, this particular perspective lacks of necessary involvement of first-person consciousness of present-time. This dimension of time which is completely absent in universal morality has its base in biological elementary events called experience. “The first scale is emotions: the awareness of a tonal shift that is constitutive of the living present. The second is affect, a dispositional trend proper to a coherent sequence of embodied actions. Finally mood, the scale of narrative description over more or less long duration” (Varela, 1999: 132). It is the reason why it is said that ethical judgment is chronically in retard.

Conclusion

The discovery of mirror neurons in the nineties of 20th century (Giaccomo Rizzolati with his colleagues at the University of Parma) triggered a very vivid scientific research of human and animal face- and body-expressions as well as capacities of imitations and spontaneity in compassionate behavior. This denomination of multilayered connections within the body as well as within the relational environment was an important step in surpassing the dualistic pattern of thinking. This “as-if body loop hypothesis” (Damasio, 2010: 102) supposes that the network which we have talked about exists. We have in a certain sense to reconsider our analysis of ethical thinking under the viewpoint of the circulation between external (rational, metaphysical, normative, neutral) and experiential (emotional, embodied, narrative, non-neutral respectively conscious of the present time) world. If the neural system is capable to simulate someone else’s body state, that is ‘to play the ape’ (literarily in the case of G. Rizzolatti), he/she is then able to simulate its own body and to reinforce the operation and narratives as well. It is a hypothesis that the mirror-neurons may be engaging emotions – or may be emotions. Anyhow, a set of possible explanations of what is going on in this
theatre of life allows us to understand actions of others by placing ourselves in a comparable body state. We can witness an action in another not only passively by not agreeing but also actively in pre-activation of living structures ready for action. I do not know if this scientific adventure in human’s complexity will create linkages to ethical thinking with enough rapid activation of all important body states, which are associated with relevant knowledge, as well as cognitive strategies.

To say at the end, I have used the hypothesis of *as-if body loop* as a metaphor, partly to indicate the need not to mingle composite living systems with social phenomena, partly with intention to indicate that central feature of human existence is language which characterizes the inner organization of social realm. The language configures relations which constitute both structures and its manner of living. Both arises codependent: the existence of conversation (languaging) can not constitute humanness by itself, the bodyhood dynamics is also necessary. Though it is not enough to be born as *homo sapiens* to be able to conserve that which makes human as human, the body also conserves the changes essential for the conservation of *homo sapiens-amans* (Maturana).

From the viewpoint of animal ethic, the choice humans make in front of animals or in front of life-world as such represents the realization of a particular part of social relations. At the same time, they validate that choice itself as well as the world which is co-originated thereof if they are partner of living. According to the present ethical discussion, the fundamental ethical problem is how to *justify* that any relation requires certain surrender of autonomy and individuality. But it ceases to be so because we can realize at any moment that the change could not be conserved if the relation would be only cosmetic. Nevertheless the social creativity as generation of novelty, which animal ethic certainly is, entails interactions/operations outside the society we know today and generates conducts (and knowledge) which might change its defining relations. It is to say that animal ethic would whether change defining relations within society or separate from it those who, as observers of the society, do not have any more the possibility to operate inside the society.
Ethical interactions are certainly not only confirmatory, but, depending from the degree of structural coupling, they are also confirmatory. This statement that ethics should stabilize human conduct and eventually prevent outburst of violence is generally known. This kind of ethics only restricts interactions the individual has within or outside the society. Animal ethic speaks of another kind of conduct: while it requires ethical choice, it is not spontaneous. We know well that it is not equally desirable and that it comes out as antisocial. Though this situation may obstruct every constructive change, any ethical thinking, and especially animal ethic, creates some experiences which can not be fully specified within society. It does not destroy established consentaneity about what is social and what not, but allow to each member of society to be integral part of it as well as its critical observer.

Bibliography

ABSTRACTS

Nadja Furlan Štante

Biotic Interdependence: From the Perspective of Ecofeminist Theology

This paper is concerned both with stereotypical religion-determined (focus on Christianity) pattern of femininity and masculinity and it also examines the perception of nature and of man-nature relationship, which is deeply marked by the collective memory of man’s domination over nature. The stereotype of man’s superiority in relation to nature remains deeply rooted in the collective consciousness especially in western societies. In this segment the positive contribution of Christian theological eco-feminism is of utmost importance, as it discloses and breaks down the prejudice of the model of human superiority over nature by means of a critical historical overview of individual religious traditions.

The paper is organized in two parts. It opens with a conceptual outline of negative impact of stereotypical religion-determined pattern of femininity and masculinity and of the man-nature relationship which is deeply marked by the collective memory of man’s domination over nature. The paper then moves on to consider the question of the individual’s identity in the context of theological ecofeminism, which is faced with the model of fundamental interconnection of all beings in the web of life. The centerpiece here is the awareness of the fundamental interconnectedness, of the consequent interdependence and joint responsibility in the ethical-moral sense which therefore represents the next step in the evolution of interpersonal relationships.

Emily A. Holmes

Ecofeminist Christology, Incarnation, and the Spirituality and Ethics of Eating

This article addresses the ways in which an ecofeminist Christology might anchor a theology of sustainable and ethical eating practices through the doctrine of the incarnation, the Christian belief that God became enfleshed in the person of Jesus Christ. In recent decades, feminist theologians have critiqued the traditional anthropocentric and androcentric assumptions of Christology and recovered submerged strands of the tradition, such as the cosmic Christ and the immanence of Wisdom/Sophia in creation, that might better speak to contemporary environmental and feminist concerns. Engaging the ecofeminist theology of Sallie McFague and Rosemary Radford Ruether along with Elizabeth Johnson, I suggest
that although the doctrine of the incarnation has been problematic for Christian views of women and the natural world, it must be central to any ecofeminist Christology and in fact is richly suggestive for rethinking Christian attitudes toward food and eating in particular in an era of environmental crisis and growing ecological awareness.

Mădălina Diaconu

*Diversity as a moral imperative and aesthetic value*

Since the rise of the conservation biology in the 1980s and the first steps to an alliance between natural and social scientists under the banner of the biocultural diversity in the 1990s, diversity has been considered an indisputable value and its protection a “moral imperative” (D. Harmon). The paper emphasizes the implicit philosophical assumptions that underlie the empirical research on this topic, by focussing on the arguments in favour of preserving biodiversity, regarded either as an instrumental-anthropocentric or as an intrinsic-metaphysical value. Special attention will be paid to the aesthetic argument, which is usually misinterpreted in the debates on biodiversity as merely subjective and hedonistic.

Paul Haught

*Place, Narrative, and Virtue*

This essay reexamines Holmes Rolston’s evocative notion of “storied residence” and evaluates it for its fitness for environmental virtue ethics. Environmental virtue ethics (or EVE) continues to garner attention among environmental philosophers, and recently Brian Treaanor has argued for the indispensability of narrative approaches as part of that discourse. In this paper, I endorse this indispensability thesis generally, but I argue that narrative environmental virtue ethics must be supplemented either by “storied residence” or a similar environmentally, scientifically, culturally, and historically rich concept of narrative. Rolston himself has criticized environmental virtue ethics for being too agent-centered. Fortunately, an adequate sense of storied-residence is precisely what is needed to avoid triggering the vicious anthropocentrism that concerns Rolston. More concretely, storied-residence makes place(s) central to environmental virtue ethics by giving expression to features of the more-than-human world that often become secondary considerations to agency in accounts of environmental virtue.
Evelyn Schulz

*Japan, March 11, 2011, and its aftermath: Reflections on issues of environmental ethics and society*

Soon after the earthquake and the tsunami had devastated Japan’s northeastern coastal area on March 11, 2011, attention began to focus on the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Until now the situation is far from being under control. A stream of unsettling news and threatening projections of future developments has led to fierce debates about the pros and cons of nuclear energy. Indications are growing that Fukushima will come to symbolize the farewell to the civil use of nuclear energy at least in Germany. In Japan the anti-nuclear movement gears up. The global debate on nuclear power has gained new momentum in the midst of the Fukushima nuclear crisis. The nuclear disaster in Fukushima with its unpredictable and incalculable consequences for coming generations raises many questions concerning environmental ethics and society. As the situation in Fukushima is changing rapidly and so do related discourses and debates, this article can only provide brief insights into selected topics. Given the abundance of important and weighty subjects relating to the Fukushima disaster, I intend to address issues, which are of particular interest for me as being a researcher of modern Japan with a focus on urban cultural and literary studies.

Vojko Strahovnik

*The Difficulty of Animal Question*

The paper deals with several different approaches to animal question. The debate is framed around J. M. Coetzee’s book *The Lives of Animals* because it offers very complex, inclusive, dialogical, and subtle insights into the subject. The paper discusses two contrasting responses to Coetzee’s work. The first response is represented by the more traditional approaches to animal question, which are based on the rejection of speciesism and framing of key issues in terms of interests or rights of animals with an aim to improve how we currently treat them in many of our practices. The second, contrasting response is more radical in its understanding of Coetzee’s book and points out the animal question is primarily also a question about us, human animals and seriously reflects difficulty or powerlessness of arguments or philosophy itself regarding the animal question.

*Keywords: non-human animals, animal question, suffering, interests, rights, companionship.*
Abstract: As a opposition to the idea of the mind as a mirror of nature which reflect the hyper-rationality of the Enlightenment, the ethical mirror in this paper is used in a metaphorical way, partly motivated by the discovery of mirror neurons. As these neurons are candidates for being actors of spontaneous compassionate behavior, so will animal ethic define the starting point of the present discussion on multilayered connections of humans within the life-world. The paper attempts to surpass the dualistic pattern of thinking which separates humans from their intimate relation with life, and to introduce it as a network and as a source of ethical knowledge. From the viewpoint of the present-time consciousness, ethical thinking will be reconsidered. This temporal dimension of ethical thinking especially in marginalized ethical patterns witnesses for responsiveness as the most important knot in the network of interrelatedness. The proposal of ethics of mindful awareness is an alternative pattern of thinking and probably a genuine step for enlarging present cultural horizon.

Keywords: animal ethic, ethical thinking, ethical knowledge, patriarchy, language, evolution, ethical choice.
POVZETKI

Nadja Furlan Štante
Biotisksa soodvisnost: iz perspektive teološkega ekofeminizma

Prispevek obravnava stereotipno religijsko (s poudarkom na krščanstvu) določenost femininosti in maskulinosti ter razumevanje odnosa med človekom in naravo, ki je globoko zaznamovan s kolektivnim spominom človekove dominacije nad naravo.

Stereotip človekove superiornosti nad naravo je vsekakor močno navzoč in zakoreninjen v zahodni kulturi. V tem segmentu je v prispevku izpostavljen pozitiven doprinos krščanskega teološkega ekofeminizma, ki s pomočjo kritične analize pregleduje zgodovinske okvire določenih religijskih tradicij (krščanstva) ter s kritičnim pregledom razbija negativne stereotipe in predsodke vezane na človekovo superiornost v odnosu do narave.

Glavni poudarek pričujočega prispevka je tematiziranje zavedanja fundamentalne medsebojne povezanosti in soodvisnosti ter vzajemne soodgovornosti ljudi v odnosu do narave, v etično-moralnem smislu, kar posledično predstavlja naslednji korak v evoluciji odnosov (medčloveških, ter med človekom in naravo).

Emily A. Holmes
Ekofeministična kristologija, utelešenje in duhovnost ter etika prehranjevanja

Ta prispevek se ukvarja z načini utemeljevanja teologije trajnostnih in etičnih prehranjevalnih praks skozi ekofeministično kristologijo in doktrino utelešenja, krščanskega prepričanja, da se je Bog utelesil v osebi Jezusa Kristusa. Feministični teologi so v zadnjih desetletjih kritizirali tradicionalne antropocentrične in androcentrične predpostavke kristologije ter s tem ponovno tematizirali ponikle veje tradicije, kot so kozmični Kristus in imanenca modrosti/Sophie v stvarstvu, ki bolj odgovarjajo sodobnim okoljskim in feminističnim problemom. S sklicevanjem na ekofeministično teologijo Sallie McFague in Rosemary Radford Ruether, skupaj z Elizabeth Johnson, zagovarjam stališče, da mora biti doktrina utelešenja, čeprav je bila v smislu krščanskih pogledov na ženske in naravni svet problematična, osrednja točka vsake ekofeministične kristologije in da lahko ponudi še posebej bogate sugestije za premislek krščanskih odnosov do hrane in prehranjevanja v dobi okoljske krize in naraščajoče okoljske ozaveščenosti.
Mădălina Diaconu

*Pestrost kot moralni imperativ in estetska vrednota*


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Paul Haught

*Kraj, naracija in vrlina*

Evelyn Schulz

Japonska, 11 marec 2011 in njegove posledice: refleksija o problemih okoljske etike in družbe


Vojko Strahovnik

Težavnost živalskega vprašanja

Prispevek se ukvarja z več različnimi pristopi k živalskemu vprašanju. Razprava je oblikovana na temelju knjige Življenja živali J. M. Coetzeeja, saj ta ponuja izjemno zapleten, vključujoč, dialoški in pretanjen vpogled v živalsko vprašanje. V prispevku sta izpostavljeni dve vrsti odziva na Coetzeejevo delo. Prvo predstavljajo bolj tradicionalni pristopi k živalskemu vprašanju, ki temeljijo na zavrtnitvi specizma in oblikovanju razprave v okviru interesov ali pravic ne-človeških živali, katerih cilj je prvenstveno v spremembi našega ravnjanja z njimi. Drugi pristop je skrajnejši v razumevanju bistva Coetzeejevega dela, ki ga razume kot prvenstveno vprašanje o nas samih, človeških živali ter na ta način tudi odseva nemoč argumentov in filozofije glede samega živalskega vprašanja.

Ključne besede: nečloveške živali, živalsko vprašanje, trpljenje, interesi, pravice, družabništvo.
Etično zrcalo v razpravi je vzeto v metaforičnem smislu, in sicer kot nasprotje ideji o zavesti kot zrcalu narave, ki odseva hiperracionalnost razsvetljenstva. Rabo metafore je deloma motiviralo tudi odkritje zrcalnih nevronov. Podobno kot so bili ti nevroni kandidati avtorstva spontanega sočutnega obnašanja, bodo tudi etiko živali pomagali opredeliti kot štartno pozicijo današnje razprave o mnogoplastnih povezavah človeškega sveta s svetom življenja. Razprava si prizadeva preseči dualistični miselni vzorec, ki ločuje ljudi od njihovih intimnih vezi z življenjem, in uvesti mrežni vzorec kot vir etičnega znanja. Z vidika zavedanja sedanjega časa bo ponovno preverjeno etično razmišljanje. Časovna razsežnost etičnega razmišljanja, posebno v marginaliziranih etičnih vzorcih, je priča odzivnosti kot najpomembnejšemu vozlišču v mreži medsebojnih povezav. Predlog etike zavestne pozornosti je alternativni miselni vzorec in najbrž verodostojen korak k razširitvi današnjega kulturnega obzorja.

Ključne besede: etika živali, etično razmišljanje, etično spoznanje, patriarhalnost, jezik, evolucija, etična izbira.
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